In this study, we conducted large-scale experiments with novel descriptions of determinism. Our goal was to investigate the effects of desires for punishment and comprehension errors on people’s intuitions about free will and moral responsibility in deterministic scenarios. Previous research has acknowledged the influence of these factors, but their total effect has not been revealed. Using a large-scale survey of Japanese participants, we found that the failure to understand causal determination (intrusion) has limited effects relative to other factors and that (...) the conflation of determinism and epiphenomenalism (bypassing) has a significant influence, even when controlling for other variables. This leads to the increased prevalence of incompatibilist responses. Furthermore, our results demonstrated a close association between the attribution of free will/responsibility and retributive desire. While further research is needed to establish the causal relationship between these factors, this association is consistent with Cory Clark and colleagues' study that increased desire contributes to increased compatibilist responses and their claim that a definitive intuition about free will may be elusive. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende reivindicar la defensa de la pericia a la luz de la filosofía experimental del libre albedrío. Mi argumento central es que la estrategia de analogía entre la filosofía y otros dominios es defendible, al menos en el debate sobre el libre albedrío, porque la formación filosófica contribuye a la formación de la intuición filosófica al permitir a los filósofos expertos comprender correctamente las cuestiones filosóficas y tener intuiciones filosóficas sobre ellas. Este artículo comenzará derivando dos requisitos para (...) la defensa de la pericia a partir de las principales críticas a la misma. En primer lugar, es preciso explicar con precisión cómo contribuye la formación filosófica a la creación de intuiciones filosóficas (Contribución); en segundo lugar, debe explicarse cómo la formación filosófica inmuniza a las intuiciones filosóficas frente a factores distorsionadores (Inmunidad). Argumentaré que el requisito de Contribución es crucial para la defensa de la pericia y que este requisito puede satisfacerse al menos en el dominio del libre albedrío: investigaciones recientes muestran que la mayoría de las personas inexpertas son incapaces de entender correctamente el determinismo, lo que sugiere que tener intuiciones sobre el determinismo requiere pericia filosófica. A continuación, discuto cómo esta propuesta puede aplicarse a otras disciplinas filosóficas. (shrink)

This paper aims to defend the Expertise Defense by addressing the problem of disanalogy, which represents one of the two main critiques against this argument. The Expertise Defense is an argument which defends the notion that philosophers’ judgments are more reliable than those of novices by making analogies between philosophy and other fields in which experts’ judgments are given a privileged position. Conventionally, this line of argumentation has aimed to demonstrate that philosophers' intuitions about thought experiments or metaphysical questions are (...) not as susceptible to being distorted by unrelated factors as those of novices. However, this paper reinterprets the Expertise Defense, proposing that it claims that philosophers' intuitions are considerably more reliable than novices, even if they are still susceptible to distorting factors. By adopting this interpretation, the current paper effectively counters the empirical objection that philosophers' intuitions are subject to distortion. Furthermore, I respond to the disanalogy problem, which contends that there is no meaningful analogy between philosophy and other domains because philosophical experience does not contribute significantly to philosophical intuitions. In response to this, I present a new model of philosophical expertise. According to this model, philosophical training plays a vital role in shaping philosophical intuitions by enabling expert philosophers to comprehend philosophical problems accurately and form well-grounded intuitions about them. Additionally, I provide empirical evidence supporting this model, particularly in the context of the debates about free-will. While the extent to which this model can be generalized remains an empirical question, it seems reasonable to think that it could plausibly be extended to other debates. (shrink)

This paper aims to vindicate the expertise defense in light of the experimental philosophy of free will. My central argument is that the analogy strategy between philosophy and other domains is defensible, at least in the free will debate, because philosophical training contributes to the formation of philosophical intuition by enabling expert philosophers to understand philosophical issues correctly and to have philosophical intuitions about them. This paper will begin by deriving two requirements on the expertise defense from major criticisms of (...) it. First, precisely how philosophical training contributes to the formation of philosophical intuitions requires explanation (Contribution); second, it must be explained how philosophical training immunizes philosophical intuitions from distorting factors (Immunity). I shall argue that the Contribution requirement is crucial for the expertise defense and that this requirement can be satisfied at least in the domain of free will: recent research shows that most novices are unable to understand determinism correctly, suggesting that having intuitions about determinism requires philosophical expertise. I then discuss how this proposal can be applied to other philosophical disciplines. (shrink)

This paper outlines ethical problems with the regional quota systems used in Japanese medical schools from the perspective of the autonomous choice of doctors and medical students. “Regional quotas” have been established in university medical schools in Japan to cultivate doctors for rural areas, and the percentage of such quotas has been significantly increasing in recent years. This study mainly focuses on the regional quota systems for medical schools whereby medical students receive scholarships on the condition that they work in (...) community medicine for a certain period after graduating and are exempt from repaying the scholarship depending on the fulfillment of their obligations. In many cases, the regional quota systems impose penalties on those who leave to prevent withdrawal, and some claim that it is morally impermissible to withdraw from the contract. Thus, the study reviews regional quota systems and argues that these systems contain contracts that restrict the signatory’s freedom of residence and professional choice for more than a decade, and that it is difficult to withdraw from the contract because of the penalties. Consequently, it demonstrates that these contracts are morally unjust as they severely restrict the autonomous choice of doctors and medical students. In conclusion, the current regional quota systems are morally impermissible and local authorities should recruit new doctors without using such systems. (shrink)