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  1. A purely geometric module in the rat's spatial representation.Ken Cheng - 1986 - Cognition 23 (2):149-178.
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  • Orthogonality of Phenomenality and Content.Gottfried Vosgerau, Tobias Schlicht & Albert Newen - 2008 - American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4):309 - 328.
    This paper presents arguments from empirical research and from philosophical considerations to the effect that phenomenality and content are two distinct and independent features of mental representations, which are both relational. Thus, it is argued, classical arguments that infer phenomenality from content have to be rejected. Likewise, theories that try to explain the phenomenal character of experiences by appeal to specific types of content cannot succeed. Instead, a dynamic view of consciousness has to be adopted that seeks to explain consciousness (...)
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  • Content preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
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  • Biosemantics.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (July):281-97.
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  • Adäquatheit und Arten mentaler Repräsentationen.Gottfried Vosgerau - 2008 - Facta Philosophica 10 (1):67-82.
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  • Knowing How and Knowing That: The Presidential Address.Gilbert Ryle - 1946 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 46:1 - 16.
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  • Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
    Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition.
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  • A Framework for Representing Knowledge.Marvin Minsky - unknown
    It seems to me that the ingredients of most theories both in Artificial Intelligence and in Psychology have been on the whole too minute, local, and unstructured to account–either practically or phenomenologically–for the effectiveness of common-sense thought. The "chunks" of reasoning, language, memory, and "perception" ought to be larger and more structured; their factual and procedural contents must be more intimately connected in order to explain the apparent power and speed of mental activities.
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  • Biosemantics.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (6):281--297.
    " Biosemantics " was the title of a paper on mental representation originally printed in The Journal of Philosophy in 1989. It contained a much abbreviated version of the work on mental representation in Language Thought and Other Biological Categories. There I had presented a naturalist theory of intentional signs generally, including linguistic representations, graphs, charts and diagrams, road sign symbols, animal communications, the "chemical signals" that regulate the function of glands, and so forth. But the term " biosemantics " (...)
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  • Is memory preservation?Mohan Matthen - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (1):3-14.
    Memory seems intuitively to consist in the preservation of some proposition (in the case of semantic memory) or sensory image (in the case of episodic memory). However, this intuition faces fatal difficulties. Semantic memory has to be updated to reflect the passage of time: it is not just preservation. And episodic memory can occur in a format (the observer perspective) in which the remembered image is different from the original sensory image. These difficulties indicate that memory cannot be preserved content. (...)
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  • Uber Sinn und Bedeutung.Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1):25-50.
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  • Misrepresentation.Fred Dretske - 1986 - In Radu J. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 17--36.
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  • What the Frog's Eye Tells the Frog's Brain.J. Lettvin - 1959 - Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers 49:1940-1951.
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  • Mental Representation and Self-Consciousness: From Basic Self-Representation to Self-Related Cognition.Gottfried Vosgerau - 2009 - Dissertation, Ruhr-Universität Bochum
    One oft the most fascinating abilities of humans is the ability to become conscious of the own physical and mental states. In this systematic investigation of self-consciousness, a representational theory is developed that is able to distinguish between different levels of self-consciousness. The most basic levels are already present in such simple animals as ants. From these basic forms, which are also relevant for adult human self-consciousness, high-level self-consciousness including self-knowledge can arise. Thereby, the theory is not only able to (...)
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  • Frames, concepts, and conceptual fields.Lawrence Barsalou - 1992 - In Adrienne Lehrer & Eva Feder Kittay (eds.), Frames, fields, and contrasts: new essays in semantic and lexical organization. Hillsdale, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates. pp. 21-74.
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  • Knowledge and abilities: The need for a new understanding of knowing-how. [REVIEW]Eva-Maria Jung & Albert Newen - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):113-131.
    Stanley and Williamson (The Journal of Philosophy 98(8), 411–444 2001 ) reject the fundamental distinction between what Ryle once called ‘knowing-how’ and ‘knowing-that’. They claim that knowledge-how is just a species of knowledge-that, i.e. propositional knowledge, and try to establish their claim relying on the standard semantic analysis of ‘knowing-how’ sentences. We will undermine their strategy by arguing that ‘knowing-how’ phrases are under-determined such that there is not only one semantic analysis and by critically discussing and refuting the positive account (...)
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  • The perceptual nature of mental models.G. Vosgerau - 2006 - In Carsten Held, Markus Knauff & Gottfried Vosgerau (eds.), Mental models and the mind: current developments in cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind. Boston: Elsevier.
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