Martin Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy reflects his famous philosophical "turning." In this work, Heidegger returns to the question of being from its inception in Being and Time to a new questioning of being as event.

Wittgenstein: Lectures, Cambridge 1930–1933. From the Notes of G. E. Moore. Edited by Stern David G., Rogers Brian, Citron Gabriel.

In this article, I aim to interpret and contextualize Heidegger’s short interpretation of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement. I provide a more accurate picture of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, showing that his reading is both appreciative and original, if speculative. I argue that Heidegger’s analysis of Kant’s aesthetics is surprisingly at odds with his general characterization and criticism of modern aesthetics. The latter can be captured by two basic theses—art is determined by a subject’s experience and art reveals (...) metaphysical truth—but neither of these theses applies to Heidegger’s Kant. Instead, Heidegger understands Kant and the third Critique’s notions of disinterestedness and purposiveness as sources of insight, offering an interpretation of Kantian disinterestedness as analogous to his own notion of ‘letting be’. The seeming inconsistency between Heidegger’s general story and his interpretation of Kant is revealing of Heidegger’s twofold use of history, as allowing for a diagnosis of the present, as well as positive inspiration for a future aesthetics. (shrink)

Husserl's marginal remarks in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik clearly do not reflect the same intense effort to penetrate Heidegger's thought that we find in his marginal notes in Sein und Zeit. Merely in terms of length, Husserl's comments in the published German text occupy only one-third the number of pages.2 Pages 1-5, 43-121, and 125-1673 contain no reading marks at all-over half of the 236 pages of KPM. This suggests that Husserl either read these pages with no intention (...) of returning to the text or skipped large parts of the middle of the text altogether.4 His remarks often express frustration or a resigned recognition of the now unbridgeable, irrevocable gap between himself and Heidegger. (shrink)

In this paper, I advance a new interpretation of Heidegger's reflections on art as we find them in his essay, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’. I begin, in Section 1, by uncovering the fundamental concern that motivates Heidegger's essay. I show that Heidegger's reflections on art are part of his attempt to uncover a path beyond the history of metaphysics. I then suggest, in Section 2, that while Heidegger does think that art may allow for the overcoming of (...) metaphysics, recent interpreters [Dreyfus (2005), Thomson (2011), and Young (2001)] have mistook the kind of art that Heidegger has in mind here. The kind of art that can allow for the overcoming of metaphysics, I argue, is not art that simply thematizes and/or reconfigures cultural worlds. It is instead what Heidegger calls ‘primal poesy’. After discussing the nature of primal poesy, I show in more detail how this kind of art may be capable of getting us beyond the history of metaphysics in Section 3. Finally, in Section 4, I reconsider the more common reading of ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ in light of the interpretation I've offered in Sections 2 and 3. (shrink)

In this essay, I distinguish two ways of depsychologizing psychology: ‘anti-psychologism’ and ‘non-psychologism’. Both positions are responses to the Fregean sharp distinction between the logical and the psychological. But where anti-psychologism, which I find in John McDowell, attempts to overcome the sharp distinction by arguing that psychological states and their expressions are apt to be articulated into judgments, Stanley Cavell's non-psychologism, a powerful and neglected alternative, wants to overcome the sharp distinction by abandoning judgment as the paradigm expression of thought (...) and communication. (shrink)

Abstract: Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (SZ) is commonly viewed as one of the 20th century's great anti-Cartesian works, usually because of its attack on the epistemology-driven dualism and mentalism of modern philosophy of mind or its apparent effort to ‘de-center the subject’ in order to privilege being or sociality over the individual. Most who stress one or other of these anti-Cartesian aspects of SZ, however, pay little attention to Heidegger's own direct engagement with Descartes, apart from the compressed discussion in (...) SZ§§19–21. I here show through a careful reading of Heidegger's lectures on Descartes from the years immediately preceding SZ that, while he has sharp criticisms of Descartes and certain ‘Cartesian’ aspects of modern philosophy along the lines commonly recognized, he also aims to disclose what he calls the ‘positive possibilities’ in Descartes and the philosophy he inspired. I detail a number of these and then show that they force us to see Heidegger's own early project as largely unconcerned with dualism and mentalism per se, and much more with questions of the philosophical methodology that gives rise to them. Moreover, I show that a careful reading of Heidegger's treatment of the cogito makes clear that he is no serious way attempting to ‘de-center the subject’ and that the fundamental question of the ‘analytic of Dasein’ is one that takes Descartes as an immediate jumping off point: how can I articulate what I understand myself to be as the general kind of entity I am, and on what besides me does my being depend? (shrink)

Wittgenstein and Heidegger’s objections against the possibility of an aesthetic science were influential on different sides of the analytic/continental divide. Heidegger’s anti-scientism is tied up with a critique of the reduction of the work of art to an object of aesthetic experience. This leads him to an aletheic view of artworks which precedes and exceeds any possible aesthetic reduction. Wittgenstein too rejects the relevance of causal explanations, psychological or physiological, to aesthetic questions. His appeal to ordinary language provides the backdrop (...) for his critique of the philosophical tradition’s focus on a narrow range of evaluative aesthetic terms, thus excluding most of the language we ordinarily employ in the relevant cases. The main aim of this paper is to compare Heidegger with Wittgenstein, showing that: (a) there are significant parallels to be drawn between Wittgenstein and Heidegger’s anti-scientism about aesthetics, and (b) their anti-scientism leads them towards partly divergent criticisms of what I will call ‘aestheticism’. The divergence is mainly due to a disagreement concerning appeals to ordinary language. Thus situating the two philosophers’ positions facilitates a possible critical dialogue between analytic and continental approaches in aesthetics. (shrink)

This is the much anticipated publication of Joan Stambaugh’s translation of Martin Heidegger’s major work. As the translator notes in her preface: “This translation was begun some time ago and has undergone changes over the years as colleagues have offered suggestions”. An earlier version of the translation was privately circulated among scholars during the nearly twenty years that passed before SUNY Press was able to make available the work, which is based on the seventh edition of Sein und Zeit. The (...) translation includes Heidegger’s marginalia to his copies of the book which have been part of the published German text since 1977. An earlier version of Professor Stambaugh’s translation of the “Introduction” of the work was published that same year. The text is equipped with a lexicon prepared by Theodore Kisiel, a leading American Heidegger scholar and champion of a critical edition of Heidegger in German and, one hopes, in English as well. (shrink)