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Daniel J. Hill [3]Daniel Hill [2]
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Daniel Hill
University of Liverpool
  1. Persons: Human and Divine.Daniel J. Hill & Greg Welty - 2009 - Ars Disputandi 9:1566-5399.
    This is a book review of Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Persons: Human and Divine (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007).
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  2. The Concept of Entrapment.Daniel J. Hill, Stephen K. McLeod & Attila Tanyi - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (4):539-554.
    Our question is this: What makes an act one of entrapment? We make a standard distinction between legal entrapment, which is carried out by parties acting in their capacities as (or as deputies of) law- enforcement agents, and civil entrapment, which is not. We aim to provide a definition of entrapment that covers both and which, for reasons we explain, does not settle questions of permissibility and culpability. We explain, compare, and contrast two existing definitions of legal entrapment to commit (...)
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  3.  99
    Deane-Peter Baker, Ed. Alvin Plantinga. [REVIEW]Daniel Hill & Greg Welty - 2009 - Philosophy in Review 29 (1):82-85.
    This is a book review of Deane-Peter Baker (ed.), Alvin Plantinga (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007).
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  4.  69
    On Truth-Functionality.Daniel J. Hill & Stephen K. McLeod - 2010 - Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (4):628-632.
    Benjamin Schnieder has argued that several traditional definitions of truth-functionality fail to capture a central intuition informal characterizations of the notion often capture. The intuition is that the truth-value of a sentence that employs a truth-functional operator depends upon the truth-values of the sentences upon which the operator operates. Schnieder proposes an alternative definition of truth-functionality that is designed to accommodate this intuition. We argue that one traditional definition of ‘truth-functionality’ is immune from the counterexamples that Schnieder proposes and is (...)
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  5. What is the Incoherence Objection to Legal Entrapment?Daniel Hill, Stephen K. McLeod & Attila Tanyi - manuscript
    Some legal theorists say that legal entrapment to commit a crime is incoherent. So far, there is no satisfactorily precise statement of this objection in the literature: it is obscure even as to the type of incoherence that is purportedly involved. (Perhaps consequently, substantial assessment of the objection is also absent.) We aim to provide a new statement of the objection that is more precise and more rigorous than its predecessors. We argue that the best form of the objection asserts (...)
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