We present nested sequent systems for propositional Gödel-Dummett logic and its first-order extensions with non-constant and constant domains, built atop nested calculi for intuitionistic logics. To obtain nested systems for these Gödel-Dummett logics, we introduce a new structural rule, called the linearity rule, which (bottom-up) operates by linearising branching structure in a given nested sequent. In addition, an interesting feature of our calculi is the inclusion of reachability rules, which are special logical rules that operate by propagating data and/or checking (...) if data exists along certain paths within a nested sequent. Such rules require us to generalise our nested sequents to include signatures (i.e. finite collections of variables) in the first-order cases, thus giving rise to a generalisation of the usual nested sequent formalism. Our calculi exhibit favourable properties, admitting the height-preserving invertibility of every logical rule and the (height-preserving) admissibility of a large collection of structural and reachability rules. We prove all of our systems sound and cut-free complete, and show that syntactic cut-elimination obtains for the intuitionistic systems. We conclude the paper by discussing possible extensions and modifications, putting forth an array of structural rules that could be used to provide a sizable class of intermediate logics with cut-free nested sequent systems. (shrink)

The present PhD dissertation aims to examine the relation between modality and change in Aristotle’s metaphysics. -/- On the one hand, Aristotle supports his modal realism (i.e., worldly objects have modal properties - potentialities and essences - that ground the ascriptions of possibility and necessity) by arguing that the rejection of modal realism makes change inexplicable, or, worse, banishes it from the realm of reality. On the other hand, the Stagirite analyses processes by means of modal notions (‘change is the (...) actuality of what is virtual insofar as it is virtual’). In other words: to grasp what change is, one has to resort to the modal idiom of potentialities, while the fact that there is change is indicative of the fact that nature is full of modal properties. -/- Aristotle’s modal and kinetic realism finds a negative in the figure of the Megaric Diodorus Kronus. The polemical situation of Greek philosophy has indeed the dialectical advantage of not opposing the Aristotelian position to a sui generis straw man. Both in its reduction of modal judgements to temporal quantifications and in its dissolution of the reality of the state-of-being-in-motion in favour of a cinematographic view of processes, the philosophical figure of reductionist antirealism embodied by Diodorus constitutes an alternative that takes the opposite view of Aristotle’s realism. -/- The present study is structured as a discussion between these two positions. In the face of Diodorus’ antirealist challenges, Aristotle articulates modal and kinetic considerations: the answers he gives to Diodorus’ puzzles thus provide valuable insight into his metaphysics. Moreover, the examination of Aristotle’s and Diodorus’ metaphysics, because of their insight and originality, will not fail to interest the philosopher concerned with the metaphysical foundations of modern physics, insofar as the entanglement between modalities and processes is nowadays at the core of mechanics (phase spaces, path integrals, etc.). (shrink)

In the literature on vagueness one finds two very different kinds of degree theory. The dominant kind of account of gradable adjectives in formal semantics and linguistics is built on an underlying framework involving bivalence and classical logic: its degrees are not degrees of truth. On the other hand, fuzzy logic based theories of vagueness—largely absent from the formal semantics literature but playing a significant role in both the philosophical literature on vagueness and in the contemporary logic literature—are logically nonclassical (...) and give a central role to the idea of degrees of truth. Each kind of degree theory has a strength: the classical kind allows for rich and subtle analyses of the comparative form of gradable adjectives and of various types of gradable precise adjectives, while the fuzzy kind yields a compelling solution to the sorites paradox. This paper argues that the fuzzy kind of theory can match the benefits of the classical kind and hence that the burden is on the latter to match the advantages of the former. In particular, we develop a new version of the fuzzy logic approach that—unlike existing fuzzy theories—yields a compelling analysis of the comparative as well as an adequate account of gradable precise predicates, while still retaining the advantage of genuinely solving the sorites paradox. (shrink)

Kripke frames (and models) provide a suitable semantics for sub-classical logics; for example, intuitionistic logic (of Brouwer and Heyting) axiomatizes the reflexive and transitive Kripke frames (with persistent satisfaction relations), and the basic logic (of Visser) axiomatizes transitive Kripke frames (with persistent satisfaction relations). Here, we investigate whether Kripke frames/models could provide a semantics for fuzzy logics. For each axiom of the basic fuzzy logic, necessary and sufficient conditions are sought for Kripke frames/models which satisfy them. It turns out that (...) the only fuzzy logics (logics containing the basic fuzzy logic) which are sound and complete with respect to a class of Kripke frames/models are the extensions of the Gödel logic (or the super-intuitionistic logic of Dummett); indeed this logic is sound and strongly complete with respect to reflexive, transitive and connected (linear) Kripke frames (with persistent satisfaction relations). This provides a semantic characterization for the Gödel logic among (propositional) fuzzy logics. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper, we present a generalisation of proof simulation procedures for Frege systems by Bonet and Buss to some logics for which the deduction theorem does not hold. In particular, we study the case of finite-valued Łukasiewicz logics. To this end, we provide proof systems and which augment Avron's Frege system HŁuk with nested and general versions of the disjunction elimination rule, respectively. For these systems, we provide upper bounds on speed-ups w.r.t. both the number of steps in proofs (...) and the length of proofs. We also consider Tamminga's natural deduction and Avron's hypersequent calculus GŁuk for 3-valued Łukasiewicz logic and generalise our results considering the disjunction elimination rule to all finite-valued Łukasiewicz logics. (shrink)

This thesis addresses philosophical problems concerning improper assertions. The first part considers the issue of defining lying: here, against a standard view, I argue that a lie need not intend to deceive the hearer. I define lying as an insincere assertion, and then resort to speech act theory to develop a detailed account of what an assertion is, and what can make it insincere. Even a sincere assertion, however, can be improper (e.g., it can be false, or unwarranted): in the (...) second part of the thesis, I consider these kinds of impropriety. An influential hypothesis maintains that proper assertions must meet a precise epistemic standard, and several philosophers have tried to identify this standard. After reviewing some difficulties for this approach, I provide an innovative solution to some known puzzles concerning the permissibility of false assertions. In my view, assertions purport to aim at truth, but they are not subject to a norm that requires speakers to assert a proposition only if it is true. (shrink)

A theory of truth is usually demanded to be consistent, but -consistency is less frequently requested. Recently, Yatabe has argued in favour of -inconsistent first-order theories of truth, minimising their odd consequences. In view of this fact, in this paper, we present five arguments against -inconsistent theories of truth. In order to bring out this point, we will focus on two very well-known -inconsistent theories of truth: the classical theory of symmetric truth FS and the non-classical theory of naïve truth (...) based on ᴌukasiewicz infinitely valued logic: PAᴌT. (shrink)

Edgington has proposed a solution to the sorites paradox in terms of ‘verities’, which she defines as degrees of closeness to clear truth. Central to her solution is the assumption that verities are formally probabilities. She is silent on what verities might derive from and on why they should be probabilities. This paper places Edgington’s solution in the framework of a spatial approach to conceptualization, arguing that verities may be conceived of as deriving from how our concepts relate to each (...) other. Building on work by Kamp and Partee, this paper further shows how verities, thus conceived of, may plausibly be assumed to have probabilistic structure. The new interpretation of verities is argued to also help answer the question of what the verities of indicative conditionals are, a question which Edgington leaves open. Finally, the question of how to accommodate higher-order vagueness, given this interpretation, is addressed. (shrink)

In the philosophical debate on lying, there has generally been agreement that either the speaker believes that his statement is false, or he believes that his statement is true. This article challenges this assumption, and argues that lying is a scalar phenomenon that allows for a number of intermediate cases – the most obvious being cases of uncertainty. The first section shows that lying can involve beliefs about graded truth values (fuzzy lies) and graded beliefs (graded-belief lies). It puts forward (...) a new definition to deal with these scalar parameters, that requires that the speaker asserts what he believes more likely to be false than true. The second section shows that statements are scalar in the same way beliefs are, and accounts for a further element of scalarity, illocutionary force. (shrink)

We describe an infinitary logic for metric structures which is analogous to Lω1,ω. We show that this logic is capable of expressing several concepts from analysis that cannot be expressed in finitary continuous logic. Using topological methods, we prove an omitting types theorem for countable fragments of our infinitary logic. We use omitting types to prove a two-cardinal theorem, which yields a strengthening of a result of Ben Yaacov and Iovino concerning separable quotients of Banach spaces.

We investigate the initial segments of the Medvedev lattice as Brouwer algebras, and study the propositional logics connected to them.

There are several three-valued logical systems that form a scattered landscape, even if all reasonable connectives in three-valued logics can be derived from a few of them. Most papers on this subject neglect the issue of the relevance of such logics in relation with the intended meaning of the third truth-value. Here, we focus on the case where the third truth-value means unknown, as suggested by Kleene. Under such an understanding, we show that any truth-qualified formula in a large range (...) of three-valued logics can be translated into KD as a modal formula of depth 1, with modalities in front of literals only, while preserving all tautologies and inference rules of the original three-valued logic. This simple information logic is a two-tiered classical propositional logic with simple semantics in terms of epistemic states understood as subsets of classical interpretations. We study in particular the translations of Kleene, Gödel, ᴌukasiewicz and Nelson logics. We show that Priest’s logic of paradox, closely connected to Kleene’s, can also be translated into our modal setting, simply by exchanging the modalities possible and necessary. Our work enables the precise expressive power of three-valued logics to be laid bare for the purpose of uncertainty management. (shrink)

It has seemed natural to model phenomena related to vagueness in terms of graded membership. However, so far no satisfactory answer has been given to the question of what graded membership is nor has any attempt been made to describe in detail a procedure for determining degrees of membership. We seek to remedy these lacunae by building on recent work on typicality and graded membership in cognitive science and combining some of the results obtained there with a version of the (...) conceptual spaces framework. (shrink)

We defend a set of acceptance rules that avoids the lottery paradox, that is closed under classical entailment, and that accepts uncertain propositions without ad hoc restrictions. We show that the rules we recommend provide a semantics that validates exactly Adams’ conditional logic and are exactly the rules that preserve a natural, logical structure over probabilistic credal states that we call probalogic. To motivate probalogic, we first expand classical logic to geo-logic, which fills the entire unit cube, and then we (...) project the upper surfaces of the geo-logical cube onto the plane of probabilistic credal states by means of standard, linear perspective, which may be interpreted as an extension of the classical principle of indifference. Finally, we apply the geometrical/logical methods developed in the paper to prove a series of trivialization theorems against question-invariance as a constraint on acceptance rules and against rational monotonicity as an axiom of conditional logic in situations of uncertainty. (shrink)

Jeff Paris proves a generalized Dutch Book theorem. If a belief state is not a generalized probability then one faces ‘sure loss’ books of bets. In Williams I showed that Joyce’s accuracy-domination theorem applies to the same set of generalized probabilities. What is the relationship between these two results? This note shows that both results are easy corollaries of the core result that Paris appeals to in proving his dutch book theorem. We see that every point of accuracy-domination defines a (...) dutch book, but we only have a partial converse. (shrink)

Vagueness is one of the most persistent and challenging topics in the intersection of philosophy and logic. At least five other noteworthy books on vagueness have been written by philosophers since 1991 [2, 6, 11, 12, 15]. A (necessarily incomplete) bibliography that has been compiled for the Arché project Vagueness: its Nature and Logic (2004-2006) of the University of St Andrews lists more than 350 articles and books on vagueness until 2005.1 Many new and interesting contributions have appeared since. The (...) book under review is much more than yet another addition to this prolific discourse. Nicholas Smith manages to tackle two different tasks that are potentially in tension. On the one hand, he provides a comprehensive, systematic and well written account of various approaches to vagueness that have been debated so far. On the other hand, Smith carefully explains and defends his own theory of vagueness, called fuzzy plurivaluationism. Given the complex and almost unsurmountably large amount of relevant literature and the fact that theories of vagueness based on fuzzy logic have almost universally been rejected by philosophers so far this is no simple feat. In the comments below, I will largely follow the structure of book. If along the way I cannot resist to make side remarks or even take issue with some of.. (shrink)

A number of authors have objected to the application of non-classical logic to problems in philosophy on the basis that these non-classical logics are usually characterised by a classical metatheory. In many cases the problem amounts to more than just a discrepancy; the very phenomena responsible for non-classicality occur in the field of semantics as much as they do elsewhere. The phenomena of higher order vagueness and the revenge liar are just two such examples. The aim of this paper is (...) to show that a large class of non-classical logics are strong enough to formulate their own model theory in a corresponding non-classical set theory. Specifically I show that adequate definitions of validity can be given for the propositional calculus in such a way that the metatheory proves, in the specified logic, that every theorem of the propositional fragment of that logic is validated. It is shown that in some cases it may fail to be a classical matter whether a given sentence is valid or not. One surprising conclusion for non-classical accounts of vagueness is drawn: there can be no axiomatic, and therefore precise, system which is determinately sound and complete. (shrink)

In the 1970s, Robin Giles introduced a game combining Lorenzen-style dialogue rules with a simple scheme for betting on the truth of atomic statements, and showed that the existence of winning strategies for the game corresponds to the validity of formulas in Łukasiewicz logic. In this paper, it is shown that ‘disjunctive strategies’ for Giles’s game, combining ordinary strategies for all instances of the game played on the same formula, may be interpreted as derivations in a corresponding proof system. In (...) particular, such strategies mirror derivations in a hypersequent calculus developed in recent work on the proof theory of Łukasiewicz logic. (shrink)

The study of weighted structures is one of the important trends in recent computer science. The aim of the article is to provide a weighted, many-valued version of classical intensional semantics formalised in the framework of higher-order fuzzy logics. We illustrate the apparatus on several variants of fuzzy S5-style modalities. The formalism is applicable to a broad array of weighted intensional notions, including alethic, epistemic, or probabilistic modalities, generalised quantifiers, counterfactual conditionals, dynamic and non-monotonic logics, and some more.

1.1 In standard modal logics, the worlds are 2-valued in the following sense: there are 2 values that a sentence may take at a world. Technically, however, there is no reason why this has to be the case. The worlds could be many-valued. This paper presents one simple approach to a major family of many-valued modal logics, together with an illustration of why this family is philosophically interesting.

We prove several interpolation theorems for many-valued infinitary logic with quantifiers by studying expansions of MV-algebras in the spirit of polyadic and cylindric algebras. We prove for various reducts of polyadic MV-algebras of infinite dimensions that if is the free algebra in the given signature,, is in the subalgebra of generated by, is in the subalgebra of generated by and, then there exists an interpolant in the subalgebra generated by and such that. We call this a varying interpolation property because (...) the integer depends on the inequality. We also address cases where this interpolation property fails, but other weaker ones hold. One such interpolation theorem says that though an interpolant may not be found as above, an interpolant can always be found if finitely many universal quantifiers are applied to making it smaller and the same number of existential quantifiers are applied to making it bigger. This number of quantifiers also varies; it depends on the inequality. Se.. (shrink)

In 1907 Borel published a remarkable essay on the paradox of the Heap (“Un paradoxe économique: le sophisme du tas de blé et les vérités statistiques”), in which Borel proposes what is likely the first statistical account of vagueness ever written, and where he discusses the practical implications of the sorites paradox, including in economics. Borel’s paper was integrated in his book Le Hasard, published 1914, but has gone mostly unnoticed since its publication. One of the originalities of Borel’s essay (...) is that it puts forward a model of vagueness as imprecision, making particular use of the Gaussian law of measurement errors to model categorization. The aim of our paper is to give a presentation of the historical context of Borel’s essay, to spell out the mathematical details of his model, and to provide a critical assessment of his theory. Three aspects of Borel’s account are particularly discussed: the first concerns the comparison between Borel’s statistical account and posterior degree-theoretic accounts of vagueness. The second concerns the anti-epistemicist flavor of Borel’s approach, whereby the idea of statistical fluctuation is used to undermine the notion of sharp boundary for vague predicates. The third concerns the problematic link between Borel’s model of vagueness as imprecision and the notion of semantic indeterminacy. An English translation of Borel’s original essay is appended to this paper (Erkenntnis, this issue). (shrink)

Power structures are obtained by lifting some mathematical structure (operations, relations, etc.) from an universe X to its power set ${\mathcal{P}(X)}$ . A similar construction provides fuzzy power structures: operations and fuzzy relations on X are extended to operations and fuzzy relations on the set ${\mathcal{F}(X)}$ of fuzzy subsets of X. In this paper we study how this construction preserves some properties of fuzzy sets and fuzzy relations (similarity, congruence, etc.). We define the notions of good, very good, Hoare good (...) and Smith good fuzzy relation and establish some connections between them, generalizing some results of Brink, Bošnjak and Madarász on power structures. (shrink)

In many applications we have a set of objects together with their properties. Since the available information is usually incomplete and/or imprecise, the true knowledge about subsets of objects can be determined approximately only. In this paper, we discuss a fuzzy generalisation of two pairs of relation-based operators suitable for fuzzy set approximations, which have been recently investigated by Düntsch and Gediga. Double residuated lattices, introduced by Orlowska and Radzikowska, are taken as basic algebraic structures. Main properties of these operators (...) are presented. (shrink)

Łukasiewicz’s infinite-valued logic is commonly defined as the set of formulas that take the value 1 under all evaluations in the Łukasiewicz algebra on the unit real interval. In the literature a deductive system axiomatized in a Hilbert style was associated to it, and was later shown to be semantically defined from Łukasiewicz algebra by using a “truth-preserving” scheme. This deductive system is algebraizable, non-selfextensional and does not satisfy the deduction theorem. In addition, there exists no Gentzen calculus fully adequate (...) for it. Another presentation of the same deductive system can be obtained from a substructural Gentzen calculus. In this paper we use the framework of abstract algebraic logic to study a different deductive system which uses the aforementioned algebra under a scheme of “preservation of degrees of truth”. We characterize the resulting deductive system in a natural way by using the lattice filters of Wajsberg algebras, and also by using a structural Gentzen calculus, which is shown to be fully adequate for it. This logic is an interesting example for the general theory: it is selfextensional, non-protoalgebraic, and satisfies a “graded” deduction theorem. Moreover, the Gentzen system is algebraizable. The first deductive system mentioned turns out to be the extension of the second by the rule of Modus Ponens. (shrink)

We sharpen Hájek’s Completeness Theorem for theories extending predicate product logic, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Pi\forall}$$\end{document}. By relating provability in this system to embedding properties of ordered abelian groups we construct a universal BL-chain L in the sense that a sentence is provable from \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Pi\forall}$$\end{document} if and only if it is an L-tautology. As well we characterize the class of lexicographic sums that have this universality property.

This paper deals with one kind of Kripke-style semantics, which we shall call algebraic Kripke-style semantics, for relevance logics. We first recall the logic R of relevant implication and some closely related systems, their corresponding algebraic structures, and algebraic completeness results. We provide simpler algebraic completeness proofs. We then introduce various types of algebraic Kripke-style semantics for these systems and connect them with algebraic semantics.

ABSTRACTIn this paper, we consider non-associative generalisations of Hájek's logics BL and psBL. As it was shown by Cignoli, Esteva, Godo, and Torrens, the former is the logic of continuous t-norms and their residua. Botur introduced logic naBL which is the logic of non-associative continuous t-norms and their residua. Thus, naBL can be viewed as a non-associative generalisation of BL. However, Botur has not presented axiomatization of naBL. We fill this gap by constructing an adequate Hilbert-style calculus for naBL. Although, (...) as was shown by Flondor, Georgescu, and Iorgulescu, there are no non-commutative continuous t-norms, Hájek's psBL can be viewed as BL's non-commutative generalisation. We present the logic psnaBL of psnaBL-algebras which can be viewed as naBL's non-commutative generalisation as well as psBL's non-associative generalisation and BL's both non-commutative and non-associative generalisation. (shrink)

This is a contribution to the discussion on the role of truth degrees in manyvalued logics from the perspective of abstract algebraic logic. It starts with some thoughts on the so-called Suszko’s Thesis (that every logic is two-valued) and on the conception of semantics that underlies it, which includes the truth-preserving notion of consequence. The alternative usage of truth values in order to define logics that preserve degrees of truth is presented and discussed. Some recent works studying these in the (...) particular cases of Łukasiewicz’s many-valued logics and of logics associated with varieties of residuated lattices are also presented. Finally the extension of this paradigm to other, more general situations is discussed, highlighting the need for philosophical or applied motivations in the selection of the truth degrees, due both to the interpretation of the idea of truth degree and to some mathematical difficulties. (shrink)

We introduce Łukasiewicz-Moisil relation algebras, obtained by considering a relational dimension over Łukasiewicz-Moisil algebras. We prove some arithmetical properties, provide a characterization in terms of complex algebras, study the connection with relational Post algebras and characterize the simple structures and the matrix relation algebras.

States have been introduced on commutative and non-commutative algebras of fuzzy logics as functions defined on these algebras with values in [0,1]. Starting from the observation that in the definition of Bosbach states there intervenes the standard MV-algebra structure of [0,1], in this paper we introduce Bosbach states defined on residuated lattices with values in residuated lattices. We are led to two types of generalized Bosbach states, with distinct behaviours. Properties of generalized states are useful for the development of an (...) algebraic theory of probabilistic models for non-commutative fuzzy logics. (shrink)

The article presents several adaptive fuzzy hedge logics. These logics are designed to perform a specific kind of hedge detection. Given a premise set Γ that represents a series of communicated statements, the logics can check whether some predicate occurring in Γ may be interpreted as being (implicitly) hedged by technically, strictly speaking or loosely speaking, or simply non-hedged. The logics take into account both the logical constraints of the premise set as well as conceptual information concerning the meaning of (...) potentially hedged predicates (stored in the memory of the interpreter in question). The proof theory of the logics is non-monotonic in order to enable the logics to deal with possible non-monotonic interpretation dynamics (this is illustrated by means of several concrete proofs). All the adaptive fuzzy hedge logics are also sound and strongly complete with respect to their [0,1]-semantics. (shrink)

1. There are two distinct lines of research that aim at modelling belief and knowledge: modal logic and uncertainty theories. Modal logic extends classical logic by introducing knowledge or belief...

Hahn’s embedding theorem asserts that linearly ordered abelian groups embed in some lexicographic product of real groups. Hahn’s theorem is generalized to a class of residuated semigroups in this paper, namely, to odd involutive commutative residuated chains which possess only finitely many idempotent elements. To this end, the partial lexicographic product construction is introduced to construct new odd involutive commutative residuated lattices from a pair of odd involutive commutative residuated lattices, and a representation theorem for odd involutive commutative residuated chains (...) which possess only finitely many idempotent elements, by means of linearly ordered abelian groups and the partial lexicographic product construction is presented. (shrink)

We introduce a propositional many-valued modal logic which is an extension of the Continuous Propositional Logic to a modal system. Otherwise said, we extend the minimal modal logic to a Continuous Logic system. After introducing semantics, axioms and deduction rules, we establish some preliminary results. Then we prove the equivalence between consistency and satisfiability. As straightforward consequences, we get compactness, an approximated completeness theorem, in the vein of Continuous Logic, and a Pavelka-style completeness theorem.

In this paper, we develop a duality for the varieties of a Łukasiewicz n + 1-valued modal System. This duality is an extension of Stone duality for modal algebras. Some logical consequences (such as completeness results, correspondence theory...) are then derived and we propose some ideas for future research.

In ${\mathbf{H}}$ , a set theory with the comprehension principle within Łukasiewicz infinite-valued predicate logic, we prove that a statement which can be interpreted as “there is an infinite descending sequence of initial segments of ω” is truth value 1 in any model of ${\mathbf{H}}$ , and we prove an analogy of Hájek’s theorem with a very simple procedure.

The aim of this paper is to give a description of the free algebras in some varieties of Glivenko MTL-algebras having the Boolean retraction property. This description is given (generalizing the results of [9]) in terms of weak Boolean products over Cantor spaces. We prove that in some cases the stalks can be obtained in a constructive way from free kernel DL-algebras, which are the maximal radical of directly indecomposable Glivenko MTL-algebras satisfying the equation in the title. We include examples (...) to show how we can apply the results to describe free algebras in some well known varieties of involutive MTL-algebras and of pseudocomplemented MTL-algebras. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce hypersequent-based frameworks for the modelling of defeasible reasoning by means of logic-based argumentation and the induced entailment relations. These structures are an extension of sequent-based argumentation frameworks, in which arguments and the attack relations among them are expressed not only by Gentzen-style sequents, but by more general expressions, called hypersequents. This generalization allows us to overcome some of the known weaknesses of logical argumentation frameworks and to prove several desirable properties of the entailments that are (...) induced by the extended frameworks. It also allows us to incorporate as the deductive base of our formalism some well-known logics, which lack cut-free sequent calculi, and so are not adequate for standard sequent-based argumentation. We show that hypersequent-based argumentation yields robust defeasible variants of these logics, with many desirable properties. (shrink)

The combination of Fuzzy Logics and Description Logics has been investigated for at least two decades because such fuzzy DLs can be used to formalize imprecise concepts. In particular, tableau algorithms for crisp Description Logics have been extended to reason also with their fuzzy counterparts. It has turned out, however, that in the presence of general concept inclusion axioms this extension is less straightforward than thought. In fact, a number of tableau algorithms claimed to deal correctly with fuzzy DLs with (...) GCIs have recently been shown to be incorrect. In this paper, we concentrate on fuzzy \, the fuzzy extension of the well-known DL \. We present a terminating, sound, and complete tableau algorithm for fuzzy \ with arbitrary continuous t-norms. Unfortunately, in the presence of GCIs, this algorithm does not yield a decision procedure for consistency of fuzzy \ ontologies since it uses as a sub-procedure a solvability test for a finitely represented, but possibly infinite, system of inequations over the real interval [0,1], which are built using the t-norm. In general, it is not clear whether this solvability problem is decidable for such infinite systems of inequations. This may depend on the specific t-norm used. In fact, we also show in this paper that consistency of fuzzy \ ontologies with GCIs is undecidable for the product t-norm. This implies, of course, that for the infinite systems of inequations produced by the tableau algorithm for fuzzy \ with product t-norm, solvability is in general undecidable. We also give a brief overview of recently obtained decidability results for fuzzy \ w.r.t. other t-norms. (shrink)

Classification of certain group-like FL $_e$ -chains is given: We define absorbent-continuity of FL $_e$ -algebras, along with the notion of subreal chains, and classify absorbent-continuous, group-like FL $_e$ -algebras over subreal chains: The algebra is determined by its negative cone, and the negative cone can only be chosen from a certain subclass of BL-chains, namely, one with components which are either cancellative (that is, those components are negative cones of totally ordered Abelian groups) or two-element MV-algebras, and with no (...) two consecutive cancellative components. It is shown that the classification theorem does not hold if we drop the absorbent-continuity condition. Our result is the first classification theorem in the literature on FL $_e$ -algebras that does not assume the condition of being naturally ordered (which, under certain conditions, corresponds to continuity of the monoid operation). In our classification theorem, continuity is replaced by the much weaker absorbent-continuity. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce a foundation for computable model theory of rational Pavelka logic and continuous logic, and prove effective versions of some related theorems in model theory. We show how to reduce continuous logic to rational Pavelka logic. We also define notions of computability and decidability of a model for logics with computable, but uncountable, set of truth values; we show that provability degree of a formula with respect to a linear theory is computable, and use this to (...) carry out an effective Henkin construction. Therefore, for any effectively given consistent linear theory in continuous logic, we effectively produce its decidable model. This is the best possible, since we show that the computable model theory of continuous logic is an extension of computable model theory of classical logic. We conclude with noting that the unique separable model of a separably categorical and computably axiomatizable theory is decidable. (shrink)

In this paper, notions of fuzzy closure system and fuzzy closure L—system on L—ordered sets are introduced from the fuzzy point of view. We first explore the fundamental properties of fuzzy closure systems. Then the correspondence between fuzzy closure systems and fuzzy closure operators is established. Finally, we study the connections between fuzzy closure systems and fuzzy Galois connections. © 2011 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim.