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Diego E. Machuca [30]Diego Machuca [3]
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  1. Sextus Empiricus: Against the Physicists. [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (3):614-617.
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  2. La critique du critère de vérité épicurien chez Sextus Empiricus: un scepticisme sur le monde extérieur?Diego E. Machuca - 2013 - In S. Marchand & F. Verde (eds.), Épicurisme et scepticisme. Sapienza Università Editrice. pp. 105-127.
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  3. Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy.Diego E. Machuca - 2008 - Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Theologie 55 (1/2):28-63.
    The purpose of this paper is twofold: to discuss some challenging issues concerning Sextus’ works and outlook, and to offer an overview of the influence exerted by Sextan Pyrrhonism on both early modern and contemporary philosophy.
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  4. The Pyrrhonian Argument From Possible Disagreement.Diego E. Machuca - 2011 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 93 (2):148-161.
    In his Pyrrhonian Outlines , Sextus Empiricus employs an argument based upon the possibility of disagreement in order to show that one should not assent to a Dogmatic claim to which at present one cannot oppose a rival claim. The use of this argument seems to be at variance with the Pyrrhonian stance, both because it does not seem to accord with the definition of Skepticism and because the argument appears to entail that the search for truth is doomed to (...)
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  5. Ancient Skepticism: Pyrrhonism.Diego E. Machuca - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):246-258.
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  6. Agrippan Pyrrhonism and the Challenge of Disagreement.Diego E. Machuca - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Research 40:23-39.
    This paper argues for the following three claims. First, the Agrippan mode from disagreement does not play a secondary role in inducing suspension of judgment. Second, the Pyrrhonist is not committed to the criteria of justification underlying the Five Modes of Agrippa, which nonetheless does not prevent him from non-doxastically assenting to them. And third, some recent objections to Agrippan Pyrrhonism raised by analytic epistemologists and experimental philosophers fail to appreciate the Pyrrhonist's ad hominem style of argumentation and the real (...)
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  7. Argumentative Persuasiveness in Ancient Pyrrhonism.Diego E. Machuca - 2009 - Méthexis 22:101-26.
    The present paper has two, interrelated objectives. The first is to analyze the different senses in which arguments are characterized as persuasive in the extant writings of Sextus Empiricus. The second is to examine the Pyrrhonist’s therapeutic use of arguments in the discussion with his Dogmatic rivals – more precisely, to determine the sense and basis of Sextus’ distinction between therapeutic arguments that appear weighty and therapeutic arguments that appear weak in their persuasiveness.
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  8. Pyrrhonism, Inquiry, and Rationality.Diego E. Machuca - 2013 - Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico 34 (1):201-228.
    In this paper, I critically engage with Casey Perin's interpretation of Sextan Pyrrhonism in his book, The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism. From an approach that is both exegetical and systematic, I explore a number of issues concerning the Pyrrhonist's inquiry into truth, his alleged commitment to the canons of rationality, and his response to the apraxia objection.
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  9. The Pyrrhonist's Ataraxia and Philanthropia.Diego E. Machuca - 2006 - Ancient Philosophy 26 (1):111-126.
    The purpose of the present paper is twofold. First, to examine what beliefs, if any, underlie (a) the Pyrrhonist’s desire for ataraxia and his account of how this state may be attained, and (b) his philanthropic therapy, which seeks to induce, by argument, ejpochv and ataraxia in the Dogmatists. Second, to determine whether the Pyrrhonist’s philanthropy and his search for and attainment of ataraxia are, as scholars have generally believed, essential aspects of his stance.
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  10. Suspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to Wieland.Diego E. Machuca - 2015 - Analytic Philosophy 56 (2):177-187.
    It is generally thought that suspension of judgment about a proposition p is the doxastic attitude one is rationally compelled to adopt whenever the epistemic reasons for and against p are equipollent or equally credible, that is, whenever the total body of available evidence bearing on p epistemically justifies neither belief nor disbelief in p. However, in a recent contribution to this journal, Jan Wieland proposes “to broaden the conditions for suspension, and argue that it is rational to suspend belief (...)
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  11. Pyrrhonism and the Law of Non-Contradiction.Diego E. Machuca - 2011 - In D. E. Machuca (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Springer.
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  12. Editor's Introduction.Diego E. Machuca - 2013 - In D. E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge.
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  13.  65
    Again on Sextus on Persuasiveness and Equipollence.Diego E. Machuca - 2017 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 99 (2):212-228.
    This paper engages with Svavar Svavarsson’s recent essay, “Sextus Empiricus on Persuasiveness and Equipollence,” arguing against both (i) his interpretation of whether two rival arguments appear equipollent to the Pyrrhonist because he himself is equally persuaded by both of them, and (ii) his interpretation of the way in which the argument from possible disagreement is supposed to induce suspension of judgment in the Pyrrhonist. In so doing, I aim to dispel some serious misunderstandings regarding key aspects of the Pyrrhonist’s skeptical (...)
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  14. Moderate Ethical Realism in Sextus' Against the Ethicists?Diego E. Machuca - 2011 - In D. E. Machuca (ed.), New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism. Brill.
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  15. A Neo-Pyrrhonian Approach to the Epistemology of Disagreement.Diego E. Machuca - 2013 - In D. E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge. pp. 66-89.
    This paper approaches the current epistemological debate on peer disagreement from a neo-Pyrrhonian perspective, thus adopting a form of skepticism which is more radical than those discussed in the literature. It makes use of argumentative strategies found in ancient Pyrrhonism both to show that such a debate rests on problematic assumptions and to block some maneuvers intended to offer an efficacious way of settling a considerable number of peer disputes. The essay takes issue with three views held in the peer (...)
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  16. Introduction.E. Machuca Diego - 2011 - In D. E. Machuca (ed.), New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism. Brill.
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  17. Conciliationism and the Menace of Scepticism.Diego E. Machuca - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (3):469–488.
    It is sometimes claimed that conciliatory views on disagreement ultimately lead to either global or widespread scepticism. This is deemed to be a serious problem for conciliationism either because scepticism of either kind is a patently untenable stance or because it poses a serious threat to our intellectual and social lives. In this paper, I first argue that the alleged untenability of both types of scepticism is far from being obvious and should therefore be established rather than taken for granted, (...)
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  18. Review of R. Joyce & S. Kirchin (Eds.), A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory (Springer, 2010). [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2011 - Philosophy in Review 31 (5):354-358.
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  19. Review of Sébastien Charles & Plínio J. Smith (Eds.), Scepticism in the Eighteenth Century: Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklärung. [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2015 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 53 (3):551-552.
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  20. Ancient Skepticism: Overview.Diego E. Machuca - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):234-245.
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  21. Review of M. Bergmann & P. Kain (Eds.), Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. [REVIEW]Diego Machuca - 2015 - Philosophy in Review 35 (5):235-237.
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  22. Pyrrhonian Relativism.Diego E. Machuca - 2015 - Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico 36:89-114.
    This paper argues that Sextus Empiricus’s Pyrrhonism is a form of relativism markedly different from the positions typically referred to by this term. The scholars who have explored the relativistic elements found in Sextus’s texts have claimed that his outlook is not actually a form of relativism, or that those elements are inconsistent with his account of Pyrrhonism, or that he is confusing skepticism with relativism. The reason for these views is twofold: first, when employing the term ‘relativism’ one hardly (...)
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  23. A Neo-Pyrrhonian Response to the Disagreeing About Disagreement Argument.Diego Machuca - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1663-1680.
    An objection that has been raised to the conciliatory stance on the epistemic significance of peer disagreement known as the Equal Weight View is that it is self-defeating, self-undermining, or self-refuting. The proponent of that view claims that equal weight should be given to all the parties to a peer dispute. Hence, if one of his epistemic peers defends the opposite view, he is required to give equal weight to the two rival views, thereby undermining his confidence in the correctness (...)
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  24. Review of R. Bett (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism (CUP, 2010). [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2011 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (3):573 - 579.
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 19, Issue 3, Page 573-579, May 2011.
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  25. Ancient Skepticism: The Skeptical Academy.Diego E. Machuca - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):259-266.
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  26. Review of S. Goldberg, Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology (OUP, 2010). [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2012 - Philosophy in Review 32 (6):468-470.
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  27.  72
    De Praktische En Epistemische Waarde van Het Pyrronisme.Diego Machuca - 2016 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 108 (1):73-98.
    This paper assesses both the practical and the epistemic value of Pyrrhonism as this stance is described in Sextus Empiricus’s extant writings. It first explores whether the Pyrrhonist’s suspension of judgment and undisturbedness make us behave in a moral or immoral way, and whether they allow us to attain those goals that would make it possible to live well. It then examines whether the Pyrrhonist’s suspension of judgment makes it possible to reach the epistemic goals of attaining truth and avoiding (...)
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  28. Review of M. Forster, Kant and Skepticism. [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2010 - Philosophy in Review 30 (3):186-8.
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  29. Review of M. Lynch, In Praise of Reason (MIT Press, 2012). [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2013 - Philosophy in Review 33 (4):308-311.
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  30. Review of Quentin Smith (Ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2010 - Philosophy in Review 30 (4):305-8.
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  31. The Local Nature of Modern Moral Skepticism.Diego E. Machuca - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):315–324.
    Julia Annas has affirmed that the kind of modern moral skepticism which denies the existence of objective moral values rests upon a contrast between morality and some other system of beliefs about the world which is not called into doubt. Richard Bett, on the other hand, has argued that the existence of such a contrast is not a necessary condition for espousing that kind of moral skepticism. My purpose in this paper is to show that Bett fails to make a (...)
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  32. Review of W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Pyrrhonian Skepticism. [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (1):154 – 159.
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  33.  93
    Review of R. Fogelin's "Walking the Tightrope of Reason: The Precarious Life of a Rational Animal". New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, Xii + 203pp., $22.00. [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (1):188-191.
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