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E. J. Coffman
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
  1. Three Arguments Against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support.Daniel Howard-Snyder & E. J. Coffman - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):535-564.
    Foundationalism is false; after all, foundational beliefs are arbitrary, they do not solve the epistemic regress problem, and they cannot exist withoutother (justified) beliefs. Or so some people say. In this essay, we assess some arguments based on such claims, arguments suggested in recent work by Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.
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  2. The Fall of the Mind Argument and Some Lessons About Freedom.Donald Smith & E. J. Coffman - 2010 - In Joseph Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 127-148.
    This chapter offers a new criticism of the Mind argument that is both decisive and instructive. It introduces a plausible principle (γ) that places a requirement on one’s having a choice about an event whose causal history includes only other events. Depending on γ’s truth-value, the Mind argument fails in such a way that one or the other of the two main species of libertarianism is the best approach to the metaphysics of freedom. Libertarians argue the compatibility of freedom and (...)
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  3. Finding, Clarifying, and Evaluating Arguments.E. J. Coffman & Trevor Hedberg - manuscript
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