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  1. Staying power in sequential games.Steven J. Brams & Marek P. Hessel - 1983 - Theory and Decision 15 (3):279-302.
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  • Omniscience and omnipotence: How they may help - or hurt - in a game.Steven J. Brams - 1982 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):217 – 231.
    The concepts of omniscience and omnipotence are defined in 2 ? 2 ordinal games, and implications for the optimal play of these games, when one player is omniscient or omnipotent and the other player is aware of his omniscience or omnipotence, are derived. Intuitively, omniscience allows a player to predict the strategy choice of an opponent in advance of play, and omnipotence allows a player, after initial strategy choices are made, to continue to move after the other player is forced (...)
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  • Double deception: Two against one in three-person games. [REVIEW]Steven J. Brams & Frank C. Zagare - 1981 - Theory and Decision 13 (1):81-90.
    This article examines deception possibilities for two players in simple three-person voting games. An example of one game vulnerable to (tacit) deception by two players is given and its implications discussed. The most unexpected findings of this study is that in those games vulnerable to deception by two players, the optimal strategy of one of them is always to announce his (true) preference order. Moreover, since the player whose optimal announcement is his true one is unable to induce a better (...)
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  • A Resolution of the Paradox of Omniscience.Steven J. Brams - 1981 - Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 3:17-30.
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