Conceptual knowledge: Grounded in sensorimotor states, or a disembodied deus ex machina?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (6):455-456 (2010)
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Abstract

If embodied models no longer address the symbol grounding problem and a conceptual system can step in and resolve categorizations when embodied simulations fail, then perhaps the next step in theory-building is to isolate the unique contributions of embodied simulation. What is a disembodied conceptual system incapable of doing with respect to semantic processing or the categorization of smiles?

Author Profiles

Carlos Montemayor
San Francisco State University
Ezequiel Morsella
San Francisco State University

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