A feminist ethics that bases morality on dependence or vulnerability challenges the moral priority of uniform over disparate treatment. Persons with disabilities resist equality's homogenization of moral personhood. But displacing equality in favor of caring or trust reprises the repression of those already marginalized. The ethics of difference proves an ineffective remedy for the negative consequences attendant on how historically marginalized groups are different. An historicized conception of equality resolves the dilemma.

The defects of any form of government may be either negative or positive. It is negatively defective if it does not concentrate in the hands of the authorities power sufficient to fulfil the necessary offices of a government; or if it does not sufficiently develop by exercise the active capacities and social feelings of the individual citizens. On neither of these points is it necessary that much should be said at this stage of our inquiry.

In this paper it is argued that neither the simple majority rule conception of democracy nor representative democracy can be shown to be politically valuable in themselves. Certain arguments of brian barry's to the effect that democracy is special are examined and found wanting. A conclusion is that democratic institutions are valuable only as constitutional checks and balances, And whether this is so in any particular case is a contingent question.