I argue that culpable ignorance can be irreducibly collective. In some cases, it is not fair to expect any individual to have avoided her ignorance of some fact, but it is fair to expect the agents together to have avoided their ignorance of that fact. Hence, no agent is individually culpable for her ignorance, but they are culpable for their ignorance together. This provides us with good reason to think that any group that is culpably ignorant in this irreducibly collective (...) sense is non-distributively collectively responsible for subsequent unwitting acts and consequences. (shrink)

In this chapter we give an overview of current and historical conceptions of the nature of obsessions and compulsions. We discuss some open questions pertaining to the primacy of the affective, volitional or affective nature of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Furthermore, we add some phenomenological suggestions of our own. In particular, we point to the patients’ need for absolute certainty and the lack of trust underlying this need. Building on insights from Wittgenstein, we argue that the kind of certainty the patients (...) strive for is unattainable in principle via the acquisition of factual knowledge. Moreover, we suggest that the patients’ attempts to attain certainty are counter-productive as their excessive conscious control in fact undermines the trust they need. (shrink)

According to the traditional Western concept of freedom, the ability to exercise free will depends on the availability of options and the possibility to consciously decide which one to choose. Since neuroscientific research increasingly shows the limits of what we in fact consciously control, it seems that our belief in free will and hence in personal autonomy is in trouble. -/- A closer look at the phenomenology of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) gives us reason to doubt the traditional concept of freedom (...) in terms of conscious control. Patients suffering from OCD experience themselves as unfree. The question is whether their lack of freedom is due to a lack of will power. Do they have too little conscious control over their thoughts and actions? Or could it be the opposite: are they exerting too much conscious control over their thoughts and actions? -/- In this chapter, we will argue that OCD patients testify to the general condition that exercising an increased conscious control over actions can in fact diminish the sense of agency rather than increase the experience of freedom. The experiences of these patients show that the traditional conception of freedom in terms of ‘free will’ has major shortcomings. There is an alternative, however, to be found in the work of Hannah Arendt. She advocates a conception of freedom as freedom in action. Combined with phenomenological insights on action, Arendt’s account of freedom helps us to get a more adequate understanding of the role of deliberation in the experience of freedom. We argue that the experience of freedom depends on the right balance between deliberate control and unreflective actions. (shrink)

People suffering from Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) do things they do not want to do, and/or they think things they do not want to think. In about 10 percent of OCD patients, none of the available treatment options is effective. A small group of these patients is currently being treated with deep brain stimulation (DBS). Deep brain stimulation involves the implantation of electrodes in the brain. These electrodes give a continuous electrical pulse to the brain area in which they are implanted. (...) It turns out that patients may experience profound changes as a result of DBS treatment. It is not just the symptoms that change; patients rather seem to experience a different way of being in the world. These global effects are insufficiently captured by traditional psychiatric scales, which mainly consist of behavioural measures of the severity of the symptoms. In this article we aim to capture the changes in the patients’ phenomenology and make sense of the broad range of changes they report. For that we introduce an enactive, affordance-based model that fleshes out the dynamic interactions between person and world in four aspects. The first aspect is the patients’ experience of the world. We propose to specify the patients’ world in terms of a field of affordances, with the three dimensions of broadness of scope (‘width’ of the field), temporal horizon (‘depth’), and relevance of the perceived affordances (‘height’). The second aspect is the person-side of the interaction, that is, the patients’ self-experience, notably their moods and feelings. Thirdly, we point to the different characteristics of the way in which patients relate to the world. And lastly, the existential stance refers to the stance that patients take towards the changes they experience: the second-order evaluative relation to their interactions and themselves. With our model we intend to specify the notion of being in the world in order to do justice to the phenomenological effects of DBS treatment. (shrink)

According to some collectivists, purposive groups that lack decision-making procedures such as riot mobs, friends walking together, or the pro-life lobby can be morally responsible and have moral duties. I focus on plural subject- and we-mode-collectivism. I argue that purposive groups do not qualify as duty-bearers even if they qualify as agents on either view. To qualify as a duty-bearer, an agent must be morally competent. I develop the Update Argument. An agent is morally competent only if the agent has (...) sufficient positive and negative control over updating their goal-seeking states. Positive control involves the general ability to update one’s goal-seeking states, whereas negative control involves the absence of other agents with the capacity to arbitrarily interfere with updating one’s goal-seeking states. I argue that even if purposive groups qualify as plural subjects or we-mode group agents, these groups necessarily lack negative control over updating their goal-seeking states. This creates a cut-off point for groups as duty-bearers: Organized groups may qualify as duty-bearers, whereas purposive groups cannot qualify as duty-bearers. (shrink)

This paper investigates agents’ blameworthiness when they are part of a group that does harm. We analyse three factors that affect the scope of an agent’s blameworthiness in these cases: shared intentionality, interpersonal influence, and common knowledge. Each factor involves circumstantial luck. The more each factor is present, the greater is the scope of each agent’s vicarious blameworthiness for the other agents’ contributions to the harm. We then consider an agent’s degree of blameworthiness, as distinct from her scope of blameworthiness. (...) We suggest that an agent mostly controls her degree of blameworthiness—but even here, luck constrains what possible degrees of blameworthiness are open to her. (shrink)

Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is a relatively new, experimental treatment for patients suffering from treatment-refractory Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). The effects of treatment are typically assessed with psychopathological scales that measure the amount of symptoms. However, clinical experience indicates that the effects of DBS are not limited to symptoms only: patients for instance report changes in perception, feeling stronger and more confident, and doing things unreflectively. Our aim is to get a better overview of the whole variety of changes that (...) OCD patients experience during DBS treatment. For that purpose we conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 18 OCD patients. In this paper, we present the results from this qualitative study.We list the changes grouped in four domains: with regard to (a) person, (b) (social) world, (c)characteristics of person-world interactions, and (d) existential stance. We subsequently provide an interpretation of these results. In particular, we suggest that many of these changes can be seen as different expressions of the same process; namely that the experience of anxiety and tension gives way to an increased basic trust and increased reliance on one’s abilities. We then discuss the clinical implications of our findings, especially with regard to properly informing patients of what they can expect from treatment, the usefulness of including CBT in treatment, and the limitations of current measures of treatment success. We end by making several concrete suggestions for further research. (shrink)

Does DBS change a patient’s personality? This is one of the central questions in the debate on the ethics of treatment with Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS). At the moment, however, this important debate is hampered by the fact that there is relatively little data available concerning what patients actually experience following DBS treatment. There are a few qualitative studies with patients with Parkinson’s disease and Primary Dystonia and some case reports, but there has been no qualitative study yet with patients (...) suffering from psychiatric disorders. In this paper, we present the experiences of 18 patients with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) who are undergoing treatment with DBS. We will also discuss the inherent difficulties of how to define and assess changes in personality, in particular for patients with psychiatric disorders. We end with a discussion of the data and how these shed new light on the conceptual debate about how to define personality. (shrink)

This article, the second of a two-part essay, outlines a solution to certain tensions in Thomist philosophical anthropology concerning the interaction of the human person’s immaterial intellectual or noetic operations with the psychosomatic sensory operations that are constituted from the formal organization of the nervous system. Continuing with where the first part left off, I argue that Thomists should not be tempted by strong emergentist accounts of mental operations that act directly on the brain, but should maintain, with Aquinas, that (...) noetic operations directly interact with psychosomatic operations. I develop a Thomist account of noetic–psychosomatic interactions that expands upon the first part’s rapprochement between the new mechanist philosophy of neuroscience and psychology and hylomorphic animalism. I argue that noetic–psychosomatic interactions are best understood as analogous to the way diverse higher and lower order psychosomatic powers interact by actualizing, coordinating, and directing the operations of other psychosomatic powers. I draw on James Ross’s arguments for the immateriality of intellectual operations as realizing definite pure functions in order to elucidate the way noetic operations uniquely actualize, coordinate, and direct the psychosomatic operations they interact with. I conclude with a conjectural sketch of how this presentation of Thomist philosophical anthropology understands the noetic and psychosomatic deficits brought about by damage to the nervous system. (shrink)

In this essay I explore the resources Thomas Aquinas provides for enquiries concerning the psychological abilities of nonhuman animals. I first look to Aquinas’s account of divine, angelic, human, and nonhuman animal naming, to help us articulate the contours of a ‘critical anthropocentrism’ that aims to steer clear of the mistakes of a na¨ıve anthropocentrism and misconceived avowals to entirely eschew anthropocentrism. I then address the need for our critical anthropocentrism both to reject the mental-physical dichotomy endorsed by ‘folk psychology’ (...) and to articulate a more adequate ‘commonsense psychology’ that acknowledges most embodied animal behavior is observable psychological behavior. Next, I argue that we can develop Aquinas’s doctrine of estimation and conation to formulate an account of nonhuman animal action that more adequately characterizes the purposeful behaviors of nonhuman animals. To do so, we first need to recognize a wider range of nonhuman animal behaviors that are captured by Aquinas’s ‘estimative sense’, and that all of these behaviors are specified by a finite variety of particular goods confined to the animals’ environmental niches. But we also need to supplement Aquinas’s account of human and nonhuman animal agency by exploring the ontogeny and ecology of how humans and other animals become attuned to affordances within these different environmental niches. I argue that we should look to Aquinas’s account of nonhuman animal capacities in ST I-II 6-17 for subtle insights that can expand our understanding of how nonhuman animals engage in purposeful behavior by exercising analogous nonrational and imperfectly voluntary forms of intention, deliberation, choice, execution, and enjoyment. I conclude with an outline for how future enquiry can seek to explain the nonrational purposeful problem-solving competencies of chimps, canines, corvids, cetaceans, cephalopods, and other nonhuman animal species. (shrink)

In this paper, we focus on the moral responsibility of organized groups in light of historicism. Historicism is the view that any morally responsible agent must satisfy certain historical conditions, such as not having been manipulated. We set out four examples involving morally responsible organized groups that pose problems for existing accounts of historicism. We then pose a trilemma: one can reject group responsibility, reject historicism, or revise historicism. We pursue the third option. We formulate a Manipulation Condition and a (...) Guarding Condition as addendums to historicism that are necessary to accommodate our cases of group responsibility. (shrink)

We propose to understand social affordances in the broader context of responsiveness to a field of relevant affordances in general. This perspective clarifies our everyday ability to unreflectively switch between social and other affordances. Moreover, based on our experience with Deep Brain Stimulation for treating obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) patients, we suggest that psychiatric disorders may affect skilled intentionality, including responsiveness to social affordances.

Thomas Aquinas consistently defended the thesis that the separated rational soul that results from a human person’s death is not a person. Nevertheless, what has emerged in recent decades is a sophisticated disputed question between “survivalists” and “corruptionists” concerning the personhood of the separated soul that has left us with intractable disagreements wherein neither side seems able to convince the other. In our contribution to this disputed question, we present a digest of an unconsidered middle way: the separated soul is (...) an incomplete person. (shrink)

This paper will argue that the order and the unity of St. Thomas Aquinas’s five ways can be elucidated through a consideration of St. Thomas’s appropriation of an Avicennian insight that he used to order and unify the wisdom of the Aristotelian and Abrahamic philosophical traditions towards the existence of God. I will begin with a central aporia from Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Aristotle says that the science of first philosophy has three different theoretical vectors: ontology, aitiology, and theology. But how can (...) all three be united into a single Aristotelian science? In his Metaphysics of the Healing, Avicenna resolved the impasse by taking the ontological vector as the subject of metaphysics. He then integrated the question of the four first causes into the penultimate stage of his demonstration for the existence of God, thereby placing aitiological and theological questions among the ultimate concerns of a unified Aristotelian metaphysics. In the five ways, St. Thomas integrated Avicenna’s Aristotelian search for the first four causes into the last four of his five ways, by showing that each of the four aitiological orders terminate in an ultimate first cause that we call God. Finally, by appending the proof from the Physics to the beginning of the five ways, St. Thomas was able to show that the ultimate aim of both natural philosophy and metaphysics is the divine first principle, which is the beginning and subject of sacra doctrina. (shrink)

Many philosophers accept the idea that there are duties to promote or create just institutions. But are the addressees of such duties supposed to be individuals – the members of the citizenry? What does it mean for an individual to promote or create just institutions? According to the ‘Simple View’, the citizenry has a collective duty to create or promote just institutions, and each individual citizen has an individual duty to do their part in this collective project. The simple view (...) appears to work well with regard to – you guessed it – ‘simple’ scenarios but it is riddled with further questions and problems. In this chapter, we raise five problems for the Simple View: (a) We suggest that one cannot develop a view concerning the citizenry’s duty to promote just institutions in isolation from a conception of the ontological relationship between the state and its citizens; (b) We argue that it is not obvious that the citizenry is the right entity to be attributed duties in the first place; (c) We show that a plausible account of collective duties to promote just institutions must not remain silent on the complexities and difficulties amorphous, unorganized group face in vis-à-vis collective action; (d) We contend that without allocation principles for contributory duties amongst the citizenry, or – alternatively – a method for practical deliberation that is action-guiding in collective action contexts, the claim that the citizens have a collective duty to promote just institutions remains moot; and, finally, (e) We demonstrate that the problem of reasonable disagreement is a serious threat to a collective duty to promote or create just institutions – it potentially undermines such a duty altogether and allows for conflicting contributory duties amongst the citizenry. We hope that our discussion will ultimately help improve existing theories and conceptual frameworks with a view to better understanding citizens’ obligations to promote justice under non-ideal conditions. (shrink)

Is it necessary for all Christians – including Christians who are metaphysicians with demonstrative knowledge of God’s existence – to hold by faith that God exists? I shall approach this apparently straightforward question by investigating two opposing lines of interpretation of Thomas Aquinas’s own response to this question. I shall begin with two texts from Thomas that motivate two incompatible theses concerning Thomas’s doctrine of the harmony of faith and reason with respect to the existence of God. Next, I shall (...) clarify the salient points of disagreement between these two interpretations of faith and reason in Thomas Aquinas before examining dialectically a number of arguments in favor and against the respective theses of these two interpretations. In the final section I shall argue that the results of our dialectical inquiry reveal that the initial disagreement between the two positions is not irresolvable. Accordingly, I shall conclude by proposing two revised versions of the initial theses that emphasize the compatibility of these two interpretations of Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of the harmony of faith and reason. (shrink)

We whole-heartedly agree with Mecacci and Haselager(2014) on the need to investigate the psychosocial effects of deep brain stimulation (DBS), and particularly to find out how to prevent adverse psychosocial effects. We also agree with the authors on the value of an embodied, embedded, enactive approach (EEC) to the self and the mind–brain problem. However, we do not think this value primarily lies in dissolving a so-called “maladaptation” of patients to their DBS device. In this comment, we challenge three central (...) claims of the authors on the basis of our direct experience with psychosocial effects of DBS in 45 obsessive- compulsive disorder (OCD) patients treated at the AMC in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, and our indepth qualitative interviews with 18 of them (de Haan et al. 2013). We end our comment by sketching out our perspective on the practical merits of an EEC approach to DBS. (shrink)

I am tasked with addressing philosophical hazards in the neuroscientific study of religion. As a philosopher concerned with the well-being of neuroscientists studying religion, I am inclined to begin with the philosophical hazards of philosophy. I am well aware of the extraordinary difficulties of both tasks, for the hazards are many and it is easy to miss the forest for the trees or the trees for the forest. Instead of focusing on one issue in great detail, I shall hang a (...) number of warning signs around a forest of issues that identify various philosophical hazards which deserve particular caution when it comes to neuroscience and religion. Since I am aiming for breadth over depth, my brief remarks on each issue shall be synoptic, non-exhaustive, contentious and suggestive for additional consideration and reflection. To redress such deficits, I have provided references for further reading. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo reflexionamos en torno a una serie de textos en los que Michel Foucault se pregunta por estatuto de la crítica. La cuestión nos parece volverse reflexivamente sobre el propio Foucualt y por ello intentaremos evaluar de qué manera, con sus propios recursos conceptuales, se puede determinar el estatuto de su propio discurso. Para ello recorreremos dos caminos: (i) su rechazo de la noción de ideología que lo pone en tensión con algunas de las tradiciones mayores del (...) pensamiento crítico. La cuestión es aquí: ¿cómo es posible la crítica sin la ideología y sin la verdad?; (ii) la recuperación foucaultiana de la actitud crítica (en los textos sobre Kant y la pregunta Was ist Aufklärung?). A partir de allí Foucault recupera la problemática de la modernidad en términos de una “ontología histórica del presente”. Ambos caminos se cruzan, ya que las observaciones sobre una “política de la verdad” (lo otro de la crítica de la ideología comprometida con una verdad aséptica) se refuerzan con las de la cuestión del gobierno en términos de una “inservidumbre voluntaria”. En ambos casos, la práctica de la crítica, que subjetiviza desujetando, plantea la cuestión de la libertad. -/- We analyze Michel Foucault’s question for the status of critique and its reflexive return over Foucault himself: How Foucault’s discourse, qua critique, should be understood? We will drive two paths: (i) the refusal of the notion of ideology, where the question is: How to think of critique without ideology and truth?; (ii) the Foucauldian recovery of the “critical attitude” (in the texts on Kant’s answer to the question Was ist Aufklärung?) and of the problem of modernity, along the lines of a “historical ontology of the present”. There is a crossroad of (i) and (ii), since the remarks on a “politics of truth” (as opposite to an “ideology critique” committed with an aseptic truth) reinforces mutually with the problem of the government, faced along the lines of an art of the “voluntary inservitude”. In both cases, practice of criticism that subjectifies desubjugating, poses the question of liberty. (shrink)

Although the enactive approach has been very successful in explaining many basic social interactions in terms of embodied practices, there is still much work to be done when it comes to higher forms of social cognition. In this article, we discuss and evaluate two recent proposals by Shaun Gallagher and Daniel Hutto that try to bridge this ‘cognitive gap’ by appealing to the notion of narrative practice. Although we are enthusiastic about these proposals, we argue that (i) it is difficult (...) to see them as continuous with the enactivist notion of direct coupling, and (ii) the failure to account for folk psychological action interpretation suggests that the enactive approach should adopt a broader notion of coupling. (shrink)

Es común escuchar que el mundo Occidental debe a los árabes el descubrimiento del álgebra. No obstante, el desarrollo de esta disciplina puede interpretarse como un crisol de distintas tradiciones científicas que fue posible gracias a la clasificación, traducción y crítica tanto de los clásicos como de las obras que los árabes obtuvieron de los pueblos que conquistaron. Entre estos trabajos se encontraba Los Elementos de Euclides. Los Elementos fueron cuidadosamente traducidos durante el califato de Al-Ma’mūn por el matemático Mohammed (...) ibn-Musa Al-Khwārizmī, autor de Al-jabr wa’l muqābalah, quien sentó los fundamentos de la disciplina que más tarde sería conocida como álgebra y quien, en la primera parte de su obra, nos proporciona tres métodos para resolver tres tipos de ecuaciones que llama “ecuaciones combinadas”. A lo largo de este artículo se ofrecen argumentos para sostener que los métodos para resolver estas ecuaciones constituyen una reinterpretación, en el terreno algebraico, de los teoremas 6, 7 y 8 del segundo libro de Los Elementos de Euclides. Mi objetivo es dar respuesta a la siguiente pregunta: ¿Qué lectura de Los elementos Euclides posibilitó la emergencia del álgebra en el mundo árabe? Para responderla necesario explorar el acercamiento que los árabes tuvieron con el Libro II de Los Elementos, con el fin de proponer una interpretación de los posibles factores que los llevaron a formular el álgebra. Esto último, en particular, se encuentra en la primera parte de la obra de Al-Khwārizmī. Palabras clave: Álgebra, Al-Khwārizmī, Euclides, Ecuación, Teorema. (shrink)

Proceedings of Philosophical Festival Drift 2014. Theme: Under Influence. Includes lectures by Katrien Schaubroeck, Philippe Descola, Markus Gabriel, Ray Brassier, Francesco Berto, Henk Oosterling, and Tomáš Sedlácek (among others). Lectures are in Dutch or English.

Street-level bureaucrats are a fundamental part of the implementation process of any policy. This study provides an examination of the factors that shape the behavior of street-level bureaucrats at the frontlines of policy implementation. This study investigates how rebelliousness generates an impact on the discretion of street-level bureaucrats and to what extent client meaningfulness plays a moderating factor. It utilizes a survey questionnaire distributed among inspectors of the Department of Labor in the Ministry of Human Resources of Malaysia (n=241). The (...) result of this study demonstrates that rebelliousness has a negative relationship with discretion, and client meaningfulness has a direct positive correlation with discretion. However, the relationship between rebelliousness and discretion is stronger with a high level of client meaningfulness. The objective of this study is to examine street-level bureaucrat behavior through the lens of Lipsky's theory which will provide an answer to the broad question of the factors that contribute to the existence of an imperfect implementation process. This study sheds light on the importance of client meaningfulness in moderating the behavior of street-level bureaucrats while interacting with inspectees. The novelty of this study is by highlighting two main constructs that are likely contributing to the implementation process by directly and indirectly impacting bureaucrats’ discretion: rebelliousness, and client meaningfulness. (shrink)

En la Constitución de la República de Polonia del 2 de abril de 19971 se reconocía el carácter objetivo de ciertos valores y un cognoscitivismo axiológico. Si tomamos las disposiciones constitucionales en serio tenemos que aceptar que algunas valoraciones morales o que algunas proferencias [utterances] valorativas pueden ser verdaderas o falsas y que nos informan acerca de una realidad objetiva. Por otro lado, en la teoría del derecho polaca y en los cursos universitarios de lógica para abogados se encuentran definiciones (...) de la justificación axiológica de las normas y de normas axiológicas (normas que poseen una justificación axiológica) que presuponen que ningún valor es objetivo y que no pueden ser conocidos — se presupone un no-cognoscitivismo axiológico. De acuerdo con el no-cognoscitivismo, ninguna valoración y ninguna proferencia valorativa puede ser verdadera o falsa, ni puede informar acerca de la realidad. En este trabajo se analiza la concepción no-cognoscitivista de Zygmunt Ziembiński tal y como ha sido formulada en su libro de texto lógica práctica [Logika praktyczna] — el cual ha formado intelecTraduddo del inglés por Jorge Cerdio; título original: «True Norms in the Light of Axiological Justification of Norms». Relectura: Germán Sucar. La Constitución de la República de Polonia [Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej] del 2 de abril de 1997, Dziennik Ustaw, 1997. No. 78, item 483. Versión en inglés en Gierach, 2009: 21. 6S6 Mark Piechowiak tualmente a dos generaciones de abogados polacos y ha establecido el estándar bajo el que se entienden las justificaciones axiológicas y las normas axiológicas2. Su definición de valoración y de normas excluyen la posibilidad misma de un discurso significativo acerca de las valoraciones o acerca de las normas en términos de verdad o falsedad. (shrink)

En su discusión “Obras de ficción, formas de conciencia y literatura”, Josep Corbí formula una serie de críticas certeras a mis ideas sobre la distinción que he hecho entre ficción y no ficción en Relatar lo ocurrido como invención. En esta nota de respuesta expongo primero de forma sucinta el núcleo de esas ideas y después proporciono las que considero las razones más decisivas para adoptarlas, a pesar de las dificultades que señala Corbí.

In his paper “Obras de ficción, formas de conciencia y literatura”, Josep Corbí raises a few sharp objections to my distinction between fiction and non-fiction, as I formulate it in my recently published Relatar lo ocurrido como invención. In this response, I present first in a compact form such ideas, and then I try to answer to Corbí’s criticisms.

O artigo tem como objetivo apresentar o problema da determinação do sentido das normas para o Kelsen considerando a flexibilidade do quadro de interpretações. Expõe, primeiramente, a suposta transição do conceito de interpretação normativa, passando de um formalismo-normativismo restritivo para um realismo jurídico a partir das suas últimas obras; em um segundo momento apresenta o decorrente conflito ainda atual constituído por essas reformulações. Finalmente, defende a hipótese de superação da dicotomia formalismo-normativismo versus realismo jurídico através de uma leitura realista normativista.

El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo analizar los principales cambios que implicará para aquellos ejercicios iniciados a partir del 1 de enero de 2018, la entrada en vigencia de la Norma Internacional de Información Financiera (NIIF) 15 – Ingreso de Actividades Ordinarias Procedentes de Contratos con Clientes- sustituyendo a las Norma Internacional de Contabilidad (NIC) 11 – Contratos de Construcción-, NIC 18 – Ingresos de Actividades Ordinarias-, Interpretación desarrollada por el Comité de Interpretaciones de las Normas Internacionales de (...) Información Financiera (CINIIF) 13 – Programas de Fidelización de Clientes-, CINIIF 15 – Acuerdos para la Construcción de Inmuebles-, CINIIF 18 – Transferencias de Activos procedentes de Clientes-, e Interpretación desarrollada por el Comité de Interpretaciones de Normas Internacionales de Contabilidad (SIC) 31 – Ingresos-Permutas de Servicios de Publicidad-. A tales efectos, analizaremos los principales lineamientos contables establecidos por la NIIF 15, a través del modelo de las cinco etapas y de otros aspectos que a nuestro entender son importantes presentando algunos casos prácticos para un mejor entendimiento. (shrink)

Una de las tesis que tradicionalmente han sido defendidas por la tradición del positivismo jurídico es la tesis coactiva, según la cual el derecho consiste en un conjunto de normas coactivas, en el sentido de impuestas por medio de la fuerza. Pero, sin abandonar esta corriente, ha habido históricamente diversas maneras de entender las relaciones entre derecho y fuerza. Si, pues, hasta comienzos del s. XX era opinión común la idea de que el derecho constituía un conjunto de mandatos o (...) normas de conducta cuya eficacia se garantizaba a través de la amenaza del uso de la fuerza coactiva a los transgresores de aquéllas; a lo largo del siglo pasado, empero, algunos autores muy destacados dieron en sostener la opinión de que la fuerza disponible por jueces y funcionarios venía a constituir sustancialmente el objeto mismo de toda regulación jurídica. Según esta última concepción, el derecho tendría primordialmente la función de articular las condiciones de legitimidad para el uso de la fuerza, designando a los sujetos a los que se encomienda tal uso y determinado los casos y modalidades en los que pueda utilizarse. Entre quienes sustentan la primera tesis, que afirma que la fuerza constituye la garantía del derecho, es lugar común citar a Austin y, a menudo, se cita también a Jhering. Entre los defensores de la segunda tesis común es habitual mencionar a Kelsen, Olivecrona y Ross, habiéndose sustanciado una polémica entre Bobbio y Olivecrona en punto a determinar si fuera menciona Olivecrona o fue Kelsen el primero en adoptarla. Sin embargo, es problemático incluir a Jhering dentro del primer grupo y no dentro del segundo, en cuyo caso habría que atribuirle la primera formulación histórica de la tesis. Este trabajo, de carácter histórico, parte de la citada polémica y trata de verificar la constancia de la segunda tesis en las obras no sólo de Kelsen y Olivecrona, sino sobre todo de Jhering. (shrink)

RESEÑAS. Margarita M. Valdés y Miguel Ángel Fernández (compiladores), Normas, virtudes y valores epistémicos. Ensayos de epistemología contemporánea, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, México, 2011, 550 pp.

Desde un punto de vista postmetafísico y a partir de los argumentos que nos proporciona un autor como Ludwig Wittgenstein, trataremos de defender la tesis de que las normas en general cobran su carácter normativo de la responsabilidad que se atribuye a cada agente cuando, al actuar en sociedad, se liga a los compromisos que sostienen la posibilidad de que esa acción sea común. Esos compromisos, ya que no pueden responder ante una instancia ajena a los agentes sociales , habrán (...) de tener el cariz práctico de todo lo que atañe en exclusiva a los afanes de los humanos entre sí. Una regla no nos pide que respondamos de su cumplimiento o no, pero nosotros sí que podemos pedirnos cuentas unos a otros de ese cumplimiento o vulneración a partir de la responsabilidad compartida en la vida social en que pululan tales reglas; de hecho, a aquellos que las incumplen gravemente, siempre podemos apartarlos definitivamente de nuestra vida en sociedad adjudicándoles «maldad» o «locura» persistente. Al caer así en la cuenta de que las reglas tienen sólo este género de responsabilidad mutua, una nueva regla se nos puede hacer plausible junto a las demás: la de tolerar la posibilidad de otros compromisos con diferentes reglas en otros contextos que hayan generado otras responsabilidades diferentes a las nuestras. (shrink)

El presente estudio ofrece una interpretación de naturaleza ontológica a uno de los fenómenos más divulgados recientemente por los medios informativos de comunicación: la displicencia de los sujetos al seguimiento de normas sociales. El trabajo se centra, especialmente, en los casos en los que se asume que la indiferencia a las normas tiene como causa la condición del privilegiado social. Argumenta que la inobservancia a las normas, más que ser un asunto de desigualdad social, es la sintomatología de importantes hendiduras (...) en la ontología de la realidad social. Así, tres partes conforman este trabajo. En la primera se describen algunos casos que, desde los medios de comunicación, se presentan como representativos en la inobservancia a las normas sociales, especialmente, aquellos que son interpretados como un asunto de abuso de privilegio social. En la segunda parte, a partir de algunos trabajos de John Austin, Ulises Moulines y Gottlob Frege, se presenta una concepción de normas sociales, y su valor para la construcción de la ontología social. En la tercera parte, desde la propuesta del filósofo John Searle, se describen algunos rasgos esenciales de la ontología de la realidad social. Se concluye que el no seguimiento de las normas sociales socava los modos de existencia de la realidad social, y que los casos interpretados por los medios de comunicación como asunto de desigualdad social, requieren una interpretación que tenga en cuenta la estructura de la realidad social. (shrink)

In this paper, I present two ways of conceiving a genealogical explanation of the concept of knowledge. The first one is through the epistemic state of nature hypothesis developed by Edward Craig, according to which knowledge is understood as a concept evolved from the concept of a good informant. After considering Craig’s project, I draw a parallel between this approach and Miranda Fricker’s value-laden account of the same concept. Then, I present and discuss Fricker’s social take on Craig’s genealogy, in (...) which she suggests that the notions of a good informant and of knowledge are necessarily dependent on the establishment of a credibility norm, and that this norm should be viewed as inherently political. Lastly, I defend an illustration, through Kristie Dotson’s work, of how both genealogical approaches could explain and offer solutions to failings in the normativity of our epistemic systems. (shrink)

Com este artigo procura-se introduzir a questão da origem social das normas morais e jurídicas a partir da obra de Hans Kelsen e solucionar, de forma breve, o problema da conciliação do método lógico-transcendental da Teoria pura com a filosofia positivista e empirista do autor.

O propósito deste trabalho é analisar a estrutura e discutir a aplicação da(s) lógica(s) deôntica(s) na representação de normas jurídicas. Após uma apresentação desta(s) lógic(s) e, em particular, do sistema de von Wright e da SDL (Standard Deontic Logic), veremos as dificuldades de se aplicar uma lógica à análise do direito positivo: as regras da lógica devem permitir realizar sobre as normas formalizadas somente os tipos de inferência e operaçôes lógicas intuitivamente feitas pelos juristas, ou seja, a reconstrução lógica do (...) direito positivo não se trata de uma tarefa de criação do direito, mas uma tarefa de representação daquilo que o conceito de direito usual reconhece como tal. Para ilustrar estas dificuldades, abordaremos as propostas de Carlos Alchourrón em artigo de 1975, “Condicionalidad y la representación de las normas jurídicas”. (shrink)

Con una metodología analítico-sintética, el propósito del presente artículo es ofrecer un fundamento teórico sobre la legitimidad de los actos y las decisiones morales. Por consiguiente, se resolverá la siguiente cuestión: ¿cuál es la función ética del derecho, en el marco del ejercicio de una conciencia y consciencia construidas por agentes morales? Se concluye que la coacción legítima debe fundarse en la protección universal de toda persona y en el sometimiento a objeciones por parte de los ciudadanos, con el propósito (...) de revisar la legitimidad y legalidad de las normas jurídicas. (shrink)

In this text we try to summarize the axiological and ethical theories, as well as its relation with human rights -HR- that is developed from scientific philosophy: a philosophy that seeks to construct general conceptual systems that are clear and exact, and tries to adjust itself to the sciences of its time, to feed back with them. In this way, it is investigated in the practical philosophy faced with the maximum possible rigor and focused on achieving certain objectivity; a technical (...) philosophy. All along this work we develop the central concepts, hypothesis and prescriptions of the practical philosophy on the scientific substrate available. It also proposes some ideas critical of ‘human rights’ that may be of interest to jurists and legal theorists. The final objective of these critics it is not the refutation or suppression of HR, but just the opposed: their strength reaffirmation with the improvements and readjustments required. (shrink)

Los sociobiólogos han defendido una posición "calvinista" que se resume en la siguiente fórmula: si la selección natural explica las actitudes morales, no hay altruismo genuino en la moral; si la moral es altruista, entonces la selección natural no puede explicarla. En este ensayo desenmascaro los presupuestos erróneos de esta posición y defiendo que el altruismo como equidad no es incompatible con la selección natural. Rechazo una concepción hobbesiana de la moral, pero sugiero su empleo en la interpretación de la (...) psicología de los primates no humanos y en un modelo de progresión evolutiva que habría llevado a la moralidad como adaptación pasando por la razón instrumental. /// Sociobiologists have endorsed a "Calvinist" position captured in the following formula: if natural selection explains moral attitudes, morality is not genuinely altruistic; if morality is altruistic, then natural selection cannot explain it. I expose the false presuppositions behind this claim and argüe that altruism as fairness is not incompatible with natural selection. I reject a Hobbesian view of morality as an instrumental endorsement of fairness norms, but suggest its use to interpret primate psychology and to model an evolutionary progression ending in moral capacities as adaptations. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose to draw attention to a specific version of non-voluntaristic imperativism, its corresponding conception of legal norm, and the framework in which it is inserted: that advocated by Scandinavian realist Karl Olivecrona. In order to carry out this analysis, I will first contextualise Olivecrona’s position and his rejection of voluntarism; briefly reconstruct his position in relation to law and legal authority; and introduce the way in which authority and legal norms are articulated as cogs in the (...) machine of law (section 2). I will then analyse in depth Olivecrona’s conception of the legal norm as an independent imperative with a suggestive character, focusing on his rejection of the norm as a mandate and the elements of this type of legal imperative (section 3). Finally, I will focus on this particular conception of norms as independent imperatives and address some problems it raises, including the problem of their identification, the obscurity of the claim that these imperatives “guide behaviour”, and the appropriateness of the category of ‘suggestive character’ (section 4). I conclude the analysis with some brief reflections on the possible usefulness of the category of independent imperatives for at least two relevant and current topics in the philosophy of law (section 5). (shrink)

Há pelo menos três modos pelos quais o debate sobre a conduta doxástica se relaciona com a ética. O primeiro e menos contencioso assinala que o ato de crer, analogamente às ações morais, responde a um tipo de normatividade, não necessariamente moral. Por exemplo, as normas para o ato de crer podem ser puramente epistêmicas. Nesse caso, essas normas diriam respeito a como o agente deve visar ou buscar a verdade. O segundo modo como o debate da ética da crença (...) se relaciona com a ética diz respeito à fundamentação das normas para crer. A ideia é que a adoção dessas normas se fundamenta com base em razões morais e sociais. Por fim, o modo mais substancial consiste em sustentar que o ato de crer, ao menos em alguns casos, é em parte um fenômeno essencialmente moral e que, portanto, razões morais incidem diretamente sobre a legitimidade da crença. Por razões morais, alguém poderia ser recriminado por sustentar uma crença ainda que tivesse evidência favorável para ela. Neste verbete, tangenciando o clássico debate entre Clifford e William James e reações mais contemporâneas ao debate, apresentaremos e discutiremos cada um desses aspectos da ética da crença. (shrink)

O Direito Global estrutura-se, predominantemente, por normas de conectividade, que se diferenciam das normas de coerência e de possibilidade. A centralidade das normas de conectividade emerge da própria função do direito global, que é a de aumentar a probabilidade de transferência de componentes sociais condensados, como capital econômico e produtos, doutrinas religiosas e conhecimento científico, de um contexto juridicamente estruturado para outro, no âmbito da sociedade mundial. Esse é o caso desde o colonialismo e o direito colonial até as atuais (...) cadeias produtivas globais e os direitos humanos. Tanto o direito colonial quanto os direitos humanos podem ser entendidos como ferramentas à serviço da função de constitucionalização orientada à estabilização e à facilitação da conectividade. Por conseguinte, é possível compreender o colonialismo e a governança global contemporânea como equivalentes funcionais, mas não como equivalentes normativos. (shrink)

El libro trata los siguientes temas de acuerdo a la normativa uruguaya: -/- NORMAS CONTABLES II EFECTIVO Y OTROS VALORES · Sistema de Banco y Fondo Fijo · Descuentos y endosos de documentos · Arqueo de Caja y Valores · Conciliación Bancaria III INVENTARIOS IV PROPIEDADES, PLANTA Y EQUIPO V ASIENTO DE APERTURA VI PRESENTACIÓN DE ESTADOS FINANCIEROS.

A partir de los postulados de una concepción semántica de norma y su clasificación en reglas y principios, Robert Alexy ha enunciado una tesis fuerte de la separación, al concebir que entre ambos tipos de normas no solo existe una diferencia gradual, sino también cualitativa. En este contexto, los principios son descritos como mandatos de optimización, caracterizados por un cumplimiento gradual en atención a las posibilidades reales y jurídicas, y a través de la denominada técnica de la ponderación. A (...) pesar de las objeciones recibidas, la vigencia de esta tesis resulta incuestionable, sirviendo todavía de inspiración a las nuevas generaciones de juristas interesados en la Teoría del Derecho. En el presente capítulo se pretende exponer de manera sucinta pero precisa los postulados del principialismo alexyano, las críticas más recurrentes y sus posibles respuestas, para terminar con algunas notas interpretativas que persiguen contribuir a la continuación del camino trazado por el insigne profesor alemán. (shrink)

Las normas nacionales y el campo de batalla tecnológico, industrial, económico e incluso militar de las aplicaciones de la inteligencia artificial se enfrentarán significativamente entre las potencias mundiales a medida que avance la carrera por la supremacía geopolítica estratégica. China y Estados Unidos están considerados como las dos naciones punteras en I+D (investigación y desarrollo). Estados Unidos alberga algunas de las principales empresas e instituciones de IA, y cuenta con un sólido historial de innovación y espíritu emprendedor en el sector (...) tecnológico. China, por su parte, ha avanzado considerablemente en I+D gracias a la financiación pública, a un gran número de jóvenes investigadores y al espíritu de competencia del Partido Comunista Chino. Rusia, por su parte, con un liderazgo pragmático y demencial, avanza en IA a paso firme y sin mayores reservas. Cada uno de los tres países ha publicado su normativa ética para la IA y, como objetivo de este capítulo, se presenta un análisis ponderado de cada uno. (shrink)

Předložený článek si na základě rozboru hlavních motivů ve Foucaultově a Canguilhemově pojetí norem klade za cíl vymezit, jaká je vzájemná vazba mezi biologickou a společenskou normativitou a jakým typem moci na nás normy vlastně působí. V souladu s interpretací navrženou Pierrem Macherey se pokusíme sílu norem vystihnout v termínech jejich „imanence a produktivity" a ukázat, proč nelze normy chápat dle modelu zákona, který by ke svému předmětu přistupoval zvnějšku. Poslední část pak přináší odpověď na otázku, jaký typ individualizace či (...) subjektivizace toto pojetí diskvalifikuje a jaké možnosti ponechává pro svébytnou singularitu v rámci normativního pole. (shrink)

Etycy nie poświęcali dotąd wiele uwagi niepewności, koncentrując się często na skrajnie wyidealizowanych hipotetycznych sytuacjach, w których zarówno kwestie empiryczne (np. stan świata, spektrum możliwych decyzji oraz ich konsekwencje, związki przyczynowe między zdarzeniami), jak i normatywne (np. treść norm, skale wartości) były jasno określone i znane podmiotowi. W poniższym artykule – który jest rezultatem projektu dotyczącego różnych typów decyzji w sytuacjach niepewności związanej z postępem w naukach i technologiach biomedycznych – przedstawię analizę sytuacji niepewności normatywnej, czyli takich, w których podmiot (...) musi podjąć decyzję, nie mając pewności co do tego, jaka norma postępowania jest właściwa, np. dlatego, że ma sprzeczne intuicje normatywne na temat dopuszczalności danej decyzji. Stanowisko, które określa się niekiedy mianem komparatywizmu, głosi, że w tego typu sytuacjach należy uwzględniać nie tylko stopnie przekonań podmiotu w kwestii różnych norm, ale także to, na ile możliwe decyzje warte są podjęcia wedle tych norm. Przedstawię tu analizę kilku przypadków niepewności normatywnej, a także charakterystyczny argument przeciwko dotychczasowym wersjom komparatywizmu, wskazujący, że nie uwzględniają one różnych nastawień do ryzyka w sytuacjach niepewności normatywnej, choć dopuszczają jednocześnie różne nastawienia do ryzyka w sytuacjach niepewności empirycznej. Pokażę też, że zasada ostrożności dotycząca statusu moralnego w upraszczający sposób przedstawia sytuacje niepewności normatywnej. (shrink)

La presente investigación se esfuerza en mostrar la impronta del pensador Hans Jonas en relación con la ética de la responsabilidad como el espejo privilegiado donde se descifra la civilización tecnológica. Cuando hablamos de ética en el mundo digital, nos acomete la reflexión filosófica jurídica y política donde se esgrime la revitalización de los valores y el espíritu de responsabilidad como exigente en este mundo, ya Max Weber dejaba las pautas sobre la ética de la responsabilidad atenta a las consecuencias (...) de las acciones y normas, en confrontación con la ética kantiana de la intención; aunque, Kant asociaba la responsabilidad con el concebir libre y la autonomía de la voluntad, así como afirma Nicola Abbagnano (2004) que Christian Wolff definía “la imputación como “el juicio mediante el cual el agente es declarado causa libre de las consecuencias de su acción, esto es, del bien o del mal que de ella resultan ya sea para él mismo o para los otros” (Philosophia practica, I, §527). -/- El mundo universitario ha experimentado profundos cambios en las últimas dos décadas. Estos cambios se han visto influenciados por factores locales, nacionales y regionales. No obstante, es innegable que se trata de un fenómeno de evolución global derivado de la creciente importancia que tiene el conocimiento para el crecimiento social y económico en un mundo interconectado. De modo que, en pleno Siglo XXI, cada Universidad debe plantearse cuál es su identidad, es decir, a qué nichos o segmentos de la población quiere dirigirse y diseñar una estrategia de mercado que le permita no sólo situarse en el mapa, sino también ser objeto de reconocimiento y distinción. -/- . (shrink)