- Materialism and Christian belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2007 - In Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Persons: Human and Divine. Oxford University Press. pp. 99--141.details
|
|
The Naive Topology of the Conscious Subject.Rory Madden - 2012 - Noûs 49 (1):55-70.details
|
|
Thinking animals, disagreement, and skepticism.Eric Yang - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):109-121.details
|
|
Solitude without Souls: Why Peter Unger hasn’t Established Substance Dualism.Will Bynoe & Nicholas K. Jones - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):109-125.details
|
|
Eliminativism, interventionism and the Overdetermination Argument.Eric Yang - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):321-340.details
|
|
Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Doctrine Of Arbitrary Undetached Parts.Peter Van Inwagen - 1981 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (2):123-137.details
|
|
The Problem of the Many.Peter Unger - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):411-468.details
|
|
Hylemorphic animalism.Patrick Toner - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):65 - 81.details
|
|
Thinking animals and epistemology.Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):310-314.details
|
|
Substance dualism : A non-cartesian approach.E. J. Lowe - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The waning of materialism. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Persons and the unity of consciousness.William Hasker - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The waning of materialism. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The moon and sixpence : a defense of mereological universalism.James van Cleve - 2008 - In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary debates in metaphysics. Malden, MA: Blackwell.details
|
|
All the power in the world.Peter K. Unger - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Theories of Location.Josh Parsons - 2008 - In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 201-232.details
|
|
Plantinga's replacement argument.Peter van Inwagen - 2007 - In Deane-Peter Baker (ed.), Alvin Plantinga. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)An argument for animalism.Eric T. Olson - unknowndetails
|
|
(1 other version)Is there a bodily criterion of personal identity?Eric T. Olson - 2006 - In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and modality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 242.details
|
|
Why I have no hands.Eric T. Olson - 1995 - Theoria 61 (2):182-197.details
|
|
The problem of material constitution.Michael C. Rea - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (4):525-552.details
|
|
In defense of mereological universalism.Michael C. Rea - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):347-360.details
|
|
The many minds account of vagueness.John Hawthorne & Andrew McGonigal - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):435 - 440.details
|
|
Dion and theon: An essentialist solution to an ancient puzzle.Michael B. Burke - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):129-139.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Personal identity.Eric T. Olson - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.details
|
|
(1 other version)A brief defense of the cartesian view.John A. Foster - 2001 - In Kevin Corcoran (ed.), Soul, body, and survival: essays on the metaphysics of human persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.details
|
|
Maximality and microphysical supervenience.Theodore Sider - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):139-149.details
|
|
Maximality and consciousness.Trenton Merricks - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):150-158.details
|
|
(1 other version)Persons and the unity of consciousness.William Hasker - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The waning of materialism. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)A Brief Defense of the Cartesian View.John Foster - 2001 - In Kevin Corcoran (ed.), Soul, body, and survival: essays on the metaphysics of human persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.details
|
|
A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person.Hud Hudson - 2001 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.details
|
|
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.details
|
|
I—Dean Zimmerman: From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism.Dean Zimmerman - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):119-150.details
|
|
Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction.William Jaworski - 2011 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
|
|
The Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity.Eric T. Olson - 2006 - In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and modality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 242.details
|
|
I am not an animal.Hud Hudson - 2007 - In Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Persons: Human and Divine. Oxford University Press. pp. 216--34.details
|
|
Review of Trenton Merricks, Objects and Persons. [REVIEW]Theodore Sider - 2001 - Mind 113 (449):195–198.details
|
|
What are we?Eric T. Olson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):37-55.details
|
|
(1 other version)An argument for animalism.Eric T. Olson - 2009 - In John P. Lizza (ed.), Defining the beginning and end of life: readings on personal identity and bioethics. Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press.details
|
|
Philosophers and the words 'human body'.Peter van Inwagen - 1980 - In Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. D. Reidel.details
|
|