- Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):135-153.details
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(2 other versions)I.—A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address.John Austin - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57 (1):1-30.details
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Moral Intuitions: Are Philosophers Experts?Kevin Tobia, Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen Stich - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):629-638.details
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Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2015 - Cognition 141 (C):127-137.details
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Phenomenalism.Wilfrid Sellars - 1963 - In Robert Colodny, Science, Perception, and Reality. Humanities Press/Ridgeview. pp. 60-105.details
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The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Cognition 129 (2):279-291.details
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The Lesson of Bypassing.David Rose & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):599-619.details
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Excuse validation: a study in rule-breaking.John Turri & Peter Blouw - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):615-634.details
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(1 other version)Experimental moral philosophy.Mark Alfano, Don Loeb & Alex Plakias - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-32.details
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Philosophical Papers.Alice Ambrose, G. E. Moore & C. D. Broad - 1961 - Philosophical Review 70 (3):408.details
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Blame, not ability, impacts moral “ought” judgments for impossible actions: Toward an empirical refutation of “ought” implies “can”.Vladimir Chituc, Paul Henne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2016 - Cognition 150 (C):20-25.details
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The development of intent-based moral judgment.Fiery Cushman, Rachel Sheketoff, Sophie Wharton & Susan Carey - 2013 - Cognition 127 (1):6-21.details
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Ought, Can, and Presupposition: An Experimental Study.Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - Methode 4 (6):232-243.details
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Judgments of cause and blame: The effects of intentionality and foreseeability.David A. Lagnado & Shelley Channon - 2008 - Cognition 108 (3):754-770.details
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An Empirical Refutation of ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’.Paul Henne, Vladimir Chituc, Felipe De Brigard & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):283-290.details
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Vision, knowledge, and assertion.John Turri - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 41:41-49.details
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Deep trouble for the deep self.David Rose, Jonathan Livengood, Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):629 - 646.details
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At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology.Steve Guglielmo, Andrew E. Monroe & Bertram F. Malle - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):449-466.details
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Why we forgive what can’t be controlled.Justin W. Martin & Fiery Cushman - 2016 - Cognition 147 (C):133-143.details
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A utilitarian theory of excuses.Richard B. Brandt - 1969 - Philosophical Review 78 (3):337-361.details
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Investigating the Neural and Cognitive Basis of Moral Luck: It’s Not What You Do but What You Know. [REVIEW]Liane Young, Shaun Nichols & Rebecca Saxe - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):333-349.details
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