One popular approach to theorizing about phenomenal consciousness has been to connect it to representations of a certain kind. Representational theories of consciousness can be further sub-divided into first-order and higher-order theories. Higher-order theories are often interpreted as invoking a special relation between the first-order state and the higher-order state. However there is another way to interpret higher-order theories that rejects this relational requirement. On this alternative view phenomenal consciousness consists in having suitable higher-order representations. I call this ‘HOROR’ (...) (‘Higher-Order Representation Of a Representation’) theory to distinguish it from relational versions of higher- order theory. In this paper I make the case that HOROR theory is a plausible account of the real nature of phenomenal consciousness whatever one’s views are about whether it is physical/reducible or not. I first clarify HOROR theory and compare it to the more traditional same-order and higher-order thought theories. Afterwards I move to presenting some considerations in favor of HOROR theory. (shrink)

Higher-order theories of consciousness typically account for introspection in terms of one's higher-order thoughts being conscious, which would require a third-order thought — i.e.a thought about a thought about a mental state. In this work, we offer an alternative account of introspection that builds on the recent HigherOrder Representation of a Representation (HOROR) theory of phenomenal consciousness. According to HOROR theory, phenomenal consciousness consists in having the right kind of higher-order representation. We claim that this theory can be (...) extended to introspection by recognizing that there is a distinctive kind of consciousness — i.e. introspective consciousness — which can be accounted for as the theory does for phenomenal consciousness generally. We call this novel view: Higher-Order Representation Intentionally For Introspective Consciousness (HORIFIC). We argue that there are independent reasons for thinking that introspective consciousness can be either 'stimuli-induced' or 'self-triggered' and that one of the benefits of the view we develop is that it can embrace a pluralist approach. Our view also accounts for what specific mental state is represented by a particular higher-order representation, and for the way in which we are aware of changes, transitions, and boundaries between mental states in specific cases of introspective consciousness. (shrink)

V této práci se zaměřím na stereotypy ve filmovém gotickém hororu 60. let, jejich symboliku a možné filosofické souvislosti.

Film Two Faces of Dr. Jekyll (1960, režie Terrence Fisher) by se dal interpretovat skrze dílo F. Nietzscheho. -/- Při interpretaci vycházím především z díla „Mimo dobro a zlo”, dále pak z děl „Tak pravil Zarathustra" a „Vůle k moci”. -/- V tomto filmu nevystupuje Dr. Jekyll jako ztělesnění dobra, jak tomu bylo v předloze, nýbrž jako obraz samotného Nietzscheho, člověka zapáleného pro hledání vyššího bytí, pro hledání nadčlověka. Člověka odsouzeného ke zkáze. -/- Jekyllova nevyrovnanost, vášeň a touha po nadčlověku (...) zrcadlí Nietzscheho i jeho životní osud. (shrink)