This essay examines Arendt’s descriptions of “Hottentots” in The Origins of Totalitarianism, especially the comparisons and contrasts she frequently draws between Hottentots and other peoples. In particular, Arendt highlights dehumanization of presumptively “civilized” people in comparing them to African “savages.” Close reading of such analogies demands that we look beyond the racial explanations that other scholars have offered and focus instead on how Arendt’s conception of humanity is bound up with a specific sense of culture that is antiprimitivist—exclusive of peoples (...) without history, primitives. Analysis of her moral anthropology uncovers the Cape Colony discourses and postenlightenment German philosophical supports that inform her antiprimitivism. However, Arendt’s antiprimitivism may not remain confined to Origins. In later essays, Arendt analyzes the various aspects of culture in instructive ways.Yet she also synthesizes culture concepts into a schema that introduces problems for her. (shrink)

What are our responsibilities in the face of injustice? How far should we go to fight it? Many would argue that as long as a state is nearly just, citizens have a moral duty to obey the law. Proponents of civil disobedience generally hold that, given this moral duty, a person needs a solid justification to break the law. But activists from Henry David Thoreau and Mohandas Gandhi to the Movement for Black Lives have long recognized that there are times (...) when, rather than having a duty to obey the law, we have a duty to disobey it. -/- Taking seriously the history of this activism, A Duty to Resist wrestles with the problem of political obligation in real world societies that harbor injustice. Candice Delmas argues that the duty of justice, the principle of fairness, the Samaritan duty, and political association impose responsibility to resist under conditions of injustice. We must expand political obligation to include a duty to resist unjust laws and social conditions even in legitimate states. -/- For Delmas, this duty to resist demands principled disobedience, and such disobedience need not always be civil. At times, covert, violent, evasive, or offensive acts of lawbreaking can be justified, even required. Delmas defends the viability and necessity of illegal assistance to undocumented migrants, leaks of classified information, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, sabotage, armed self-defense, guerrilla art, and other modes of resistance. There are limits: principle alone does not justify law breaking. But uncivil disobedience can sometimes be not only permissible but required in the effort to resist injustice. (shrink)

This article examines Hannah Arendt’s bold and provocative proposal to institutionalize civil disobedience. First, I argue that the proposal follows from Arendt’s peculiar interpretation of this mode of protest. She sees it as an unexpected yet welcome echo of the revolutionary spirit that accompanied the foundation of the American republic. In seeking to bring civil disobedience into government, she aims to embed this spirit within the very institutional fabric of the polity. Second, I suggest that we have strong reasons to (...) take the proposal seriously as an account of how the constitutional state should respond to dissenting minorities. The call to institutionalize civil disobedience can be defended as an approach that is different to — and ultimately more appealing than — familiar liberal and democratic perspectives on this issue. (shrink)

This paper considers the implications of Hannah Arendt's criticisms of Frantz Fanon and the theories of violence and politics associated with his influence for our understanding of the relationship between those two phenomena. Fanon argues that violence is a means necessary to political action, and also is an organic force or energy. Arendt argues that violence is inherently unpredictable, which means that end reasoning is in any case anti-political, and that it is a profound error to naturalize violence. We evaluate (...) their respective arguments concluding that in her well-founded rejection of the naturalization of violence, Arendt's understanding of the embodied nature of violence is less insightful than Fanon's. (shrink)

This paper considers the implications of Hannah Arendt's criticisms of Frantz Fanon and the theories of violence and politics associated with his influence for our understanding of the relationship between those two phenomena. Fanon argues that violence is a means necessary to political action, and also is an organic force or energy. Arendt argues that violence is inherently unpredictable, which means that end reasoning is in any case anti-political, and that it is a profound error to naturalize violence. We evaluate (...) their respective arguments concluding that in her well-founded rejection of the naturalization of violence, Arendt's understanding of the embodied nature of violence is less insightful than Fanon's. (shrink)

Briskly written, McGowan{u2019}s book serves Arendt{u2019}s complex thought well while also rendering it accessible, demonstrating the unity of Arendt{u2019}s career and the continuing relevance of her concerns. Readers new to Arendt as well as those intimately familiar with her work will be intrigued and enlightened by this comprehensive and authoritative introduction.

While acknowledging Hannah Arendt's keen philosophical and political insights, Kathryn T. Gines claims that there are some problematic assertions and oversights regarding Arendt’s treatment of the "Negro question." Gines focuses on Arendt's reaction to the desegregation of Little Rock schools, to laws making mixed marriages illegal, and to the growing civil rights movement in the south. Reading them alongside Arendt's writings on revolution, the human condition, violence, and responses to the Eichmann war crimes trial, Gines provides a systematic analysis of (...) anti-black racism in Arendt’s work. (shrink)

In this major new assessment of Hannah Arendt's writings on International Relations Patricia Owens provides a compelling case for Arendt's continued relevance to debates about suicide bombing; genocide; the ethics of war; civilian casualties; and the dangers of lies and hypocrisy in wartime.

Although the modern age is often described as the age of democratic revolutions, the subject of popular foundings has not captured the imagination of contemporary political thought. Most of the time, democratic theory and political science treat as the object of their inquiry normal politics, institutionalized power, and consolidated democracies. The aim of Andreas Kalyvas' study is to show why it is important for democratic theory to rethink the question of its beginnings. Is there a founding unique to democracies? Can (...) a democracy be democratically established? What are the implications of expanding democratic politics in light of the question of whether and how to address democracy's beginnings? Kalyvas addresses these questions and scrutinizes the possibility of democratic beginnings in terms of the category of the extraordinary, as he reconstructs it from the writings of Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Hannah Arendt and their views on the creation of new political, symbolic, and constitutional orders. (shrink)

Politics seem most alien to the demand for truth, for they engage the future which is, on principle, undeterminable, whereas truth conversely requires that the object be determined according to strict rules. Yet, political philosophy has never renounced the quest for a true understanding of human living_together, an understanding that makes becoming predictable, thus denying its contingency. However lofty, the ambition nonetheless elicited the most devastating political experience in history: totalitarianism. Such a disaster would seem to call for cautious relativism, (...) but letting oneself be ruled by the arbitrariness of opinions is just as irresponsible as obeying the necessity of a postulated "destiny."Such is the quandary whose challenge was taken up by Hannah Arendt. In so doing, Arendt does not dismiss the true from the sphere of action. She seeks to comprehend which uses of truth cancel political lucidity and which uses of truth conversely warrant political lucidity. What shapes Arendt's position is a battle waged on several fronts, pointing to three distinct goals which this article proposes to address successively: first, the ambition to rescue politics from any "true law of history" which would aim at governing them; secondly, the ambition to rescue politics from the political lies in charge of their rewriting; thirdly, the ambition to rescue politics from a value relativism which would be irresponsible or cynical. Rational truth, factual truth, and opinion are all successively implicated, even though one cannot simply dissociate them from one another. (shrink)

Politics seem most alien to the demand for truth, for they engage the future which is, on principle, undeterminable, whereas truth conversely requires that the object be determined according to strict rules. Yet, political philosophy has never renounced the quest for a true understanding of human living_together, an understanding that makes becoming predictable, thus denying its contingency. However lofty, the ambition nonetheless elicited the most devastating political experience in history: totalitarianism. Such a disaster would seem to call for cautious relativism, (...) but letting oneself be ruled by the arbitrariness of opinions is just as irresponsible as obeying the necessity of a postulated "destiny."Such is the quandary whose challenge was taken up by Hannah Arendt. In so doing, Arendt does not dismiss the true from the sphere of action. She seeks to comprehend which uses of truth cancel political lucidity and which uses of truth conversely warrant political lucidity. What shapes Arendt's position is a battle waged on several fronts, pointing to three distinct goals which this article proposes to address successively: first, the ambition to rescue politics from any "true law of history" which would aim at governing them; secondly, the ambition to rescue politics from the political lies in charge of their rewriting; thirdly, the ambition to rescue politics from a value relativism which would be irresponsible or cynical. Rational truth, factual truth, and opinion are all successively implicated, even though one cannot simply dissociate them from one another. (shrink)