- Can self-representationalism explain away the apparent irreducibility of consciousness?Tom McClelland - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1-22.details
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Gappiness and the Case for Liberalism About Phenomenal Properties.Tom McClelland - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly (264):536-558.details
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The Phenomenal Character of Emotional Experience: A Look at Perception Theory.Anika Lutz - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (3):313-334.details
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Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
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The epistemic significance of experience.Alex Byrne - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173:947-67.details
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O princípio da cognoscibilidade e os qualia.Cícero Antônio Cavalcante Barroso - 2014 - Trans/Form/Ação 37 (2):91-109.details
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The Problem of Consciousness: Easy, Hard or Tricky?Tom McClelland - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):17-30.details
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Self-Representationalism and the Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis: A Hybrid Account of Phenomenal Consciousness.Tom McClelland - 2012 - Dissertation, Sussexdetails
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Space Perception, Visual Dissonance and the Fate of Standard Representationalism.Farid Masrour - 2017 - Noûs 51 (3):565-593.details
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Same but Different.Anna-Sofia Maurin - 2005 - Metaphysica 6 (1):131-146.details
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Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.details
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Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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"Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknowndetails
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Experimental Methods for Unraveling the Mind-body Problem: The Phenomenal Judgment Approach.Victor Argonov - 2014 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 35 (1-2):51-70.details
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Subjekt und selbstmodell. Die perspektivität phänomenalen bewußtseins vor dem hintergrund einer naturalistischen theorie mentaler repräsentation.Thomas K. Metzinger - 1999 - In 自我隧道 自我的新哲学 从神经科学到意识伦理学.details
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Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.details
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On the coherence of inversion.Clayton Littlejohn - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (2):127-137.details
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The experience of left and right.Geoffrey Lee - 2006 - In Tama Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), The Experience of Left and Right. Oxford University Press.details
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In Defence of the Phenomenological Objection to Mental Fictionalism.Márton Miklós & Tőzsér János - 2020 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 27 (2):169-186.details
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Against qualia theory.James John - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):323 - 346.details
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Color: A vision scientist's perspective.Davida Y. Teller - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):48-49.details
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Surface color perception in constrained environments.Laurence T. Maloney - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):38-39.details
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Why not color physicalism without color absolutism?Zoltán Jakab & Brian P. McLaughlin - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):34-35.details
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Do metamers matter?Martin Hahn - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):30-31.details
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Concepts, introspection, and phenomenal consciousness: An information-theoretical approach.Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):197-255.details
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Qualia im knotenpunkt zwischen Leib und seele: „Argumentatives“ dilemma in der gegenwärtigen diskussion über die subjektivität mentaler zustände. [REVIEW]Georg Northoff - 1995 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 26 (2):269 - 295.details
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Chalmers on consciousness and quantum mechanics.Alex Byrne & Ned Hall - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):370-90.details
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Color realism redux.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):52-59.details
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Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993).Roberto Casati & Barry Smith (eds.) - 1994 - Vienna: Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.details
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The mind as the software of the brain.Ned Block - 1990 - In Daniel N. Osherson & Edward E. Smith (eds.), An Invitation to Cognitive Science: Visual cognition. 2. MIT Press. pp. 377-425.details
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The argument from diaphanousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (Supplement):341--90.details
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Color realism and color science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.details
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Perceptual variation, realism, and relativization, or: How I learned to stop worrying and love variations in color vision.Jonathan Cohen - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):25-26.details
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The contents of perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The duality of non-conceptual content in Husserl’s phenomenology of perception.Michael K. Shim - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):209-229.details
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Perceptual experience, conscious content, and nonconceptual content.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-14.details
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Experiences, thoughts, and qualia.Harold Langsam - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (3):269-295.details
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Sense data: The sensible approach.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2001 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):17-63.details
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Curse of the qualia.Stephen L. White - 1986 - Synthese 68 (August):333-68.details
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An argument against spectrum inversion.Pär Sundström - 2002 - In Sten Lindström & Pär Sundström (eds.), Physicalism, Consciousness, and Modality: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind. Umeå: Department of Philosophy and Linguistics, Umeå University. pp. 65--94.details
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Black and white and the inverted spectrum.Justin Broackes - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):161-175.details
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Intentionalism and the imaginability of the inverted spectrum.Eric Marcus - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):321-339.details
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Introduction.Vivian Mizrahi & Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):209-222.details
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Quining qualia Quine's way.Don Ross - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (3):439-59.details
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What is it like to be a phenomenologist?Kelly D. Jolley & Michael Watkins - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):204-9.details
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Qualia.Michael Tye - 1997 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Wittgenstein and Qualia.Ned Block - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.details
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Qualia: They’re Not What They Seem.John Gibbons - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):397-428.details
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On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.details
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Phenomenal content.Uriah Kriegel - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (2):175-198.details
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