- Attributing error without taking a stand.Caleb Perl & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1453-1471.details
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Flexible Contextualism about Deontic Modals: A Puzzle about Information-Sensitivity.J. L. Dowell - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (2-3):149-178.details
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The sense of incredibility in ethics.Nicholas Laskowski - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):93-115.details
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Disagreement Lost and Found.Stephen Finlay - 2017 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12. Oxford University Press. pp. 187-205.details
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Defining Normativity.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - In Toh Kevin, Plunkett David & Shapiro Scott (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 62-104.details
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Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics.Justin Khoo & Joshua Knobe - 2016 - Noûs:109-143.details
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Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.Robert Shaver - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):458.details
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How many meanings for ‘may’? The case for modal polysemy.Barbara Vetter & Emanuel Viebahn - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16.details
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Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language, by Stephen Finlay. [REVIEW]Daniel Fogal - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):281-288.details
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The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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How to Pull a Metaphysical Rabbit out of an End-Relational Semantic Hat.Nicholas Laskowski - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (4):589-607.details
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The meaning of 'ought'.Ralph Wedgwood - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 127-160.details
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Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms.David Plunkett & Timothy Sundell - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13 (23):1-37.details
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Modals with a Taste of the Deontic.Zoltán Gendler Szabó & Joshua Knobe - 2013 - Semantics and Pragmatics 6 (1):1-42.details
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(1 other version)Contextualist Solutions to Three Puzzles about Practical Conditionals.Janice Dowell, J. L. - 2009 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Four. Oxford University Press.details
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Metaethical Contextualism Defended.Gunnar Björnsson & Stephen Finlay - 2010 - Ethics 121 (1):7-36.details
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Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.details
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Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.John Leslie Mackie - 1977 - New York: Penguin Books.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):385 - 409.details
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Ifs and Oughts.Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.details
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The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral relativism defended.Gilbert Harman - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (1):3-22.details
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(2 other versions)The Language of Morals.Brian F. Chellas - 1971 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (1):180-181.details
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Moral Realism: Facts and Norms. [REVIEW]David O. BRINK - 1991 - Ethics 101 (3):610-624.details
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Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.Fred Feldman & J. L. Mackie - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (1):134.details
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(1 other version)The Language of Morals.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1952 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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The Meaning of 'Ought': Beyond Descriptivism and Expressivism in Metaethics.Matthew Chrisman - 2015 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language.Stephen Finlay - 2014 - New York, US: Oup Usa.details
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Objective and Subjective 'Ought'.Ralph Wedgwood - 2016 - In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 143-168.details
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Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Normative Language in Context.Alex Silk - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12.details
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Ethics, Inventing Right and Wrong.[author unknown] - 1977 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3):581-582.details
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(4 other versions)Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity.Gilbert Harman & Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1996 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 50 (4):654-658.details
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Impassioned Belief.Michael Ridge - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Internalism and speaker relativism.James Dreier - 1990 - Ethics 101 (1):6-26.details
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(1 other version)Contextualist Solutions to Three Puzzles about Practical Conditionals.Janice L. Dowell - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7.details
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(2 other versions)Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. [REVIEW]Michael R. Depaul - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):731-735.details
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The Myth of Morality.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):760-763.details
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Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Alan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.details
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(1 other version)Ralph Wedgwood, The Nature of Normativity: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 296, ISBN-13:9780199251315. £35.00. [REVIEW]Chris Alen Sula - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (2):227-228.details
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Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.Harry S. Silverstein - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):122-127.details
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(2 other versions)Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW]David Jehle - 2006 - Studia Logica 84 (1):161-165.details
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(2 other versions)Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW]Richard Feldman - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):211-226.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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