Our paper draws attention to a neglected channel of corruption—the bribe payments by state-owned enterprises. This is an important phenomenon as bribe payments by SOEs fruitlessly waste national resources, compromising public welfare and national prosperity. Using a large dataset of 30,249 firms from 50 countries, we show that, in general, SOEs are less likely to pay bribes for achieving organizational objectives owing to their political connectivity. However, in deteriorated institutional environments, SOEs may be subjected to potential managerial rent-seeking behaviors, which (...) disproportionately increase SOE bribe propensity relative to privately owned enterprises. Specifically, our findings highlight the importance of fostering democracy and rule of law, reducing prevalence of corruption and shortening power distance in reducing the incidence of SOE bribery. (shrink)

Using a sample of 15,174 firms from 24 countries included in the 2009 World Bank Enterprise Survey, we investigate the impact of disclosure standards and auditing infrastructure on the bribery of public officials to secure government contracts. We find that firms are less likely to grant gift to secure a government contract in countries having more extensive financial reporting requirements and countries where audit firms face a higher litigation and sanction risk. Findings also show that firms are less likely to (...) bribe bureaucrats in case financial statements are reviewed by an external audit firm. Our results are economically significant and are robust to several sensitivity analyses. These findings support certain policies that are currently being implemented or discussed to mitigate bribery within the public sector across the globe. (shrink)

This research investigates firms’ bribery motivations in China. Based on resource dependence theory and anomie theory, we identify resource conditions as firms’ proactive motivation to bribe and firms’ perceived institutional environment as their passive motivation to bribe. We use the data from 2002 World Business Environment Survey, collected by the World Bank, to investigate firms’ bribery in the world’s largest emerging market, China. We employ a multi-level logistic model to test our hypotheses. The results show that unsatisfactory general and task (...) environmental conditions may trigger firms to bribe in order to compete for better resources and opportunities; institutional conditions such as the security expenditure and anomie climate may make firms perceive bribery as a common phenomenon and thus induce firms to bribe. This research provides some insights to understand business bribery behaviors in emerging market. It also discusses some managerial implications and guidelines for policy-making from the findings. (shrink)

While it is widely believed that bribery is ubiquitous among Asian firms, few studies have offered systematic evidence of such activities, and the dynamics of bribery in Asian firms have not been well understood. The research reported here used World Business Environment Survey data to examine some distinct characteristics of bribery in Asian firms and to empirically test 10 hypotheses on determinants of bribery. We find that firm characteristics such as firm size, growth rate, and corporate governance are important determinants (...) of bribery activities at the firm level, and that Asian firms are more likely to bribe when faced with fierce market competition, corrupted court systems, convoluted licensing requirements, nontransparent interpretation of laws and regulations, inefficient government service delivery, and high taxes. (shrink)

We examine the impact on firm bribery of two corporate governance devices heavily studied in corporate governance research—i.e., separation of ownership and control, and equity share of the largest shareholder. In addition, we investigate the impact of the principal–owner’s gender on firm bribery. From agency theory, we predict that firms with the owner also acting as a manager (owner–manager) are more likely to engage in bribery compared to their counterparts with separation of ownership and control. We argue that an increase (...) of the equity share of the largest shareholder can either increase or decrease firm bribery likelihood depending on the net cost-benefit effect of such bribery actions. In addition, we predict that bribery is more likely to occur when the principal–owner is male rather than female. Using a rich dataset of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys of 2002–2005, we find that the equity share of the largest shareholder is negatively and male principal–owner is positively associated with the likelihood of firm bribery. Furthermore, we reveal that owner–manager is more likely to bribe when the principal–owner is male rather than female. We also observe that the effect of owner–manager is smaller as the equity share of the largest shareholder increases. (shrink)

This study proposes and empirically tests the conceptual model of bribe giving decision process under the ethical decision context. Four alternative structural models are tested against one another with data collected from an experiment with Thai managers. Findings suggest that intention to give bribe is positively influenced by attitude toward bribe giving and subjective norm, and negatively by perceived choice. Attitude toward bribe giving is, in turn, positively affected by perceived necessity of the bribe and negatively by perceived unethicality of (...) the act. Subjective norm, on the other hand, is positively influenced by perceived support of the act by top management. There are also direct, bi-causal, positive relations between attitude toward bribe giving and subjective norm. Managerial implications, limitations, and future research directions are also discussed. (shrink)

There has been some theoretical and empirical debate that the positive relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and firm financial performance (FFP) is spurious and in fact caused by a third factor, namely large firm size. This study examines this question by integrating three meta-analyses of more than two decades of research on (1) CSP and FFP, (2) firm size and CSP, and (3) firm size and FFP into one path-analytic model. The present study does not confirm size as a (...) third factor which would confound the relationship between CSP and FFP. That is, even if firm size is controlled for across studies (comprising, on average, over 15 000 observations), CSP and FFP remain positively correlated, showing a "true-score" corrected path coefficient p of 0.37. (shrink)

Local firms in their home countries often engage in behavior that constitutes corruption, at least through some cultural lenses. One such practice is bribery of public officials. This study uses multilevel theory to address the question of why bribery activity of this type differs among countries. We analyze responses from nearly 4,000 firms worldwide using hierarchical linear modeling to investigate cross-level predictions about bribery. Drawing from anomie theory, we find support for country-level cultural and institutional drivers of firm-level bribery. We (...) extend anomie theory by showing how firm-level pressures can encourage the supplying of bribes as a firm strategy. (shrink)