- Epistemic Authorities and Skilled Agents: A Pluralist Account of Moral Expertise.Federico Bina, Sofia Bonicalzi & Michel Croce - forthcoming - Topoi:1-13.details
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On Second Thought: Reflections on the Reflection Defense.Markus Kneer, David Colaco, Joshua Alexander & Edouard Machery - 2022 - In Tania Lombrozo, Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 257–296.details
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In Bello Proportionality: Philosophical Reflections on a Disturbing Empirical Study.Stephen de Wijze, Daniel Statman & Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan - 2022 - Journal of Military Ethics 21 (2):116-131.details
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A Guide to Thought Experiments in Epistemology.Wesley Buckwalter - 2024 - In Blake Roeber, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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The epistemology of thought experiments without exceptionalist ingredients.Paul O. Irikefe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-29.details
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Culture and Cognitive Science.Andreas De Block & Daniel Kelly - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Philosophers on Philosophy: The 2020 PhilPapers Survey.David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (11).details
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Moral Judgement and Moral Progress: The Problem of Cognitive Control.Michael Klenk & Hanno Sauer - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (7):938-961.details
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Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Stable Across both Demographic Groups and Situations.Joshua Knobe - 2021 - Filozofia Nauki 29 (2):11-76.details
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Against overgeneralisation objections to the argument from moral disagreement.Thomas Pölzler - 2020 - South African Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):261-273.details
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Moral Realism and Expert Disagreement.Prabhpal Singh - 2020 - Trames: A Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 24 (3):441-457.details
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Why do ethicists eat their greens?Andrew Sneddon - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (7):902-923.details
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The threat of the intuition-shaped hole.Ethan Landes - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (4):539-564.details
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The Unreliable Intuitions Objection Against Reflective Equilibrium.Norbert Paulo - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (3):333-353.details
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Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism.Cory J. Clark, Bo M. Winegard & Roy F. Baumeister - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10:397001.details
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Framing how we think about disagreement.Joshua Alexander, Diana Betz, Chad Gonnerman & John Philip Waterman - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2539-2566.details
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Religious Beliefs and Philosophical Views: A Qualitative Study.Helen De Cruz - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):477-504.details
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Religious Disagreement.Helen De Cruz - 2019 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.details
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The ‘Arguments Instead of Intuitions’ Account of Thought Experiments.Friderik Klampfer - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):191-203.details
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Can deliberation neutralise power?Samuel Bagg - 2018 - European Journal of Political Theory 17 (3):257-279.details
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Philosophical expertise under the microscope.Miguel Egler & Lewis Dylan Ross - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1077-1098.details
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Two types of debunking arguments.Peter Königs - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):383-402.details
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The Unreasonable Destructiveness of Political Correctness in Philosophy.Manuel Doria - 2017 - Philosophies 2 (3):17.details
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Mens rea ascription, expertise and outcome effects: Professional judges surveyed.Markus Https://Orcidorg Kneer & Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde - 2017 - Cognition 169 (C):139-146.details
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Perspective and Epistemic State Ascriptions.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):313-341.details
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Moral nihilism and its implications.Marc Krellenstein - 2017 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 38 (1):75-90.details
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Mapping Cognitive Structure onto the Landscape of Philosophical Debate: an Empirical Framework with Relevance to Problems of Consciousness, Free will and Ethics.Jared P. Friedman & Anthony I. Jack - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):73-113.details
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The Problem of Error: The Moral Psychology Argument for Atheism.John Jung Park - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):501-516.details
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Arguments from Expert Opinion and Persistent Bias.Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (2):175-195.details
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Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.details
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The Epistemic Value of Speculative Fiction.Johan De Smedt & Helen De Cruz - 2015 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39 (1):58-77.details
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Religious disagreement: An empirical study among academic philosophers.Helen De Cruz - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1).details
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Philosophical Method and Intuitions as Assumptions.Kevin Patrick Tobia - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):575-594.details
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Explanatory Judgment, Moral Offense and Value-Free Science.Matteo Colombo, Leandra Bucher & Yoel Inbar - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):743-763.details
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In the Thick of Moral Motivation.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):433-453.details
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Moral psychology: Empirical approaches.John Doris & Stephen Stich - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Moral preference reversals: Violations of procedure invariance in moral judgments of sacrificial dilemmas.Justin F. Landy, Benjamin A. Lemli, Pritika Shah, Alexander D. Perry & Rebekah Sager - 2024 - Cognition 252 (C):105919.details
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Some Socratic Modesty: A Reconsideration of Recent Empirical Work on Moral Judgment.David Sackris & Michael T. Dale - 2024 - Journal of Value Inquiry 1:1-23.details
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Exploring the psychology of LLMs’ Moral and Legal Reasoning.Guilherme F. C. F. Almeida, José Luiz Nunes, Neele Engelmann, Alex Wiegmann & Marcelo de Araújo - forthcoming - Artificial Intelligence.details
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The Problem with Apu: Recognizing Moral Issues in Media Ethics.Bastiaan Vanacker - 2023 - Journal of Media Ethics 38 (4):255-266.details
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Expressive Responding, Experimental Philosophy, and Philosophical Expertise.Shane Nicholas Glackin - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.details
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(1 other version)Moral Education Through the Fostering of Reasoning Skills.Kirsten Meyer - 2024 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 27 (1):41-55.details
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How Stable are Moral Judgments?Paul Rehren & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1377-1403.details
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The genetic technologies questionnaire: lay judgments about genetic technologies align with ethical theory, are coherent, and predict behaviour.Svenja Küchenhoff, Johannes Doerflinger & Nora Heinzelmann - 2022 - BMC Medical Ethics 23 (54):1-14.details
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Positive Psychology and Philosophy-as-Usual: An Unhappy Match?Josef Mattes - 2022 - Philosophies 7 (3):52.details
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Philosophers' linguistic expertise: A psycholinguistic approach to the expertise objection against experimental philosophy.Eugen Fischer, Paul E. Engelhardt & Aurélie Herbelot - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-33.details
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The brittleness of expertise and why it matters.Daniel Kilov - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3431-3455.details
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Expert or Esoteric? Philosophers Attribute Knowledge Differently Than All Other Academics.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (7):e12850.details
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Rationalization in Philosophical and Moral Thought.Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Ellis - 2017 - In Jean-François Bonnefon & Bastien Trémolière (eds.), Moral Inferences. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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What Should we Believe About Free Will?Jeremy Byrd - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):505-522.details
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