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Donald Smith [7]Donald P. Smith [2]
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Donald Smith
Virginia Commonwealth University
  1.  92
    Mereology Without Weak Supplementation.Donald Smith - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):505 – 511.
    According to the Weak Supplementation Principle (WSP)—a widely received principle of mereology—an object with a proper part, p , has another distinct proper part that doesn't overlap p . In a recent article in this journal, Nikk Effingham and Jon Robson employ WSP in an objection to endurantism. I defend endurantism in a way that bears on mereology in general. First, I argue that denying WSP can be motivated apart from the truth of endurantism. I then go on to offer (...)
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  2. ‘Wholly Present’ Defined.Thomas M. Crisp & Donald P. Smith - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):318–344.
    Three-dimensionalists , sometimes referred to as endurantists, think that objects persist through time by being “wholly present” at every time they exist. But what is it for something to be wholly present at a time? It is surprisingly difficult to say. The threedimensionalist is free, of course, to take ‘is wholly present at’ as one of her theory’s primitives, but this is problematic for at least one reason: some philosophers claim not to understand her primitive. Clearly the three-dimensionalist would be (...)
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  3. The Vagueness Argument for Mereological Universalism.Donald Smith - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):357–368.
    In this paper, I critically discuss one of the more influential arguments for mereological universalism, what I will call ‘the Vagueness Argument’. I argue that a premise of the Vagueness Argument is not well supported and that there are at least two good reasons for thinking that the premise in question is false.
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  4.  82
    Vague Singulars, Semantic Indecision, and the Metaphysics of Persons.Donald P. Smith - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):569-585.
    Composite materialism, as I will understand it, is the view that human persons are composite material objects. This paper develops and investigates an argument, The Vague Singulars Argument, for the falsity of composite materialism. We shall see that cogent or not, the Vague Singulars Argument has philosophically significant ramifications.
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  5. The Fall of the Mind Argument and Some Lessons About Freedom.Donald Smith & E. J. Coffman - 2010 - In Joseph Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 127-148.
    This chapter offers a new criticism of the Mind argument that is both decisive and instructive. It introduces a plausible principle (γ) that places a requirement on one’s having a choice about an event whose causal history includes only other events. Depending on γ’s truth-value, the Mind argument fails in such a way that one or the other of the two main species of libertarianism is the best approach to the metaphysics of freedom. Libertarians argue the compatibility of freedom and (...)
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  6.  54
    Chisholm's Phenomenal Argument Revisited: A Dilemma for Perdurantism.Donald Smith - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1):31.
    According to perdurantism, objects persist by being spread out over time, just as composite three-dimensional objects are spread out over space. Just as a composite three-dimensional object is spread out over space by having spatial parts, objects persist, according to perdurantism, by having temporal parts. Perdurantism can be stated more precisely by saying what exactly a temporal part is. In the sequel, Theodore Sider's definition of "instantaneous temporal part" shall be assumed: x is an instantaneous temporal part of y at (...)
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  7.  32
    "On Zimmerman's 'The Providential Usefulness of Simple Foreknowledge'".Donald Smith - 2012 - In Kelly James Clark & Michael Rea (eds.), Reason, Metaphysics and Mind: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 197-202.
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  8. Lottery Puzzles and Jesus' ‘Return’.Donald Smith - 2009 - Religious Studies 45 (1):37.
    This paper is about a puzzle – I'll call it ‘the Return’ – that puts considerable pressure upon Christians to accept a very robust scepticism about the future. Those familiar with work on so-called ‘lottery puzzles’ will notice much similarity between those puzzles and the Return. However, there is an important difference that renders the Return an especially difficult problem for a Christian who believes that he has much knowledge about the future. After introducing the Return, I'll argue that it (...)
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  9.  89
    How to Endure an Alleged Paradox.Donald Smith - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Research 33:285-292.
    Stephen Barker and Phil Dowe have argued, through what they call the mereological paradox, that endurantism is contradictory. In this paper, I take issue with Barker and Dowe’s argument. In addition to disarming an interesting philosophical argument against endurantism, my diagnosis of Barker and Dowe’s mereological paradox underscores what is central to the endurantism/perdurantism debate and reveals the inadequacy of a familiar way of describing enduring objects.
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