Dynamic Theodicy (DT) is a broad concept we bring up to designate some modern Philosophical Theology attempts to reconcile the necessary and perfect existence of God with the contingent characteristics of human life. In this paper we analyze such approaches and discuss how they have become incomprehensible because the metaphysical assumptions implicit in these explanations have lost their intrinsic relation to the natural human desire for salvation. In the first part we show Charles Hartshorne's DT-model, arising from the modal logic (...) of perfection, and the modern rational problems of this position in making infinite-necessary Being (God) and finite-contingent being (human) compatible. We note that at the heart of the contradictions in this DT account is a dialectical mode of thinking that makes it difficult to find a correct solution to this dichotomy, and to assume a human desire that could be considered related to lifelong goals. In the second part, supported by the proposal of Hans Urs von Balthasar's DT, we develop the concepts of bodily vulnerability, corporeal intentionality, and natural desire for salvation, which come from an Aristotelian-Thomistic thought. This theory is established in order to build an argument, following Alasdair MacIntyre’s ethical framework, on how to make possible the recovery of a metaphysical and anthropological desire that transcends natural aging and goes beyond death. We conclude that both human dependence and the virtues that arise naturally when human beings decide to seek the good of their transcendent condition, make it possible to recover the natural desire for salvation through divine and human love. (shrink)

Despite its importance in different occupational and everyday contexts, vigilance, typically defined as the capacity to sustain attention over time, is remarkably limited. What explains these limits? Two theories have been proposed. The Overload Theory states that being vigilant consumes limited information-processing resources; when depleted, task performance degrades. The Underload Theory states that motivation to perform vigilance tasks declines over time, thereby prompting attentional shifts and hindering performance. We highlight some conceptual and empirical problems for both theories and propose an (...) alternative: the Strategic Allocation Theory. For the Strategic Allocation Theory, performance on vigilance tasks optimizes as a function of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, including metacognitive factors such as the expected value of effort and the expected value of planning. Limited capacities must be deployed across task sets to maximize expected reward. The observed limits of vigilance reflect changes in the perceived value of, among other things, sustaining attention to a task rather than attending to something else. Drawing from recent computational theories of cognitive control and meta-reasoning, we argue that the Strategic Allocation Theory explains more phenomena related to vigilance behavior than other theories, including self-report data. Lastly, we outline some of the testable predictions the theory makes across several experimental paradigms. (shrink)

Fitouchi et al. claim that seemingly victimless pleasures and nonproductive activities are moralized because they alter self-control. Their account predicts that: (1) victimless excesses are negatively moralized because they diminish self-control, and (2) restrained behaviors are positively moralized because they enhance self-control. Several examples run contrary to these predictions and call into question the general relationship between self-control and cooperation.

This is a draft of my chapter on Negligence for the forthcoming Oxford Handbook in Moral Psychology. It discusses philosophical, psychological, and legal approaches to the attribution of culpability in cases of negligent wrongdoing.

This paper argues that habits, just like beliefs, can guide intentional action. To do this, a variety of real-life cases where a person acts habitually but contrary to her beliefs are discussed. The cases serve as dissociations showing that intentional agency is possible without doxastic guidance. The upshot is a model for thinking about the rationality of habitual action and the rationalizing role that habits can play in it. The model highlights the role that our history and institutions play in (...) shaping what actions become habitual for us. (shrink)

Como dice en la presentación de esta obra el profesor Javier Sánchez Cañizares, director del Grupo Ciencia, Razón y Fe (CRYF) de la Universidad de Navarra, los autoreshan tomado sobre sí, cada uno, la plena responsabilidad respecto de las verdades en las que sostienen a diario sus vidas. Han aceptado el desafío de acoger valientemente el empeño de pensar los problemas actuales, de modo interdisciplinar, para intentar iluminar los retos que presenta la sociedad de nuestros días. Es por esto que (...) el profesor Sergio Sánchez-Migallón señala en el prólogo de este libro que Jorge Martín Montoya Camacho y José Manuel Giménez Amaya «se comprometen con sus páginas porque hablan de lo que nos pasa y de lo que nos espera, así como de lo que nosotros miramos o dejamos de ver. No se habla aquí solo de ideas, ni solo de diagnósticos de algo ajeno al investigador. Se tratan problemas de los que todos somos en alguna medida responsables: y los filósofos no menos que los científicos, ni los creyentes menos que los increyentes». (shrink)

:In this essay, I present an account of forgiveness as a process of emotional distancing. The central claim is that, understood in these terms, forgiveness does not require a change in judgment. Rationally forgiving someone, in other words, does not require that one judges the significance of the wrongdoing differently or that one comes to the conclusion that the attitudes behind it have changed in a favorable way. The model shows in what sense forgiving is inherently social, shows why we (...) should be pluralists about it, and provides a basis for arguing against the existence of necessary conditions of forgiving. (shrink)

This paper argues that “free will” is vague. The argument has two steps. First, I argue that free will is a matter of degrees and, second, that there are no sharp boundaries separating free decisions and actions and non‐free ones. After presenting the argument, I focus on one significant consequence of the thesis, although others are mentioned along the way. In short, considerations of vagueness help understand the logic behind so‐called manipulation arguments, but also show why these arguments are ultimately (...) flawed. (shrink)

Most human actions are complex, but some of them are basic. Which are these? In this paper, I address this question by invoking slips, a common kind of mistake. The proposal is this: an action is basic if and only if it is not possible to slip in performing it. The argument discusses some well-established results from the psychology of language production in the context of a philosophical theory of action. In the end, the proposed criterion is applied to discuss (...) some well-known theories of basic actions. (shrink)

Philosophers of perception are familiar with the argument from illusion, at least since Hume formulated it to challenge a naïve form of realism. In this paper, I present an analogous argument but in the domain of action. It focuses on slips, a common kind of mistake. But, otherwise, it is structurally similar. The argument challenges some contemporary views about the nature of action inspired by Wittgenstein. The discussion shows how thinking about these common mistakes helps illuminate aspects of human agency (...) that tend to be overlooked whenever too much emphasis is placed on the rationality of human actions. (shrink)

This is a draft of my chapter on Agency and Mistakes for the Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency. In it, I focus on performance mistakes and distinguish them from other "derivative" mistakes that we make as agents. I argue that a proper understanding of these mistakes recommends a generalized fallibilism about human agency.

Este artículo está escrito para una colección de ensayos introductorios sobre filosofía de las ciencias cognitivas. Es una revisión (selectiva) de la literatura sobre la psicología del juicio moral.

Loyalty is considered central to people’s moral life, yet little is known about how people think about what it means to be loyal. We used a prototype approach to understand how loyalty is represented in Colombia and the United States and how these representations mediate attributions of loyalty and moral judgments of loyalty violations. Across 7 studies (N = 1,984), we found cross-cultural similarities in the associative meaning of loyalty (Study 1) but found differences in the centrality of features associated (...) with loyalty (Study 2) and the latent structure of loyalty representations (Study 3). Colombians represent loyalty in terms of more general moral characteristics, while US participants represent loyalty in terms of interpersonal commitment, both in contrast with current approaches to loyalty. By comparing representations of loyalty and honesty, we establish that difference in loyalty conceptualizations reflect a different way of thinking about loyalty rather than morality more generally (Study 4). Further, Colombians attributed greater loyalty to individuals with general moral characteristics compared to participants from the United States sample (Study 5) and were more likely to classify non-loyal values as loyalty-related (Study 6). While the centrality of prototypical features predicts categorizing norm violations as loyalty-related, differences in prototypical structure account for differences in the severity of moral judgment for such violations (Study 7), which suggests that loyalty representations have similar functions even though these representations differ in structural characteristics. (shrink)

Are we ever morally permitted to do what is morally wrong? It seems intuitive that we are, but evidence for dissociations among judgment of permissibility and wrongness are relatively scarce. Across 4 experiments (N = 1,438), we show that people judge that some behaviors can be morally wrong and permissible. The dissociations arise because these judgments track different morally relevant aspects of everyday moral encounters. Judgments of individual rights predicted permissibility but not wrongness, while character assessment predicted wrongness but not (...) permissibility. These findings suggest a picture in which moral evaluation is granular enough to express reasoning about different types of normative considerations, notably the possibility that people can exercise their rights in morally problematic ways. (shrink)

This text, commissioned by the OSUN Global Observatory of Academic Freedom, discusses how the concept of academic freedom is codified in Colombian Law and regulations of public and private higher education institutions. It also explores common conceptions of academic freedom among Colombian scholars, as well as commonly observed threats to it.

En el mundo académico contemporáneo han venido tomando fuerza, desde hace varias décadas, los temas de la interdisciplinariedad y la transdisciplinariedad, como respuesta de un sector de la comunidad científica a los problemas de la especialización y a la desconexión entre las ciencias. Como todo elemento o aspecto de la realidad, este tema requiere de una debida fundamentación filosófica que se encuentra en el pensamiento clásico. En el presente artículo se intenta mostrar la relación entre la tradición de la filosofía (...) perenne y este fundamento, atendiendo, sobre todo, a la importancia de la mirada holística del fenómeno ético y pretendiendo sustentar que el diálogo entre las ciencias sólo es posible rescatando el paradigma metafísico, legado por los griegos a la civilización occidental y defendido por MacIntyre en su libro "Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity. An Essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning, and Narrative" (University of Cambridge, 2016). (shrink)

Pulcro, sobrio, comedido, preciso, cotidiano, manual, podrían ser calificativos (demasiado fácilmente) aplicables al trabajo de Amaya Bombín. Como si se tratara de la labor de una cirujana, de una bordadora, de una artesana, de un ama de casa. Si afirmáramos esto no solamente estaríamos recurriendo a tópicos sobradamente manidos cuando se trata de hablar de la obra de mujeres artistas, sino que además estaríamos desviando nuestra atención de lo que se nos ha dado a experimentar para reflexionar. [...].

Los autores son miembros del grupo Ciencia, Razón y Fe (CRYF) de la Universidad de Navarra, y llevan trabajando en este grupo de forma interdisciplinar durante casi una década en temas de antropología y ética. Como dice Javier Bernácer en el prólogo de este libro, los profesores Montoya Camacho y Giménez Amaya han realizado una obra profunda, académica, y al mismo tiempo de fácil lectura. Los autores apoyándose en el filósofo anglosajón Alasdair MacIntyre señalan que «la fragilidad del ser (...) humano es un elemento vertebral de su actuar ético». Una vez que se descubre de modo natural el sentido de la vulnerabilidad, tanto propia como ajena, el ser humano desarrolla una serie de virtudes, que, por definición, llevan a la culminación de una vida realizada: la felicidad como eudemonía. No es el camino más fácil, pero sí el más directo a una existencia llena de sentido. [Portada e índice]. (shrink)

The articles presents my journey with "Live Poetry" a participatory poetry methods created by Luis Enrique Amaya in Perù. This journey is marked by three encounters I had, that convinced me of the depth of the beauty and healing this journey can bring. The first occurs in Cali, Colombia, in a vast set of working-class neighbourhoods called Distrito de Agua Blanca. This area is dominated by drug trafficking and invisible borders between rival gangs. Teenagers experience a daily life of (...) violence and neglect. In this neighbourhood, I meet Luis Enrique Amaya, poet and social activist from Lima, Peru. Today, Luis will lead a poetry workshop with teenagers in the neighbourhood. It is based on a community poetry method he created years before with his collaborators. The workshop today will have two phases. In the first phase, the poet interviews a passer-by, a member of the community, and asks them to talk about someone important to her or him (a family member, a friend, a lover). In the second phase, the poet asks the interviewee to wait for few minutes. Then the poet sits alone for about ten minutes and composes a poem dedicated to the person chosen by the interviewee. When he has finished, the poet gives the poem to the interviewee as a gift saying: “After listening to you, I composed this poem and I give it to you as a gift. But beware: it is not for you. It is to invite you give it as a gift to the person you told me about”. (shrink)

¿Cuáles son los componentes distintivos del cuerpo humano que permiten identificarlo como un elemento material diferente del resto del mundo físico? ¿Son tales elementos algo meramente funcional, o remiten a otra dimensión que va más allá de la instrumentalidad? Estas son las preguntas que se plantean en el libro “Biología y racionalidad. El carácter distintivo del cuerpo humano” de José Ángel Lombo y José Manuel Giménez Amaya. Partiendo desde la perspectiva filosófica, los autores buscan clarificar estas cuestiones ofreciendo un (...) marco conceptual interdisciplinar que remite en todo momento a la unidad de la persona humana. (shrink)

¿Puede ser comprendida la moralidad aisladamente de los órdenes sociales, culturales, políticos y económicos en los que surge y se desarrolla? ¿El interés intelectual por la moralidad de nuestro tiempo requiere algo más que el análisis de teorías éticas? Las respuestas de Alasdair MacIntyre a estas preguntas se muestran a través del trabajo de toda una vida, en la que ha desarrollado un análisis ético de la Modernidad. El libro «Valoración ética de la modernidad según Alasdair MacIntyre», de Hernando José (...) Bello Rodríguez y José Manuel Giménez Amaya, expone el desarrollo de tal análisis, llevado a cabo por el filósofo escocés en el marco de sus ideas que van desde la publicación de su obra After Virtue, hasta la reciente aparición de Ethics in Conflicts of Modernity. (shrink)