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  1. Individuals.P. F. Strawson - 1959 - Garden City, N.Y.: Routledge.
    Since its publication in 1959, Individuals has become a modern philosophical classic. Bold in scope and ambition, it continues to influence debates in metaphysics, philosophy of logic and language, and epistemology. Peter Strawson's most famous work, it sets out to describe nothing less than the basic subject matter of our thought. It contains Strawson's now famous argument for descriptive metaphysics and his repudiation of revisionary metaphysics, in which reality is something beyond the world of appearances. Throughout, Individuals advances some highly (...)
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  • (1 other version)An Externalist Theory of Social Understanding: Interaction, Psychological Models, and the Frame Problem.Axel Seemann - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
    I put forward an externalist theory of social understanding. On this view, psychological sense making takes place in environments that contain both agent and interpreter. The spatial structure of such environments is social, in the sense that its occupants locate its objects by an exercise in triangulation relative to each of their standpoints. This triangulation is achieved in intersubjective interaction and gives rise to a triadic model of the social mind. This model can then be used to make sense of (...)
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  • Joint attention and perceptual experience.Lucas Battich & Bart Geurts - 2021 - Synthese 198 (9):8809-8822.
    Joint attention customarily refers to the coordinated focus of attention between two or more individuals on a common object or event, where it is mutually “open” to all attenders that they are so engaged. We identify two broad approaches to analyse joint attention, one in terms of cognitive notions like common knowledge and common awareness, and one according to which joint attention is fundamentally a primitive phenomenon of sensory experience. John Campbell’s relational theory is a prominent representative of the latter (...)
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  • On underestimating us.Jane Heal - 2020 - Think 19 (54):9-20.
    Human beings are social animals. A solitary life would be horrible for most of us. What makes life worthwhile is being with others and engaging in shared projects with them. To do justice to these facts, philosophers need to pay more attention to the first-person plural, we/us, and to rethink their accounts of value and virtue.
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  • Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Hugh J. McCann & M. E. Bratman - 1991 - Noûs 25 (2):230.
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  • (1 other version)Uncommon Knowledge.Harvey Lederman - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1069-1105.
    Some people commonly know a proposition just in case they all know it, they all know that they all know it, they all know that they all know that they all know it, and so on. They commonly believe a proposition just in case they all believe it, they all believe that they all believe it, they all believe that they all believe that they all believe it, and so on. A long tradition in economic theory, theoretical computer science, linguistics (...)
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  • On the transformative character of collective intentionality and the uniqueness of the human.Andrea Kern & Henrike Moll - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (3):315-333.
    Current debates on collective intentionality focus on the cognitive capacities, attitudes, and mental states that enable individuals to take part in joint actions. It is typically assumed that collective intentionality is a capacity which is added to other, pre-existing, capacities of an individual and is exercised in cooperative activities like carrying a table or painting a house together. We call this the additive account because it portrays collective intentionality as a capacity that an individual possesses in addition to her capacity (...)
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  • Joint attention in joint action.Anika Fiebich & Shaun Gallagher - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):571-87.
    In this paper, we investigate the role of intention and joint attention in joint actions. Depending on the shared intentions the agents have, we distinguish between joint path-goal actions and joint final-goal actions. We propose an instrumental account of basic joint action analogous to a concept of basic action and argue that intentional joint attention is a basic joint action. Furthermore, we discuss the functional role of intentional joint attention for successful cooperation in complex joint actions. Anika Fiebich is PhD (...)
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  • Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition.Michael Tomasello, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call, Tanya Behne & Henrike Moll - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):675-691.
    We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and (...)
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  • (1 other version)Epistemic operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
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  • Epistemic conditions for collective action.Sara Rachel Chant & Zachary Ernst - 2008 - Mind 117 (467):549-573.
    Writers on collective action are in broad agreement that in order for a group of agents to form a collective intention, the members of that group must have beliefs about the beliefs of the other members. But in spite of the fact that this so-called "interactive knowledge" is central to virtually every account of collective intention, writers on this subject have not offered a detailed account of the nature of interactive knowledge. In this paper, we argue that such an account (...)
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  • The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
    A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I point out that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories.
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  • (1 other version)Consciousness and Reference.John Campbell - 2007 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • In defense of proper functions.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (June):288-302.
    I defend the historical definition of "function" originally given in my Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories (1984a). The definition was not offered in the spirit of conceptual analysis but is more akin to a theoretical definition of "function". A major theme is that nonhistorical analyses of "function" fail to deal adequately with items that are not capable of performing their functions.
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  • Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    John Campbell investigates how consciousness of the world explains our ability to think about the world; how our ability to think about objects we can see depends on our capacity for conscious visual attention to those things. He illuminates classical problems about thought, reference, and experience by looking at the underlying psychological mechanisms on which conscious attention depends.
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  • Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness?Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.
    It is often assumed thatconsciousness and intentionality are twomutually independent aspects of mental life.When the assumption is denounced, it usuallygives way to the claim that consciousness issomehow dependent upon intentionality. Thepossibility that intentionality may bedependent upon consciousness is rarelyentertained. Recently, however, John Searle andColin McGinn have argued for just suchdependence. In this paper, I reconstruct andevaluate their argumentation. I am in sympathyboth with their view and with the lines ofargument they employ in its defense. UnlikeSearle and McGinn, however, I am (...)
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  • The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans & John Mcdowell - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (238):534-538.
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  • Consciousness, self-consciousness and communication.Naomi Eilan - 2007 - In Thomas Baldwin (ed.), Reading Merleau-Ponty: On Phenomenology of Perception. New York: Routledge.
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  • (3 other versions)Individuals.P. F. Strawson - 1959 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 14 (2):246-246.
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  • (1 other version)Hume's Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature.Michael Williams & Robert J. Fogelin - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (2):263.
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  • (5 other versions)Meaning.Stephen R. Schiffer - 1973 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 163:478-479.
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  • Embodying the False-Belief Tasks.Michael Wilby - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):519-540.
    Embodied approaches to mindreading have tended to define themselves in contrast to cognitive approaches to social mindreading. One side effect of this has been a lack of engagement with key areas in the study of social cognition—in particular the topic of how we gain an understanding of the referential nature of others’ thoughts, and how that understanding develops from infancy. I argue that embodied accounts of mindreading are well equipped to enter into this debate, by making use of the notion (...)
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  • A new look at joint attention and common knowledge.Barbora Siposova & Malinda Carpenter - 2019 - Cognition 189 (C):260-274.
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  • (1 other version)Attention and direct realism.Bill Brewer - 2018 - In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness. new york: MIT Press.
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  • Eighteen-month-old infants show false belief understanding in an active helping paradigm.David Buttelmann, Malinda Carpenter & Michael Tomasello - 2009 - Cognition 112 (2):337-342.
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  • On Social Facts.Margaret Gilbert - 1989 - Ethics 102 (4):853-856.
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  • (2 other versions)Some origins of self.Tyler Burge - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (6-7):287-315.
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