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Diego E. Machuca [31]Diego Machuca [4]
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  1.  14
    Scepticisme, apraxia et rationalité.Diego E. Machuca - 2019 - In Diego E. Machuca & Stéphane Marchand (eds.), Les raisons du doute: études sur le scepticisme antique. Paris: Classiques Garnier. pp. 53-87.
    La présente étude a deux objectifs. Le premier est d’examiner les différentes formulations de l’objection de l’ἀπραξία telle qu’elle fut soulevée contre le scepticisme académicien et le pyrrhonisme, ainsi que les réponses à cette objection proposées par Arcésilas et Sextus Empiricus. Le second objectif consiste à évaluer la force de la version de l’objection de l’ἀπραξία selon laquelle le sceptique ne peut réaliser les actions rationnelles propres à l’être humain.
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  2. Walking the Tightrope of Reason: The Precarious Life of a Rational AnimalRobert J. Fogelin New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, Xii + 203pp., $22.00. [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (1):188-191.
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  3. Review of R. Bett (Trans.), Sextus Empiricus: Against the Physicists. [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (3):614-617.
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  4. La critique du critère de vérité épicurien chez Sextus Empiricus: un scepticisme sur le monde extérieur?Diego E. Machuca - 2013 - In S. Marchand & F. Verde (eds.), Épicurisme et scepticisme. Sapienza Università Editrice. pp. 105-127.
    It is generally agreed that one of the key differences between ancient skepticism and modern and contemporary skepticism is that the ancient skeptic does not call into question the existence of the external world, but only our ability to know the properties or qualities of external objects. In this paper, I argue that in Sextus Empiricus's attack on the Epicurean criterion of truth one finds evidence that the ancient Pyrrhonist also suspends judgment about the existence of external objects.
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  5. Agrippan Pyrrhonism and the Challenge of Disagreement.Diego E. Machuca - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Research 40:23-39.
    This paper argues for the following three claims. First, the Agrippan mode from disagreement does not play a secondary role in inducing suspension of judgment. Second, the Pyrrhonist is not committed to the criteria of justification underlying the Five Modes of Agrippa, which nonetheless does not prevent him from non-doxastically assenting to them. And third, some recent objections to Agrippan Pyrrhonism raised by analytic epistemologists and experimental philosophers fail to appreciate the Pyrrhonist's ad hominem style of argumentation and the real (...)
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  6. The Pyrrhonian Argument From Possible Disagreement.Diego E. Machuca - 2011 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 93 (2):148-161.
    In his Pyrrhonian Outlines , Sextus Empiricus employs an argument based upon the possibility of disagreement in order to show that one should not assent to a Dogmatic claim to which at present one cannot oppose a rival claim. The use of this argument seems to be at variance with the Pyrrhonian stance, both because it does not seem to accord with the definition of Skepticism and because the argument appears to entail that the search for truth is doomed to (...)
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  7. Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy.Diego E. Machuca - 2008 - Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Theologie 55 (1/2):28-63.
    The purpose of this paper is twofold: to discuss some challenging issues concerning Sextus’ works and outlook, and to offer an overview of the influence exerted by Sextan Pyrrhonism on both early modern and contemporary philosophy.
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  8. Ancient Skepticism: Pyrrhonism.Diego E. Machuca - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):246-258.
    Pyrrhonism was one of the two main ancient skeptical traditions. In this second paper of the three‐part series devoted to ancient skepticism, I present and discuss some of the issues on Pyrrhonian skepticism which have been the focus of much attention in the recent literature. The topics to be addressed concern the outlooks of Pyrrho, Aenesidemus, and Sextus Empiricus.
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  9. Pyrrhonism and the Law of Non-Contradiction.Diego E. Machuca - 2011 - In D. E. Machuca (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Springer.
    The question of whether the Pyrrhonist adheres to certain logical principles, criteria of justification, and inference rules is of central importance for the study of Pyrrhonism. Its significance lies in that, whereas the Pyrrhonist describes his philosophical stance and argues against the Dogmatists by means of what may be considered a rational discourse, adherence to any such principles, criteria, and rules does not seem compatible with the radical character of his skepticism. Hence, if the Pyrrhonist does endorse them, one must (...)
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  10. A Neo-Pyrrhonian Response to the Disagreeing About Disagreement Argument.Diego Machuca - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1663-1680.
    An objection that has been raised to the conciliatory stance on the epistemic significance of peer disagreement known as the Equal Weight View is that it is self-defeating, self-undermining, or self-refuting. The proponent of that view claims that equal weight should be given to all the parties to a peer dispute. Hence, if one of his epistemic peers defends the opposite view, he is required to give equal weight to the two rival views, thereby undermining his confidence in the correctness (...)
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  11. Pyrrhonism, Inquiry, and Rationality.Diego E. Machuca - 2013 - Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico 34 (1):201-228.
    In this paper, I critically engage with Casey Perin's interpretation of Sextan Pyrrhonism in his book, The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism. From an approach that is both exegetical and systematic, I explore a number of issues concerning the Pyrrhonist's inquiry into truth, his alleged commitment to the canons of rationality, and his response to the apraxia objection.
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  12. Argumentative Persuasiveness in Ancient Pyrrhonism.Diego E. Machuca - 2009 - Méthexis 22:101-26.
    The present paper has two, interrelated objectives. The first is to analyze the different senses in which arguments are characterized as persuasive in the extant writings of Sextus Empiricus. The second is to examine the Pyrrhonist’s therapeutic use of arguments in the discussion with his Dogmatic rivals – more precisely, to determine the sense and basis of Sextus’ distinction between therapeutic arguments that appear weighty and therapeutic arguments that appear weak in their persuasiveness.
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  13. Editor's Introduction.Diego E. Machuca - 2013 - In D. E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge.
    In this introductory chapter, I first offer an overview of the two themes addressed in the present collection - namely, disagreement and skepticism - and their connection, then present the purpose and content of the volume.
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  14. The Pyrrhonist’s Ἀταραξία and Φιλανθρωπία.Diego E. Machuca - 2006 - Ancient Philosophy 26 (1):111-126.
    The purpose of the present paper is twofold. First, to examine what beliefs, if any, underlie (a) the Pyrrhonist’s desire for ataraxia and his account of how this state may be attained, and (b) his philanthropic therapy, which seeks to induce, by argument, ejpochv and ataraxia in the Dogmatists. Second, to determine whether the Pyrrhonist’s philanthropy and his search for and attainment of ataraxia are, as scholars have generally believed, essential aspects of his stance.
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  15. A Neo-Pyrrhonian Approach to the Epistemology of Disagreement.Diego E. Machuca - 2013 - In D. E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge. pp. 66-89.
    This paper approaches the current epistemological debate on peer disagreement from a neo-Pyrrhonian perspective, thus adopting a form of skepticism which is more radical than those discussed in the literature. It makes use of argumentative strategies found in ancient Pyrrhonism both to show that such a debate rests on problematic assumptions and to block some maneuvers intended to offer an efficacious way of settling a considerable number of peer disputes. The essay takes issue with three views held in the peer (...)
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  16. Suspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to Wieland.Diego E. Machuca - 2015 - Analytic Philosophy 56 (2):177-187.
    It is generally thought that suspension of judgment about a proposition p is the doxastic attitude one is rationally compelled to adopt whenever the epistemic reasons for and against p are equipollent or equally credible, that is, whenever the total body of available evidence bearing on p epistemically justifies neither belief nor disbelief in p. However, in a recent contribution to this journal, Jan Wieland proposes “to broaden the conditions for suspension, and argue that it is rational to suspend belief (...)
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  17.  8
    Does Pyrrhonism Have Practical or Epistemic Value?Diego E. Machuca - 2019 - In Giuseppe Veltri, Racheli Haliva, Stephan Franz Schmid & Emidio Spinelli (eds.), Sceptical Paths: Enquiry and Doubt from Antiquity to the Present. Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter. pp. 43-66.
    My purpose in this paper is to examine whether Pyrrhonian skepticism, as this stance is described in Sextus Empiricus’s extant works, has practical or epistemic value. More precisely, I would like to consider whether the Pyrrhonist’s suspension of judgment (ἐποχή) and undisturbedness (ἀταραξία) can be deemed to be of practical or epistemic value. By ‘practical’ value I mean both moral value and prudential value. Moral value refers to moral rightness and wrongness; prudential value to the value of well-being, personal or (...)
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  18. Conciliationism and the Menace of Scepticism.Diego E. Machuca - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (3):469–488.
    It is sometimes claimed that conciliatory views on disagreement ultimately lead to either global or widespread scepticism. This is deemed to be a serious problem for conciliationism either because scepticism of either kind is a patently untenable stance or because it poses a serious threat to our intellectual and social lives. In this paper, I first argue that the alleged untenability of both types of scepticism is far from being obvious and should therefore be established rather than taken for granted, (...)
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  19. Again on Sextus on Persuasiveness and Equipollence.Diego E. Machuca - 2017 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 99 (2):212-228.
    This paper engages with Svavar Svavarsson’s recent essay, “Sextus Empiricus on Persuasiveness and Equipollence,” arguing against both (i) his interpretation of whether two rival arguments appear equipollent to the Pyrrhonist because he himself is equally persuaded by both of them, and (ii) his interpretation of the way in which the argument from possible disagreement is supposed to induce suspension of judgment in the Pyrrhonist. In so doing, I aim to dispel some serious misunderstandings regarding key aspects of the Pyrrhonist’s skeptical (...)
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  20. Review of R. Joyce & S. Kirchin (Eds.), A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory (Springer, 2010). [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2011 - Philosophy in Review 31 (5):354-358.
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  21. Moderate Ethical Realism in Sextus' Against the Ethicists?Diego E. Machuca - 2011 - In D. E. Machuca (ed.), New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism. Brill.
    Several scholars familiar with Sextus Empiricus’s Pyrrhonism who have attentively read his Against the Ethicists have gotten the impression that something strange is going on in this book. For, at variance with the ‘official’ Pyrrhonian attitude of universal suspension of judgment, a number of passages of Against the Ethicists seem to ascribe to the Pyrrhonist both a type of negative dogmatism and a form of realism, which together amount to what may be called ‘moderate ethical realism’. The purpose of this (...)
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  22. Review of M. Bergmann & P. Kain (Eds.), Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. [REVIEW]Diego Machuca - 2015 - Philosophy in Review 35 (5):235-237.
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  23. Introduction.E. Machuca Diego - 2011 - In D. E. Machuca (ed.), New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism. Brill.
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  24. Review of Sébastien Charles & Plínio J. Smith (Eds.), Scepticism in the Eighteenth Century: Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklärung. [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2015 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 53 (3):551-552.
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  25. Ancient Skepticism: Overview.Diego E. Machuca - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):234-245.
    Scholarship on ancient skepticism has undergone a remarkable renaissance in the last three decades. Specialists in ancient philosophy have explored the complex history of the Greco‐Roman skeptical traditions and discussed difficult philological and exegetical issues. But they have also assessed the philosophical significance of the various ancient skeptical outlooks. In this first paper, I provide a general presentation of this area of study, while in the two subsequent articles I will focus on some of the topics that have been the (...)
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  26. Review of M. Lynch, In Praise of Reason (MIT Press, 2012). [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2013 - Philosophy in Review 33 (4):308-311.
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  27. Pyrrhonian Relativism.Diego E. Machuca - 2015 - Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico 36:89-114.
    This paper argues that Sextus Empiricus’s Pyrrhonism is a form of relativism markedly different from the positions typically referred to by this term. The scholars who have explored the relativistic elements found in Sextus’s texts have claimed that his outlook is not actually a form of relativism, or that those elements are inconsistent with his account of Pyrrhonism, or that he is confusing skepticism with relativism. The reason for these views is twofold: first, when employing the term ‘relativism’ one hardly (...)
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  28. Ancient Skepticism: The Skeptical Academy.Diego Machuca - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):259-266.
    Ancient philosophy knew two main skeptical traditions: the Pyrrhonian and the Academic. In this final paper of the three‐part series devoted to ancient skepticism, I present some of the topics about Academic skepticism which have recently been much debated in the specialist literature. I will be concerned with the outlooks of Arcesilaus, Carneades, and Philo of Larissa.
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  29. De Praktische En Epistemische Waarde van Het Pyrronisme.Diego Machuca - 2016 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 108 (1):73-98.
    This paper assesses both the practical and the epistemic value of Pyrrhonism as this stance is described in Sextus Empiricus’s extant writings. It first explores whether the Pyrrhonist’s suspension of judgment and undisturbedness make us behave in a moral or immoral way, and whether they allow us to attain those goals that would make it possible to live well. It then examines whether the Pyrrhonist’s suspension of judgment makes it possible to reach the epistemic goals of attaining truth and avoiding (...)
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  30. Review of R. Bett (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism (CUP, 2010). [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2011 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (3):573 - 579.
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 19, Issue 3, Page 573-579, May 2011.
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  31. Review of S. Goldberg, Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology (OUP, 2010). [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2012 - Philosophy in Review 32 (6):468-470.
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  32. Review of M. Forster, Kant and Skepticism. [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2010 - Philosophy in Review 30 (3):186-8.
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  33. The Local Nature of Modern Moral Skepticism.Diego E. Machuca - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):315–324.
    Julia Annas has affirmed that the kind of modern moral skepticism which denies the existence of objective moral values rests upon a contrast between morality and some other system of beliefs about the world which is not called into doubt. Richard Bett, on the other hand, has argued that the existence of such a contrast is not a necessary condition for espousing that kind of moral skepticism. My purpose in this paper is to show that Bett fails to make a (...)
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  34. Review of Quentin Smith (Ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2010 - Philosophy in Review 30 (4):305-8.
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  35. Review of W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Pyrrhonian Skepticism. [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (1):154 – 159.
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