The Road to Reality John M. Rist. 13 THE ORIGINALITY OF PLOTINUS ' It is necessary to take the notable opinions of the ancients and consider whether any of them agree with ours.' (Enneads 3.7.7.15) It will not have escaped the reader's  ...

Plotinus' recognises the possibility of conflict between self-referential aims and the good of the kosmos. His solution resembles closely one attributed sometimes to the Stoics. The inner reformation Plotinus proposes will yield a detached understanding of the whole universe. This view is accompanied by a realisation that one's happiness lies in functioning as a part of the whole and in contributing to the perfection of the universe. Other-regard cannot, therefore, be seen as altogether missing from neoplatonic ethics. What gives Plotinus' (...) ethics an agent-centred spin is its emphasis on how this state can be attained. Promoting the self's true well-being by an inward turn is the only means to an understanding of what is good simpliciter. (shrink)

Cette étude a pour but d'établir en quoi consiste l'éthique plotinienne en analysant la figure du sage, le spoudaios, dans les "Ennéades", en particulier dans le traité I, 4 [46].

Amazing as it may be, to this day few commentaries on the treatises of Plotinus' Enneads are written. The classic ninth treatise, for example, has hardly been studied. This treatise, however, is of vital importance, because it is in this work that for the first time in the Enneads, the One in its superform emerges and Plotinus dwells on the remarkable phenomenon of a 'mystical union' of the soul with the One. A thorough analysis of the argument and its development (...) next to philosophical and philo-logical support will be welcome to any reader of this in-triguing but difficult treatise. These aims are pursued in the main part of Meijer's work, the commentary. The first part of the book, preceding the commentary, examines the philosophical history of the concept of the One and its status in the first eight treatises. This new approach to the problem of the One leads to striking conclusions. It appears that while Plotinus was writing these first eight treatises, the concept of the One developed from that of a Supreme Entity of a Mesoplatonian character, viz. the upper part of the mind, to One of a Superone above mind. This casts an entirely new light on the position of the One in Plotinus and that of the ninth treatise itself. The third part not only examines the mystical union as pictured in the ninth treatise, but also provides a full scale discussion of Plotinus' descriptions of this union in his en-tire work. The degree of unification, viz. the question whether a part of the mystic self remains intact during the unification, is a matter of vigorous scholarly debate. Meijer shows that, in spite of some inconsistencies in his doctrine about the union, one must accept that Plotinus basically considered the union as a complete absorption of the soul into the Supreme Entity. (shrink)

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.

This book traces the development of conceptions of God and the relationship between God's being and activity from Aristotle, through the pagan Neoplatonists, to thinkers such as Augustine, Boethius and Aquinas and Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor and Gregory Palamas. The result is a comparative history of philosophical thought in the two halves of Christendom, providing a philosophical backdrop to the schism between the Eastern and Western Churches.

ARISTOTLE PRESENTS HIS DOCTRINE OF GOD as the first unmoved mover as the crown of his metaphysics, and thus of his entire theoretical philosophy. He obviously considers it an important achievement. Yet the doctrine has been peculiarly resistant to interpretation. It is difficult to know where to break in to Aristotle's theology: certainly not with his proof that the first mover must be unmoved. The proof has clearly been developed for the sake of the conclusion and not vice versa. How (...) did this conclusion occur to Aristotle, and why did he want it to be true? (shrink)

There is a passage in the Nicomachean Ethics that holds out the promise of giving us a profound insight into Aristotle’s view of the good, A6: 1096a23-29. Unfortunately, the passage - where Aristotle argues, contra Plato, that the good cannot be one thing - has proven remarkably resistant to satisfactory interpretation, defying the efforts of scholars over the last nine decades or so. This essay offers an interpretation which, while attempting both to be true to Aristotle’s text and to avoid (...) the pitfalls of past efforts, shows that he makes a solid case for the claim that goods are irreducibly diverse. It is driven by new theses on several topics: the meaning he attaches to legetai in phrases such as legetai pollacwV, his method for identifying the significance of words, his method for identifying what the good is, and the fundamental manner in which the good is predicated for him. (shrink)