_Naming and Necessity_ has had a great and increasing influence. It redirected philosophical attention to neglected questions of natural and metaphysical necessity and to the connections between these and theories of naming, and of identity. This seminal work, to which today's thriving essentialist metaphysics largely owes its impetus, is here reissued in a newly corrected form with a new preface by the author. If there is such a thing as essential reading in metaphysics, or in philosophy of language, this is (...) it. (shrink)

One of the cornerstone books of Western philosophy, Critique of Pure Reason is Kant's seminal treatise, where he seeks to define the nature of reason itself and builds his own unique system of philosophical thought with an approach known as transcendental idealism. He argues that human knowledge is limited by the capacity for perception and attempts a logical designation of two varieties of knowledge: a posteriori, the knowledge acquired through experience; and a priori, knowledge not derived through experience. This accurate (...) translation by J. M. D. Meiklejohn offers a simple and direct rendering of Kant's work that is suitable for readers at all levels. (shrink)

This entirely new translation of Critique of Pure Reason by Paul Guyer and Allan Wood is the most accurate and informative English translation ever produced of this epochal philosophical text. Though its simple, direct style will make it suitable for all new readers of Kant, the translation displays a philosophical and textual sophistication that will enlighten Kant scholars as well. This translation recreates as far as possible a text with the same interpretative nuances and richness as the original.

This collection of 17 essays by the author offers a comprehensive theory of mind, encompassing traditional issues of consciousness and free will.

A transcript of three lectures, given at Princeton University in 1970, which deals with (inter alia) debates concerning proper names in the philosophy of language.

What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. (...) But according to strong AI, the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather, the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to. (shrink)

Breaking new ground in the debate about the relation of mind and body, David Armstrong's classic text - first published in 1968 - remains the most compelling and comprehensive statement of the view that the mind is material or physical. In the preface to this new edition, the author reflects on the book's impact and considers it in the light of subsequent developments. He also provides a bibliography of all the key writings to have appeared in the materialist debate.

This paper presents a partial analysis of perceptual knowledge, an analysis that will, I hope, lay a foundation for a general theory of knowing. Like an earlier theory I proposed, the envisaged theory would seek to explicate the concept of knowledge by reference to the causal processes that produce (or sustain) belief. Unlike the earlier theory, however, it would abandon the requirement that a knower's belief that p be causally connected with the fact, or state of affairs, that p.

The "Cartesian Meditations" translation is based primarily on the printed text, edited by Professor S. Strasser and published in the first volume of Husserliana ...

Professor Hilary Putnam has been one of the most influential and sharply original of recent American philosophers in a whole range of fields. His most important published work is collected here, together with several new and substantial studies, in two volumes. The first deals with the philosophy of mathematics and of science and the nature of philosophical and scientific enquiry; the second deals with the philosophy of language and mind. Volume one is now issued in a new edition, including an (...) essay on the philosophy of logic first published in 1971. (shrink)

Functionalism represents the most promising as well as the most severely criticized approach to the philosophy of mind. In this dissertation functionalism is defended as a theory of the propositional content of intentional states. The first chapter is a criticism of the competing theories of propositional content: anti-mentalism, instrumentalism, and nonfunctionalist materialism. Theories of the first two kinds are open to straightforward counterexamples. Theories of the third sort are open to counterexamples on the assumption that the distinction between physical and (...) functional properties is neither incoherent nor arbitrary. It is shown that the criticisms which have been advanced against this assumption do not succeed. ;The second chapter is an account of the notion of a partial state functional description and its place in a theory of content. The role of radical interpretation in a theory of content is discussed and a method of assigning content to the partial functional state is elaborated. ;The third chapter is a treatment of the distinction between occurrent and dispositional mental states. The distinction which is relevant to philosophy of mind is between states which are causally efficacious and those which are not. It is argued that the occurrent/dispositional distinction so construed is definable in terms of partial state functional descriptions and a definition is provided. ;The fourth chapter is an account of the instantiation relation between physical systems and abstract automata. Conventionalism with respect to instantiation is the thesis that any causal system which is sufficiently large will instantiate any functional description. Counterexamples are provided to the most extreme version of the conventionalist thesis. General arguments are provided that the strategies which a conventionalist might employ in defending a weaker version of the thesis will not succeed. The chapter concludes with a formulation of the instantiation relation. ;The fifth chapter reconciles functionalism as a kind of autonomous psychology with causal theories of the referential content of intentional states. It is argued that although functional states do not determine propositions, they determine a kind of semantic content which is relevant to psychological explanation. (shrink)