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Buddhism, comparative neurophilosophy, and human flourishing.Christian Coseru - 2014 - Zygon 49 (1):208-219.details
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The Humean theory of reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 2. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 195--219.details
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Weighting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Noûs 41 (1):110–132.details
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Up and Down with Aggregation.Bradford Hooker - 2009 - Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1):126-147.details
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VIII-An Argument Against Motivational Internalism.Elinor Mason - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part2):135-156.details
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Meta-Ethics Naturalized.David Zimmerman - 1980 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):637 - 662.details
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‘Ought’-contextualism beyond the parochial.Alex Worsnip - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):3099-3119.details
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Björnsson and Olinder on Motivational Internalism.Emma Wood - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):379-383.details
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Aristotelian Naturalism vs. Mutants, Aliens and the Great Red Dragon.Scott Woodcock - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):313-328.details
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Evilism, moral rationalism, and reasons internalism.Christopher Gregory Weaver - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (1):3-24.details
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The Normativity of Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1057-1068.details
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Morality, reasons, and sentiments.Eric Vogelstein - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):421-432.details
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Morality without Categoricity.Elizabeth Ventham - 2023 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 19 (2):4-1.details
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A moral framework for multicultural education in healthcare.Wayne Vaught - 2003 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 24 (4):301-328.details
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Discursively Prioritizing Stakeholder Interests.Bastiaan van der Linden - 2012 - Business and Professional Ethics Journal 31 (3-4):419-439.details
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An argument against the social fact thesis (and some additional preliminary steps towards a new conception of legal positivism).Kevin Toh - 2008 - Law and Philosophy 27 (5):445 - 504.details
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Two kinds of moral relativism.John J. Tilley - 1995 - Journal of Value Inquiry 29 (2):187-192.details
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The Problem for Normative Cultural Relativism.John J. Tilley - 1998 - Ratio Juris 11 (3):272-290.details
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Inner judgments and moral relativism.John J. Tilley - 1988 - Philosophia 18 (2-3):171-190.details
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Constructivism, representation, and stability: path-dependence in public reason theories of justice.John Thrasher - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):429-450.details
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Intuitional Disagreement.Folke Tersman - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):639-659.details
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À la rescousse du platonisme moral.Christine Tappolet - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (3):531-556.details
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Moore's "New" Open Question Argument.Peter A. Sutton - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (4):681-693.details
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The Possibility of Love Independent Reasons.Jussi Suikkanen - 2011 - Essays in Philosophy 12 (1):32-54.details
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Contextualism, Moral Disagreement, and Proposition Clouds.Jussi Suikkanen - 2019 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 47-69.details
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Anti-Luminosity and Anti-Realism in Metaethics.Jussi Suikkanen - 2024 - Synthese 203 (6):1-24.details
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In defence of the open question argument.Caj Strandberg - 2004 - The Journal of Ethics 8 (2):179-196.details
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Moral reasons and relativism.Bonnie Steinbock - 1981 - Journal of Value Inquiry 15 (2):157-168.details
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Realism about the Nature of Law.Torben Spaak - 2016 - Ratio Juris 29 (4).details
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Realism about the Nature of Law.Torben Spaak - 2017 - Ratio Juris 30 (1):75-104.details
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Moral contractualism.Nicholas Southwood - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (6):926-937.details
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Contractualism for Us As We Are.Nicholas Southwood - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):529-547.details
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Moral Relativism, Metalinguistic Negotiation, and the Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Katharina Anna Sodoma - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1621-1641.details
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Moral disagreement and non-moral ignorance.Nicholas Smyth - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1089-1108.details
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The Water Margin, Moral Criticism, and Cultural Confrontation.William Sin - 2017 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 16 (1):95-111.details
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The explanationist argument for moral realism.Neil Sinclair - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):1-24.details
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Reasons Internalism and the Function of Normative Reasons.Neil Sinclair - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):209-229.details
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The argument from agreement: How universal values undermine moral realism.Hanno Sauer - 2019 - Ratio 32 (4):339-352.details
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Talking about appearances: the roles of evaluation and experience in disagreement.Rachel Etta Rudolph - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):197-217.details
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The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):802-831.details
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Moral Error Theory Without Epistemic Error Theory: Scepticism About Second-Personal Reasons.Richard Rowland - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):547-569.details
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