THE ISSUE about hermeneutics in modern philosophy and social science goes back to Dilthey and to his claim that we must distinguish between what we could call the natural and human sciences. The claim is that there is something special about the subject matter of the latter which forbids us simply to carry over the method elaborated in natural science to the study of man. But to many, this distinction has seemed unjustified, even obscurantist. One of the important traits of (...) modern science has been its concern about method, ever since Descartes’ great discourse on the subject. To put the sciences of man outside the ban of the methods of natural science seems to be to put them outside the range of science itself. On this view, science must be in principle a unity; or at least it must involve a set of démarches which are the same without discrimination as to the object studied. (shrink)

ALTHOUGH hailed as a sign of a thaw in the cold war between Anglo-American and continental philosophy, Richard Rorty's beguiling appropriation of the thought of Heidegger in his recent writings has produced no small measure of confusion. How seriously, one wonders, has Rorty moved towards Heidegger? Or contrariwise, just how close does Heidegger come to saying the sorts of things Rorty does? Is Rorty just trying to shock the Anglo-American community by invoking the name of Heidegger? Is he being intentionally (...) outrageous in order to draw attention to what he takes to be the more sober part of his argument? Is there only a grain of truth to this assimilation of Heidegger, while the real positions of the two thinkers are vastly different? (shrink)