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What's in a Numeral? Frege's Answer

Mind 116 (463):677-716 (2007)

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  1. Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism.Hartry H. Field - 1980 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
    Science Without Numbers caused a stir in 1980, with its bold nominalist approach to the philosophy of mathematics and science. It has been unavailable for twenty years and is now reissued in a revised edition with a substantial new preface presenting the author's current views and responses to the issues raised in subsequent debate.
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  • What numbers could not be.Paul Benacerraf - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.
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  • Begriffsschrift: Eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens.Gottlob Frege - 1879 - Halle a.d.S.: Louis Nebert.
    Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens / von Dr. Gottlob Frege,...Date de l'edition originale : 1879Ce livre est la reproduction fidele d'une oeuvre publiee avant 1920 et fait partie d'une collection de livres reimprimes a la demande editee par Hachette Livre, dans le cadre d'un partenariat avec la Bibliotheque nationale de France, offrant l'opportunite d'acceder a des ouvrages anciens et souvent rares issus des fonds patrimoniaux de la BnF.Les oeuvres faisant partie de cette collection ont ete numerisees (...)
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  • Frege - Begriffschrift, eine der Arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens. [REVIEW]Paul Tannery - 1879 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 8:108-109.
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  • Frege's reduction.Patricia A. Blanchette - 1994 - History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (1):85-103.
    This paper defends the view that Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic would, if successful, have shown that arithmetical knowledge is analytic in essentially Kant’s sense. It is argued, as against Paul Benacerraf, that Frege’s apparent acceptance of multiple reductions is compatible with this epistemological thesis. The importance of this defense is that (a) it clarifies the role of proof, definition, and analysis in Frege’s logicist works; and (b) it demonstrates that the Fregean style of reduction is a valuable tool (...)
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