- Experimental philosophy and the method of cases.Joachim Horvath & Steffen Koch - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (1):e12716.details
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A (moderate) skill-based defense of the expertise defense.M. Hosein M. A. Khalaj - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Exploring the psychology of LLMs’ Moral and Legal Reasoning.Guilherme F. C. F. Almeida, José Luiz Nunes, Neele Engelmann, Alex Wiegmann & Marcelo de Araújo - forthcoming - Artificial Intelligence.details
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The Unreasonable Destructiveness of Political Correctness in Philosophy.Manuel Doria - 2017 - Philosophies 2 (3):17.details
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Against overgeneralisation objections to the argument from moral disagreement.Thomas Pölzler - 2020 - South African Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):261-273.details
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Mapping Cognitive Structure onto the Landscape of Philosophical Debate: an Empirical Framework with Relevance to Problems of Consciousness, Free will and Ethics.Jared P. Friedman & Anthony I. Jack - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):73-113.details
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On Second Thought: Reflections on the Reflection Defense.Markus Kneer, David Colaco, Joshua Alexander & Edouard Machery - 2021 - In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 4. New York: pp. 257–296.details
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Neo-Confucianism, experimental philosophy and the trouble with intuitive methods.Hagop Sarkissian - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (5):812-828.details
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Religious Beliefs and Philosophical Views: A Qualitative Study.Helen De Cruz - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):477-504.details
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Religious disagreement: An empirical study among academic philosophers.Helen De Cruz - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1).details
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Moral learning: Psychological and philosophical perspectives.Fiery Cushman, Victor Kumar & Peter Railton - 2017 - Cognition 167 (C):1-10.details
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Sacrificial utilitarian judgments do reflect concern for the greater good: Clarification via process dissociation and the judgments of philosophers.Paul Conway, Jacob Goldstein-Greenwood, David Polacek & Joshua D. Greene - 2018 - Cognition 179 (C):241-265.details
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Explanatory Judgment, Moral Offense and Value-Free Science.Matteo Colombo, Leandra Bucher & Yoel Inbar - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):743-763.details
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The Ethical Education and Perspectives of Chinese Engineering Students: A Preliminary Investigation and Recommendations.Rockwell F. Clancy - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (4):1935-1965.details
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Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism.Cory J. Clark, Bo M. Winegard & Roy F. Baumeister - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10:397001.details
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What Should we Believe About Free Will?Jeremy Byrd - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):505-522.details
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Thinking Off Your Feet: How Empirical Psychology Vindicates Armchair Philosophy, by Michael Strevens. [REVIEW]Wesley Buckwalter - 2021 - Mind 130 (517): 307–320.details
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In the Thick of Moral Motivation.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):433-453.details
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Philosophers on Philosophy: The 2020 PhilPapers Survey.David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (11).details
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Epistemic Authorities and Skilled Agents: A Pluralist Account of Moral Expertise.Federico Bina, Sofia Bonicalzi & Michel Croce - forthcoming - Topoi:1-13.details
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Can deliberation neutralise power?Samuel Bagg - 2018 - European Journal of Political Theory 17 (3):257-279.details
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Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions.James Andow - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):904-911.details
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Are Intuitions About Moral Relevance Susceptible to Framing Effects?James Andow - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):115-141.details
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Payment in challenge studies from an economics perspective.Sandro Ambuehl, Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (12):831-832.details
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The Challenges Involved with Going Negative.Joshua Alexander - 2017 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3):465-479.details
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Framing how we think about disagreement.Joshua Alexander, Diana Betz, Chad Gonnerman & John Philip Waterman - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2539-2566.details
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Does harm or disrespect make discrimination wrong? An experimental approach.Andreas Albertsen, Bjørn G. Hallsson, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen & Viki M. L. Pedersen - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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The Problem of Error: The Moral Psychology Argument for Atheism.John Jung Park - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):501-516.details
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Rationalization in Philosophical and Moral Thought.Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Ellis - 2017 - In Jean-François Bonnefon & Bastien Trémolière (eds.), Moral Inferences. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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A Guide to Thought Experiments in Epistemology.Wesley Buckwalter - forthcoming - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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The Epistemic Value of Speculative Fiction.Johan De Smedt & Helen De Cruz - 2015 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39 (1):58-77.details
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Moral Education Through the Fostering of Reasoning Skills.Kirsten Meyer - 2024 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 27 (1):41-55.details
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Religious Disagreement.Helen De Cruz - 2019 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.details
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VII-Internal and External Validity in Thought Experiments.James Wilson - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (2):127-152.details
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Philosophical Intuition Is the Capacity to Recognize one’s Epistemic Position. An Old-Fashion Approach Based on Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein, and Husserl.Konrad Werner - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1725-1751.details
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Experimental Explications for Conceptual Engineering.Samantha Wakil - 2021 - Erkenntnis:1-23.details
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Experimental Explications for Conceptual Engineering.Samantha Wakil - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1509-1531.details
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The Problem with Apu: Recognizing Moral Issues in Media Ethics.Bastiaan Vanacker - 2023 - Journal of Media Ethics 38 (4):255-266.details
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Pathways from inability to blamelessness in moral judgment.John Turri - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (6):777-792.details
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Philosophical Method and Intuitions as Assumptions.Kevin Patrick Tobia - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):575-594.details
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Intuitive Skill.Sebastian Sunday Grève - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (3):1677-1700.details
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Expert or Esoteric? Philosophers Attribute Knowledge Differently Than All Other Academics.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (7):e12850.details
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Why do ethicists eat their greens?Andrew Sneddon - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (7):902-923.details
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Philosophical Expertise and Philosophical Methodology.Hamid Seyedsayamdost - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (1-2):110-129.details
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Recent experimental work on “ought” implies “can”.Jen Semler & Paul Henne - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (9):e12619.details
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The moral behavior of ethics professors: A replication-extension in German-speaking countries.Philipp Schönegger & Johannes Wagner - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (4):532-559.details
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Philosophical Expertise Put to the Test.Samuel Schindler & Pierre Saint-Germier - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):592-608.details
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Carving Intuition at its Joints.Jason Schukraft - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (3):326-352.details
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How Stable are Moral Judgments?Paul Rehren & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1377-1403.details
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A plea for minimally biased naturalistic philosophy.Andrea Polonioli - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3841-3867.details
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