An apathetic life is not the sort of life that most of us would want for ourselves or believe that we have a duty to strive for. And yet Kant argues that we have a duty of apathy, a duty to strive to be without affects (Affecten) and passions (Leidenschaften). But is Kant’s claim that there is a duty of apathy really as problematic as it sounds? In arguing that it is not, this paper investigates in detail in Kant’s accounts (...) of affects and passions and defends Kant’s argument that we have a duty of apathy. This investigation reveals Kant’s nuanced view on the role that sensible motivating states play in moral agency and the development of a virtuous character. (shrink)

This book is the first systematic treatment of 'responsibilist' or character-based virtue epistemology, an approach to epistemology that focuses on intellectual ...

"Exemplary Originality": Kant on Genius and Imitation MARTIN GAMMON 1. INTRODUCTION ACCORDING TO ERNST CASSIRER, Kant 's discussion of genius in the Third Cri- tique stands "at the crossroads of all aesthetic discussions in the eighteenth century," in that he tries to accommodate the neo-Classical demand that art- works follow determinate rules to the Romantic insistence that aesthetic cre- ativity be free from such rules? In the Third Critique itself, Kant defends both of these criteria through the doctrine of "exemplary (...) originality." For Kant, the genius combines two qualities: on the one hand, "a talent for produc- ing that for which no rule can be given," so that "originality must be its primary property"; however, "since there may also be original nonsense, its products must at the same time be models, i.e., be exemplary; and consequently, though not themselves derived from imitation, they must serve that purpose for oth- ers, i.e., as a standard or rule for estimating."' On the basis of this exemplary originality, then, a genius puts "freedom from constraint of rules so into force in his art, that for art itself a new rule is won -- which is what shows a talent to be exemplary". Recently, some commentators have puzzled over the "air of paradox" sur- rounding Kant 's union of originality and exemplarity in works of genius. "If such works," Timothy Gould conjectures, "make advances on what is familiar and gain new ground, their very. (shrink)

Quite remarkably, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling uses the notion of “drive” in analysing important cognitive achievements: An important instance of this attitude can be found in his characterizing Kant as a philosopher who operates in the basis of instincts. His key argument in adopting “drives” as key to the cognitive faculties of humans derives from the conviction that cognitive endeavours need to be open and directed towards grasping reality not in individual items, but as a totality. He arrives, in employing (...) these terms, at an understanding of science, and of cognition in general, as an open, future-directed, and dynamic process. This chapter presents an overview of Schelling’s usage of “drive”-related terms, discusses his rather detailed description of the mechanics of drives within the structure of human faculties, and draws some conclusions as to Schelling’s understanding of “science” and the dynamics of science. (shrink)

In the Critique of Judgment, Kant claims that genius is a talent for art, but not for science. Despite his restriction of genius to the domain of fine art, several recent interpreters have suggested that genius has a role to play in Kant’s account of cognition in general and scientific practice in particular. In this paper, I explore Kant’s reasons for excluding genius from science as well as the reasons that one might nevertheless be tempted to think that his account (...) allows room for the scientific genius. I then argue that Kant’s concerns are not only epistemic, but also moral, and together, they give us good reason for resisting the veneration of genius. (shrink)

Since 1790, the term Naturwissenschaften occurs in the lecture lists of the University of Jena published in the Allgemeine Literatur‐Zeitung of Jena. Naturwissenschaften is used as a title for lectures previously listed under the headings of Philosophie or Naturgeschichte. The introduction of the concept of Naturwissenschaften is interesting for several reasons: Firstly, at that time it is not the usual label in this context, and one therefore has to ask whether it already implies the connotations that are associated with the (...) modern concept of Naturwissenschaften, i. e. science in the modern sense. Secondly, the lecture lists of the University of Jena give insight into the various changes in the established ordering scheme for academic lectures that lead to the introduction of the term Naturwissenschaften, thus contributing to a better understanding of both the history of this concept and of the development of the university faculties as we know them. A close look at the concept of Naturwissenschaften as it was used around 1800 may, thirdly, help to understand the use made of this concept in philosophy, especially in the philosophy of nature of this period. (shrink)