Russell, Wittgenstein, and synthesis in thought

In Jose L. Zalabardo (ed.), Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 15 (2012)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Wittgenstein held that Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment fails to explain an atomic judgment’s representation of entities as combined. He demonstrated this failure as follows. Under the multiple relation theory, an atomic judgment is a complex whose relating relation is judgment, the universal, and whose terms include the entities the judgment represents as combined. Taking such a complex we may arrive through the substitution of constituents at a complex whose relating relation is again judgment but whose terms do not include entities which are logically suited for combination. This second judgment complex will not represent any of its terms as combined, for entities that are logically uncombinable are unrepresentable as combined. Russell’s theory does not, however, explain how the original judgment differs from the complex arrived at by the substitution of constituents such that the former but not the latter represents certain of its terms as combined.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-03-09
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
70 ( #32,252 of 43,689 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #32,733 of 43,689 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.