- Constructivism in Ethics.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Moral Worth, Supererogation, and the Justifying/Requiring Distinction.Joshua Gert - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (4):611-618.details
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Constructivism and the Error Theory.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2011 - In Christian Miller (ed.), Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum.details
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Internalism and Hyperexternalism About Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (1):15-34.details
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Anti-paternalism and Invalidation of Reasons.Kalle Grill - 2010 - Public Reason 2 (2):3-20.details
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The Standard-Relational Theory of 'Ought' and the Oughtistic Theory of Reasons.Daan Evers - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):131-147.details
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Parity, incomparability and rationally justified choice.Martijn Boot - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):75 - 92.details
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Imperfect Reasons and Rational Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2012 - Noûs 46 (1):24 - 60.details
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The Relation Between Moral Reasons and Moral Requirement.Brendan de Kenessey - 2023 - Erkenntnis.details
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Even More Supererogatory.Holly M. Smith - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):1-20.details
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Überforderungseinwände in der Ethik.Lukas Naegeli - 2022 - Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter.details
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Parity, moral options, and the weights of reasons.Chris Tucker - 2022 - Noûs 57 (2):454-480.details
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A Holist Balance Scale.Chris Tucker - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (3):533-553.details
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Reasons, normativity, and value in aesthetics.Alex King - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 17 (1):1-17.details
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Too far beyond the call of duty: moral rationalism and weighing reasons.Chris Tucker - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):2029-2052.details
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There Are No Purely Aesthetic Obligations.John Dyck - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):592-612.details
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Supererogation and Conditional Obligation.Daniel Muñoz & Theron Pummer - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1429–1443.details
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Weighing Reasons Against.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.details
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Exploitation and Effective Altruism.Daniel Muñoz - 2021 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 20 (4):409-423.details
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The dual scale model of weighing reasons.Chris Tucker - 2021 - Noûs 56 (2):366-392.details
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From rights to prerogatives.Daniel Muñoz - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):608-623.details
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Three Paradoxes of Supererogation.Daniel Muñoz - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):699-716.details
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The Moral Worth of Intentional Actions.Laura Tomlinson - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):704-723.details
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What We Owe to Ourselves: Essays on Rights and Supererogation.Daniel Muñoz - 2019 - Dissertation, MITdetails
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Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons.Caj Sixten Strandberg - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):69-100.details
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Against Elective Forgiveness.Per-Erik Milam - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):569-584.details
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Transitivity, Moral Latitude, and Supererogation.Douglas W. Portmore - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (3):286-298.details
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Right in some respects: reasons as evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2191-2208.details
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(1 other version)Making room for options: Moral reasons, imperfect duties, and choice: Patricia Greenspan.Patricia Greenspan - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):181-205.details
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The buck passing account of value: assessing the negative thesis.Philip Stratton-Lake - unknowndetails
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Harm, Benefit, and Non-Identity.Per Algander - 2013 - Dissertation, Uppsala Universitydetails
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Conflicting reasons, unconflicting ‘ought’s.Shyam Nair - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):629-663.details
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(1 other version)Moral reasons and rational status.Joshua Gert - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 171-196.details
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The All or Nothing Ranking Reversal and the Unity of Morality.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.details
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Suspension of Judgement: Fittingness, Reasons, and Permissivism.Michael Vollmer - 2023 - Episteme:1-16.details
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Formalizing Reasons, Oughts, and Requirements.Robert Mullins - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:568-599.details
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The knowledge norm of assertion: keep it simple.Max Lewis - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12963-12984.details
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Duty and Doubt.Seth Lazar - 2020 - Journal of Practical Ethics 8 (1):28-55.details
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Reasons, Competition, and Latitude.Justin Snedegar - 2021 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 16. Oxford University Press.details
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Reasons and Normativity.Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2019 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
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Moral Status and Agent-Centred Options.Seth Lazar - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (1):83-105.details
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Accommodating Options.Seth Lazar - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):233-255.details
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Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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A Theory of Epistemic Supererogation.Han Li - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (2):349-367.details
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Understanding standing: permission to deflect reasons.Ori J. Herstein - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):3109-3132.details
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How to think about satisficing.Chris Tucker - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1365-1384.details
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Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?Douglas W. Portmore - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):369-388.details
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Normative metaphysics for accountants.Barry Maguire & Justin Snedegar - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):363-384.details
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'Along an imperfectly-lighted path': practical rationality and normative uncertainty.Andrew Sepielli - unknowndetails
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Perform a Justified Option.Joshua Gert - 2014 - Utilitas 26 (2):206-217.details
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