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  1. Ineffability and Nonsense.A. W. Moore - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):169–193.
    [A. W. Moore] Criteria of ineffability are presented which, it is claimed, preclude the possibility of truths that are ineffable, but not the possibility of other things that are ineffable—not even the possibility of other things that are non-trivially ineffable. Specifically, they do not preclude the possibility of states of understanding that are ineffable. This, it is argued, allows for a reappraisal of the dispute between those who adopt a traditional reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and those who adopt the new (...)
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  2. On the Necessity of the Categories.Anil Gomes, Andrew Stephenson & A. W. Moore - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (2):129–168.
    For Kant, the human cognitive faculty has two sub-faculties: sensibility and the understanding. Each has pure forms which are necessary to us as humans: space and time for sensibility; the categories for the understanding. But Kant is careful to leave open the possibility of there being creatures like us, with both sensibility and understanding, who nevertheless have different pure forms of sensibility. They would be finite rational beings and discursive cognizers. But they would not be human. And this raises a (...)
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  3.  85
    Transcendental Idealism in Wittgenstein, and Theories of Meaning.A. W. Moore - 1985 - Philosophical Quarterly 35 (139):134-155.
    This essay involves exploration of certain repercussions of Bernard Williams’ view that there is, in Wittgenstein’s later work, a transcendental idealism akin to that found in the Tractatus—sharing with it the feature that it cannot be satisfactorily stated. It is argued that, if Williams is right, then Wittgenstein’s later work precludes a philosophically substantial theory of meaning; for such a theory would force us to try to state the idealism. In a postscript written for the reprint of the essay, reasons (...)
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  4.  72
    Ineffability and Religion.A. W. Moore - 2003 - European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):161–176.
    It is argued that, although there are no ineffable truths, the concept of ineffability nevertheless does have application—to certain states of knowledge. Towards the end of the essay this idea is related to religion: it is argued that the language that results from attempting (unsuccessfully) to put ineffable knowledge into words is very often of a religious kind. An example of this is given at the very end of the essay. This example concerns the Euthyphro question: whether what is right (...)
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  5.  94
    On Saying and Showing: A. W. Moore.A. W. Moore - 1987 - Philosophy 62 (242):473 - 497.
    This essay constitutes an attempt to probe the very idea of a saying/showing distinction of the kind that Wittgenstein advances in the Tractatus—to say what such a distinction consists in, to say what philosophical work it has to do, and to say how we might be justified in drawing such a distinction. Towards the end of the essay the discussion is related to Wittgenstein’s later work. It is argued that we can profitably see this work in such a way that (...)
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  6.  42
    Apperception and the Unreality of Tense.A. W. Moore - 2001 - In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press. pp. 375-391.
    The aim of this essay is to characterize the issue whether tense is real. Roughly, this is the issue whether, given any tensed representation, its tense corresponds in some suitably direct way to some feature of reality. The task is to make this less rough. Eight characterizations of the issue are considered and rejected, before one is endorsed. On this characterization, the unreality of tense is equivalent to the unity of temporal reality. The issue whether tense is real, so characterized, (...)
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  7. How significant is the use/mention distinction?A. W. Moore - 1986 - Analysis 46 (4):173.
    It is argued that the use/mention distinction, if it is to be a clear-cut one, cannot have the significance that it is usually thought to have. For that significance attaches to the distinction between employing an expression in order to draw attention to, or to talk about, some aspect of the world, as determined by the expression’s meaning, and employing it in order to draw attention to, or to talk about, the expression itself—and this distinction is not a clear-cut one. (...)
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  8.  63
    One World.A. W. Moore - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):934-945.
    This essay appeared as a contribution to a special issue of European Journal of Philosophy to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of P. F. Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense. In that book Strawson asks whether we should agree with Kant's claim, in his Critique of Pure Reason, that there can be only one world. What Kant means by this claim is that the four-dimensional realm that we inhabit must constitute the whole of empirical reality. Strawson gives reasons for (...)
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  9.  60
    What Are These Familiar Words Doing Here?: A. W. Moore.A. W. Moore - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:147-171.
    This essay is concerned with six linguistic moves that we commonly make, each of which is considered in turn. These are: stating rules of representation; representing things categorically; mentioning expressions; saying truly or falsely how things are; saying vaguely how things are; and stating rules of rules of representation. A common-sense view is defended of what is involved in our doing each of these six things against a much more sceptical view emanating from the idea that linguistic behavior is fundamentally (...)
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  10.  84
    I—The Presidential Address: Being, Univocity, and Logical Syntax.A. W. Moore - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (1pt1):1-23.
    In this essay I focus on the idea of the univocity of being, championed by Duns Scotus and given prominence more recently by Deleuze. Although I am interested in how this idea can be established, my primary concern is with something more basic: how the idea can even be properly thought. In the course of exploring this issue, which I do partly by borrowing some ideas about logical syntax from Wittgenstein's Tractatus, I try to show how there can be dialogue (...)
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  11.  95
    Solispsim and Subjectivity.A. W. Moore - 1996 - European Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):220-235.
    This essay is concerned with solipsism, understood as the extreme sceptical view that I have no knowledge except of my subjective state. A less rough formulation of the view is mooted, inspired by a Quinean combination of naturalism and empiricism. An objection to the resultant position is then considered, based on Putnam’s argument that we are not brains in vats. This objection is first outlined, then pitted against a series of counter-objections. Eventually it is endorsed, but only at the price (...)
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  12. The Underdetermination/Indeterminacy Distinction and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.A. W. Moore - 1997 - Erkenntnis 46 (1):5-32.
    Two of Quine's most familiar doctrines are: that there is a distinction between underdetermination and indeterminacy; and that there is no distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. An argument is given that these two doctrines are incompatible. In terms wholly acceptable to Quine and based on the underdetermination/indeterminacy distinction, an exhaustive and exclusive distinction is drawn between two kinds of true sentences, which, it is argued, corresponds to the traditional analytic/synthetic distinction. An appendix is used to develop one aspect of (...)
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  13.  42
    The Metaphysics of Perspective: Tense and Colour. [REVIEW]A. W. Moore - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):387–394.
    This essay is a contribution to a symposium on Barry Stroud’s book The Quest for Reality. It exploits various analogies between tense and colour to defend the idea, about which Stroud is deeply sceptical, that we can successfully undertake what Stroud calls ‘the philosophical quest for reality’—more specifically, to defend the idea that we can do this by arguing that any fact can be represented from no point of view.
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  14.  40
    Bird on Kant's Mathematical Antinomies.A. W. Moore - 2011 - Kantian Review 16 (2):235-243.
    This essay is concerned with Graham Bird’s treatment, in The Revolutionary Kant, of Kant’s mathematical antinomies. On Bird’s interpretation, our error in these antinomies is to think that we can settle certain issues about the limits of physical reality by pure reason whereas in fact we cannot settle them at all. On the rival interpretation advocated in this essay, it is not true that we cannot settle these issues. Our error is to presuppose that the concept of the unconditioned has (...)
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  15.  21
    Review: One or Two Dogmas of Objectivism. [REVIEW]A. W. Moore - 1999 - Mind 108 (430):381 - 393.
    This essay is a critical notice of Thomas Nagel’s The Last Word. Though the essay evidences broad sympathy with the spirit of Nagel’s book, its main burden is to query the letter of the book. Nagel’s defence of the view that there are certain beliefs and ways of thinking that are not from any point of view, or that are ‘objective’ in his own terms, is criticized on the grounds that it is too facile. It is also criticized for not (...)
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  16.  59
    A Note on Kant's First Antinomy.A. W. Moore - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (169):480-485.
    An interpretation of Kant's first antinomy is defended whereby both its thesis and its antithesis depend on a common basic principle that Kant endorses, namely that there cannot be an ‘infinite contingency’, by which is meant a contingent fact about how an infinite region of space or time is occupied. The greatest problem with this interpretation is that Kant explicitly declines to apply counterparts of the temporal arguments in the antinomy to the world’s future, even though, if the interpretation is (...)
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