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Jason Konek
University of Bristol
  1. Comparative Probabilities.Jason Konek - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 267-348.
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  2. IP Scoring Rules: Foundations and Applications.Jason Konek - 2019 - Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 103:256-264.
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  3. The Art of Learning.Jason Konek - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 7.
    Confirmational holism is at odds with Jeffrey conditioning --- the orthodox Bayesian policy for accommodating uncertain learning experiences. Two of the great insights of holist epistemology are that the effects of experience ought to be mediated by one's background beliefs, and the support provided by one's learning experience can and often is undercut by subsequent learning. Jeffrey conditioning fails to vindicate either of these insights. My aim is to describe and defend a new updating policy that does better. In addition (...)
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  4. Degrees of Incoherence, Dutch Bookability & Guidance Value.Jason Konek - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-34.
    Why is it good to be less, rather than more incoherent? Julia Staffel, in her excellent book "Unsettled Thoughts," answers this question by showing that if your credences are incoherent, then there is some way of nudging them toward coherence that is guaranteed to make them more accurate and reduce the extent to which they are Dutch-bookable. This seems to show that such a nudge toward coherence makes them better fit to play their key epistemic and practical roles: representing the (...)
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    Independent Natural Extension for Choice Functions.Arthur Van Camp, Kevin Blackwell & Jason Konek - 2023 - International Journal of Approximate Reasoning:390-413.
    We introduce an independence notion for choice functions, which we call ‘epistemic independence’ following the work by De Cooman et al. [17] for lower previsions, and study it in a multivariate setting. This work is a continuation of earlier work of one of the authors [29], and our results build on the characterization of choice functions in terms of sets of binary preferences recently established by De Bock and De Cooman [11]. We obtain the many-to-one independent natural extension in this (...)
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    Independent Natural Extension for Choice Functions.Jason Konek, Arthur Van Camp & Kevin Blackwell - 2021 - PMLR 147:320-330.
    We investigate epistemic independence for choice functions in a multivariate setting. This work is a continuation of earlier work of one of the authors [23], and our results build on the characterization of choice functions in terms of sets of binary preferences recently established by De Bock and De Cooman [7]. We obtain the independent natural extension in this framework. Given the generality of choice functions, our expression for the independent natural extension is the most general one we are aware (...)
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  7. Believing Probabilistic Contents: On the Expressive Power and Coherence of Sets of Sets of Probabilities.Catrin Campbell-Moore & Jason Konek - 2019 - Analysis Reviews:anz076.
    Moss (2018) argues that rational agents are best thought of not as having degrees of belief in various propositions but as having beliefs in probabilistic contents, or probabilistic beliefs. Probabilistic contents are sets of probability functions. Probabilistic belief states, in turn, are modeled by sets of probabilistic contents, or sets of sets of probability functions. We argue that this Mossean framework is of considerable interest quite independently of its role in Moss’ account of probabilistic knowledge or her semantics for epistemic (...)
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