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  1. An Introduction to Non-classical Logic. [REVIEW]Stewart Shapiro - 2003 - Review of Metaphysics 56 (3):670-671.
    This book is just what its title says: an introduction to nonclassical logic. And it is a very good one. Given the extensive interest in nonclassical logics, in various parts of the philosophical scene, it is a welcome addition to the corpus. Typical courses in logic, at all levels and in both philosophy departments and mathematics departments, focus exclusively on classical logic. Most instructors, and some textbooks, give some mention to some nonclassical systems, but usually few details are provided.
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  • (1 other version)An Infinitist Account of Doxastic Justification.John Turri - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (2):209-218.
    Any satisfactory epistemology must account for the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. Can infinitism account for it? Proposals to date have been unsatisfactory. This paper advances a new infinitist account of the distinction. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 sets the stage. Section 2 presents Peter Klein's account. Section 3 raises a problem for Klein's account and suggests an improvement. Section 4 raises a further challenge. Sections 5 to 7 consider several unsuccessful attempts to meet the challenge. Section (...)
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  • An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is.Graham Priest - 2008 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This revised and considerably expanded 2nd edition brings together a wide range of topics, including modal, tense, conditional, intuitionist, many-valued, paraconsistent, relevant, and fuzzy logics. Part 1, on propositional logic, is the old Introduction, but contains much new material. Part 2 is entirely new, and covers quantification and identity for all the logics in Part 1. The material is unified by the underlying theme of world semantics. All of the topics are explained clearly using devices such as tableau proofs, and (...)
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  • Reply to Ginet.Peter D. Klein - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell.
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  • Modest Infinitism.Jeremy Fantl - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):537 - 562.
    Modest Infinitism -/- Jeremy Fantl -/- Abstract -/- Infinitism, a theory of justification most recently developed and defended by Peter Klein, is the view that justification is a matter of having an infinite series of non-repeating reasons for a proposition. I argue that infinitism is preferable to other theories (like foundationalism) in that only infinitism can plausibly account for two important features of justification: 1) that it admits of degrees and 2) that a concept of complete justification makes sense.
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  • (1 other version)An infinitist account of doxastic justification.John Turri - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (2):209-218.
    Any satisfactory epistemology must account for the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. Can infinitism account for it? Proposals to date have been unsatisfactory. This paper advances a new infinitist account of the distinction. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 sets the stage. Section 2 presents Peter Klein's account. Section 3 raises a problem for Klein's account and suggests an improvement. Section 4 raises a further challenge. Sections 5 to 7 consider several unsuccessful attempts to meet the challenge. Section (...)
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  • On the regress argument for infinitism.John Turri - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):157 - 163.
    This paper critically evaluates the regress argument for infinitism. The dialectic is essentially this. Peter Klein argues that only an infinitist can, without being dogmatic, enhance the credibility of a questioned non-evident proposition. In response, I demonstrate that a foundationalist can do this equally well. Furthermore, I explain how foundationalism can provide for infinite chains of justification. I conclude that the regress argument for infinitism should not convince us.
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  • Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.
    Evidentialism is the thesis that epistemic justification for belief supervenes on evidential support. However, we claim there are cases in which, even though two subjects have the same evidential support for a proposition, only one of them is justified. What make the difference are pragmatic factors, factors having to do with our cares and concerns. Our argument against evidentialism is not based on intuitions about particular cases. Rather, we aim to provide a theoretical basis for rejecting evidentialism by defending a (...)
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  • An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic.Graham Priest - 2001 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (2):294-295.
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  • Introduction to Non-Classical Logic.Graham Priest - 2001 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This is the first introductory textbook on non-classical propositional logics.
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  • On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology.Matthew McGrath - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):558-589.
    We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic—that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth‐related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing to the role of knowledge‐citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by giving a (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Human knowledge and the infinite regress of reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:297-325.
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  • An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is.Graham Priest - 2008 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 14 (4):544-545.
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  • On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology.Matthew Mcgrath Jeremy Fantl - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):558-589.
    We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic—that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth‐related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing to the role of knowledge‐citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by giving a (...)
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  • (1 other version)An introduction to non-classical logic. [REVIEW]Petr Hájek - 2006 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (2):294-295.
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  • (2 other versions)Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):297-325.
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  • Infinitism is not the solution to the regress problem.Carl Ginet - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 140--149.
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