Taking a cue from Philo we may ask: If the adoption of the "seeing" approach from Greek philosophy was a misfortune for theology, does the repudiation or overcoming of that approach in a contemporary philosophy provide a conceptual means for theology to reform itself, to become more adequate to its task? Can it thus lead to a new alliance between theology and philosophy after, e.g., the medieval one with Aristotelianism has broken down? The question assumes that some use of philosophy, (...) i.e., of the elucidation of the nature of reality by secular thought, and of the nature of thinking about reality in secular thought, is desirable and even necessary for theology. This assumption must be granted, since theology, as the logos about things divine, is by definition the discursive, in some sense scientific, elucidation of the contents of faith and thus, for one thing, comes under the rules and norms of elucidation and discourse as such; and since the contents of faith comprise the dealings of God with the world and with man, the elucidation of the mundane and human side of this polarity must be informed by a knowledge of what world and man are, and philosophy is supposed to provide such knowledge. It would then follow that that philosophy is most adequate to theology which is most adequate to being, i.e., which is most nearly true—by the criteria of philosophy itself, i.e., by the criteria of secular reason. But since for a decision on this the theologians cannot wait for the consensus of philosophers, nor even necessarily trust its authority, they may be guided in their choice by the appeal of affinity, the lessons of past experience with philosophical liaisons, the present needs of their discipline, and by appraising which philosophy is most helpful to the discharge of theology's task, or least dangerous to its own trust, to its own genuineness, least seductive, least alienating—by any or all of these considerations, but as little as possible by fashion. On all these counts the theologian would do well to exercise a great deal of caution and mistrust. Especially in the face of tempting similarity: what theology needs in this relationship is the otherness of philosophy, not its similarity. On this I need not elaborate before a theological audience. However, the experiment of relationship itself is inescapable, and the one choice closed is abstention. Thus, the openness to contemporary thought shown by theology in the present experiment—as it was shown at all times—is to be welcomed. (shrink)

I argue that the theological enterprise within universities faces grave threats, especially by tendencies within the religious community itself. Following a discussion of these, a preliminary analysis or what the modern university should be is offered, together with reflections on the place of Christianity in this university environment.

In Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit (1930/31; 1942) deutet Heidegger die Platonische Auffassung von Wahrheit, so wie sie im Hohlengleichnis (Politeia) zum Ausdruck kommt, als Unverborgenheit eines Unverborgenen (der idea). Damit steht Platon fur Heidegger am Beginn der metaphysischen Wahrheitsauffassung, die in Nietzsche als dem Vollender der Metaphysik ihren Kulminationspunkt erreicht. Heidegger insistiert gegenuber Platon darauf, dass das Wesen der Wahrheit als Unverborgenheit anfanglicher gedacht werden muss. Das Wesen der Wahrheit ereignet sich als ein Wahrheitsgeschehen, das mit den traditionellen metaphysischen, (...) von Vernunft, Subjektivitat und Logizitat gepragten Denkformen nicht erfasst werden kann. Die Ausgabe enthalt auch den griechischen Text des Hohlengleichnisses sowie Heideggers Ubersetzung. Der Text dieser Ausgabe ist wort- und Seitengleich mit dem Abdruck des Textes in der 3. Auflage der Wegmarken als Band 9 der Gesamtausgabe sowie mit der Einzelausgabe der Wegmarken in der Reihe Klostermann RoteReihe. (shrink)