We investigate a contractionless naive set theory, due to Grisin [11]. We prove that the theory is undecidable.

We prove a set-theoretic version of Hájek, Paris and Shepherdson's theorem [HPS00] as follows: The set ω of natural numbers must contain a non-standard natural number in any natural Tarskian semantics of CŁ0, the set theory with comprehension principle within Lukasiewicz's infinite-valued predicate logic. The key idea of the proof is a generalization of the derivation of Moh Shaw-Kwei's paradox, which is a Russell-like paradox for many-valued logic.

Axiomatic set theory with full comprehension is known to be consistent in Łukasiewicz fuzzy predicate logic. But we cannot assume the existence of natural numbers satisfying a simple schema of induction; this extension is shown to be inconsistent.

This book presents a systematic treatment of deductive aspects and structures of fuzzy logic understood as many valued logic sui generis. It aims to show that fuzzy logic as a logic of imprecise (vague) propositions does have well-developed formal foundations and that most things usually named ‘fuzzy inference’ can be naturally understood as logical deduction. It is for mathematicians, logicians, computer scientists, specialists in artificial intelligence and knowledge engineering, and developers of fuzzy logic.