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Constantin C. Brîncuș
University of Bucharest
  1. What Makes Logical Truths True?Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3): 249-272.
    The concern of deductive logic is generally viewed as the systematic recognition of logical principles, i.e., of logical truths. This paper presents and analyzes different instantiations of the three main interpretations of logical principles, viz. as ontological principles, as empirical hypotheses, and as true propositions in virtue of meanings. I argue in this paper that logical principles are true propositions in virtue of the meanings of the logical terms within a certain linguistic framework. Since these principles also regulate and control (...)
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  2.  30
    ”John P. Burgess, Philosophical Logic, Princeton University Press, 2009”. [REVIEW]Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2013 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (1):90-92.
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  3. Categoricity and Negation. A Note on Kripke’s Affirmativism.Constantin C. Brîncuș & Iulian D. Toader - 2019 - In The Logica Yearbook 2018. London: College Publications. pp. 57-66.
    We argue that, if taken seriously, Kripke's view that a language for science can dispense with a negation operator is to be rejected. Part of the argument is a proof that positive logic, i.e., classical propositional logic without negation, is not categorical.
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  4.  48
    ”Carnap’s Ideal of Explication and Naturalism, Edited by Pierre Wagner, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012". [REVIEW]Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2014 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (2).
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  5. The Epistemic Significance of Valid Inference – A Model-Theoretic Approach.Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2015 - In Sorin Costreie & Mircea Dumitru (eds.), Meaning and Truth. Bucharest: PRO Universitaria Publishing. pp. 11-36.
    The problem analysed in this paper is whether we can gain knowledge by using valid inferences, and how we can explain this process from a model-theoretic perspective. According to the paradox of inference (Cohen & Nagel 1936/1998, 173), it is logically impossible for an inference to be both valid and its conclusion to possess novelty with respect to the premises. I argue in this paper that valid inference has an epistemic significance, i.e., it can be used by an agent to (...)
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