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  1. Reliabilism and Imprecise Credences.Weng Hong Tang - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1463-1480.
    What is it for an imprecise credence to be justified? It might be thought that this is not a particularly urgent question for friends of imprecise credences to answer. For one might think that its answer just depends on how a well-trodden issue in epistemology plays out—namely, that of which theory of doxastic justification, be it reliabilism, evidentialism, or some other theory, is correct. I’ll argue, however, that it’s difficult for reliabilists to accommodate imprecise credences, at least if we understand (...)
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  • Believing Probabilistic Contents: On the Expressive Power and Coherence of Sets of Sets of Probabilities.Catrin Campbell-Moore & Jason Konek - 2019 - Analysis Reviews:anz076.
    Moss (2018) argues that rational agents are best thought of not as having degrees of belief in various propositions but as having beliefs in probabilistic contents, or probabilistic beliefs. Probabilistic contents are sets of probability functions. Probabilistic belief states, in turn, are modeled by sets of probabilistic contents, or sets of sets of probability functions. We argue that this Mossean framework is of considerable interest quite independently of its role in Moss’ account of probabilistic knowledge or her semantics for epistemic (...)
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