In this paper, I examine Pascal's Wager as a decision problem where the uncertainty is massive, that is, as a decision under ignorance. I first present several reasons to support this interpretation. Then, I argue that wagering for God is the optimal act in a broad range of cases, according to two well-known criteria for decision-making: the Minimax Regret rule and the Hurwicz criterion. Given a Pascalian standard matrix, I also show that a tie between wagering for God and wagering (...) against God is only possible under very narrow conditions when applying the Hurwicz criterion. Finally, I discuss three objections to these two versions of the Wager. The most pressing challenge comes from the Many-Gods objection. I conclude that this objection is even more challenging whenever one faces a situation of massive uncertainty about God's existence. I argue that addressing it requires a more detailed examination of the benefits of adopting a religious life compared to those of choosing non-theism, or an additional criterion that can break the tie between these options. (shrink)

Unlike other classical arguments for the existence of God, Pascal’s Wager provides a pragmatic rationale for theistic belief. Its most popular version says that it is rationally mandatory to choose a way of life that seeks to cultivate belief in God because this is the option of maximum expected utility. Despite its initial attractiveness, this long-standing argument has been subject to various criticisms by many philosophers. What is less discussed, however, is the rationality of this choice in situations where the (...) decision-makers are confronted with greater uncertainty. In this paper, I examine the imprecise version of Pascal’s Wager: those scenarios where an agent’s credence that God exists is imprecise or vague rather than precise. After introducing some technical background on imprecise probabilities, I apply five different principles for decision-making to two cases of state uncertainty. In the final part of the paper, I argue that it is not rationally permitted to include zero as the lower probability of God’s existence. Although the conditions for what makes an act uniquely optimal vary significantly across those principles, I also show how the option of wagering for God can defeat any mixed strategy under two distinct interpretations of salvation. (shrink)

The Proceedings of the Brazilian Research Group on Epistemology is an annual publication of research in contemporary analytic epistemology (both traditional, social and formal approaches), organized and edited by members of the Brazilian academia. It aims mainly at publishing the work of Latin-American epistemologists to the international community, in an attempt to create a new channel of debate with researchers from other parts of the globe.