The value-free ideal in science has been criticised as both unattainable and undesirable. We argue that it can be defended as a practical principle guiding scientific research even if the unattainability and undesirability of a value-free end-state are granted. If a goal is unattainable, then one can separate the desirability of accomplishing the goal from the desirability of pursuing it. We articulate a novel value-free ideal, which holds that scientists should act as if science should be value-free, and we argue (...) that even if a purely value-free science is undesirable, this value-free ideal is desirable to pursue. (shrink)

The value-free ideal for science holds that values should not influence the core features of scientific reasoning. We defend the difference-to-inference model of value-permeation, which holds that value-permeation in science is problematic when values make a difference to the inferences made about a hypothesis. This view of value-permeation is superior to existing views, and it suggests a corresponding maxim—namely, that scientists should strive to eliminate differences to inference. This maxim is the basis of a novel value-free ideal for science. -/- (...) . (shrink)

Robustness arguments hold that hypotheses are more likely to be true when they are confirmed by diverse kinds of evidence. Robustness arguments require the confirming evidence to be independent. We identify two kinds of independence appealed to in robustness arguments: ontic independence —when the multiple lines of evidence depend on different materials, assumptions, or theories—and probabilistic independence. Many assume that OI is sufficient for a robustness argument to be warranted. However, we argue that, as typically construed, OI is not a (...) sufficient independence condition for warranting robustness arguments. We show that OI evidence can collectively confirm a hypothesis to a lower degree than individual lines of evidence, contrary to the standard assumption undergirding usual robustness arguments. We employ Bayesian networks to represent the ideal empirical scenario for a robustness argument and a variety of ways in which empirical scenarios can fall short of this ideal. (shrink)

Background Several jurisdictions, including Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and most recently Ireland, have a public interest or public good criterion for granting waivers of consent in biomedical research using secondary health data or tissue. However, the concept of the public interest is not well defined in this context, which creates difficulties for institutions, institutional review boards and regulators trying to implement the criterion. Main text This paper clarifies how the public interest criterion can be defensibly deployed. We first explain the (...) ethical basis for requiring waivers to only be granted to studies meeting the public interest criterion, then explore how further criteria may be set to determine the extent to which a given study can legitimately claim to be in the public interest. We propose an approach that does not attempt to measure magnitude of benefit directly, but rather takes into account metrics that are more straightforward to apply. To ensure consistent and justifiable interpretation, research institutions and IRBs should also incorporate procedural features such as transparency and public engagement in determining which studies satisfy the public interest requirement. Conclusion The requirement of public interest for consent waivers in secondary biomedical research should be guided by well-defined criteria for systematic evaluation. Such a criteria and its application need to be periodically subject to intra-committee and intra-institution review, reflection, deliberation and amendment. (shrink)

Through detailed analysis of Plato’s Meno, I identify and set general argumentative rules (useful both to scientists and philosophers) concerning how to use definitions. I show how the character Socrates establishes strong requirements for knowledge in general, i.e., that the knowledge of the definition of a thing must be prior to the knowledge of properties or instances of that thing. Socrate’s requirements and the way he characterizes a definition (as coextensive to the definiendum, not circular, true and explanatorily relevant) lead (...) Meno to aporia and to enunciate the famous Meno’s Paradox concerning the impossibility of inquiry for knowledge. That only occurs because Meno is unable to identify Socrate’s dialectical move: strong requirements for knowing a definition, the priority of the knowledge of the definition and the taking of all knowledge to be like the knowledge by acquaintance. After the paradox, Socrate’s proceeds the discussion using hypotheses to map the truth conditions of some theses Meno is inquiring about. I explain what are Meno’s paradox, the socratic definition and the Method of Hypotheses, in a way só as to find in this classical text in the history of philosophy general principles of argumentation that are still usefull today. (shrink)

Review of B. Vancamp, Untersuchungen zur handschriftlichen Überlieferung von Platons Menon, Palingenesia Band 97. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010.

This work articulates two thesis: one Socratic and one Platonic; and displays how the first one is heir of the second. The Socratic one is called the principle of priority of definition; the Platonic one is the Recollection theory. The articulation between both theses is possible due to the Meno’s paradox, which makes a criticism on the first thesis, but it is solved with the second one. The consequence of this articulation is a new interpretation of the Recollection theory, as (...) a theory of knowledge acquisition that depends, mainly, on a distinction between knowledge and true opinion. To conclude, a new interpretation of the knowledge/true opinion distinction is displayed –not in the traditional fashion, evaluating the propositions one by one, and in an atomic way–, but as big blocks or chains of propositions shaping knowledge through explanatory reasoning (aitías logismós). (shrink)

The study of active matter systems demonstrates how interactions might co-constitute agential dynamics. Active matter systems are comprised of self-propelled independent entities which, en masse, take part in complex and interesting collective group behaviors at a far-from-equilibrium state (Menon, 2010 ; Takatori & Brady, 2015 ). These systems are modelled using very simple rules (Vicsek at al. 1995), which reveal the interactive nature of the collective behaviors seen from humble to highly complex entities. Here I show how the study (...) of active matter systems supports two related proposals regarding interaction and agency. First, I argue that the study of interactive dynamics in these systems evidences the utility of treating interaction as an ontological category (Longino, 2021 ) and challenges methodological individualism as the received explanatory primitive in the study of agency. Second, the methods used to research active matter systems demonstrate how a minimal approach to agency can scale up in studying interactive agential dynamics in more complex systems. The examples of coordination dynamics (Kelso, 2001 ) and participatory sense-making (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007 ) are provided to show how understanding agency requires us to look beyond the individuals to the interactive agential dynamics that can guide, scaffold, or constrain their activity. (shrink)

Pretendemos averiguar como Aristóteles concebe a passagem do nosso conhecimento prévio do mundo ao conhecimento científico, avaliando os pressupostos e consequências de sua resposta ao paradoxo de Mênon e atentando para a metodologia científica defendida nos Segundos Analíticos. Quanto ao conhecimento preliminar necessário à edificação da ciência, procuraremos caracterizar seus tipos e também os meios pelos quais ele pode vir a ser adquirido por nós. Buscaremos estabelecer também as propriedades que o conhecimento científico deve possuir em relação à sua necessidade, (...) universalidade e caráter explanatório. Buscaremos marcar, com precisão, a natureza da conclusão científica segundo a teoria científica aristotélica, argumentando que, nas conclusões, o atributo demonstrado, em relação com seu substrato, representa uma propriedade por si concomitante. Pretendemos averiguar como os diferentes tipos de demonstração e definição respondem a diferentes estágios de organização do saber prévio e a diferentes estágios na estruturação das demonstrações propriamente científicas, e, por conseguinte, como esses se organizam de modo a responder as quatro perguntas que toda investigação científica deve abarcar em seus dois estágios. (shrink)

Is any unified theory of brain function possible? Following a line of thought dat- ing back to the early cybernetics (see, e.g., Cordeschi, 2002), Clark (in press) has proposed the action-oriented Hierarchical Predictive Coding (HPC) as the account to be pursued in the effort of gain- ing the “Grand Unified Theory of the Mind”—or “painting the big picture,” as Edelman (2012) put it. Such line of thought is indeed appealing, but to be effectively pursued it should be confronted with experimental (...) findings and explana- tory capabilities (Edelman, 2012). The point we are making in this note is that a brain with predictive capa- bilities is certainly necessary to endow the agent situated in the environment with forethought or foresight, a crucial issue to outline the unified account advocated by Clark. But the capacity for fore- thought is deeply entangled with the capacity for emotions and when emotions are brought into the game, cogni- tive functions become part of a large-scale functional brain network. However, for such complex networks a consistent view of hierarchical organization in large-scale functional networks has yet to emerge (Bressler and Menon, 2010), whilst heterarchical organization is likely to play a strategic role (Berntson et al., 2012). This raises the necessity of a multilevel approach that embraces causal relations across levels of explanation in either direc- tion (bottom–up or top–down), endorsing mutual calibration of constructs across levels (Berntson et al., 2012). Which, in turn, calls for a revised perspective on Marr’s levels of analysis framework (Marr, 1982). In the following we highlight some drawbacks of Clark’s proposal in address- ing the above issues. (shrink)

Greu de spus ce este cunoașterea. Cu cât se discută mai mult asupra acestui concept, cu atât mai multe sunt opiniile divergente. Epistemologia este teoria cunoașterii, iar una dintre întrebările caracteristice epistemologiei se referă la ce au în comun toate nenumăratele tipuri de cunoștințe pe care ni le atribuim. O distincție majoră între diferitele tipuri de cunoaștere este cunoașterea descriptivă, declarativă sau propozițională (care necesită un grad mai mare de sofisticare intelectuală din partea celui care caută cunoașterea) și cunoașterea cunoștințelor (...) sau a abilităților. Pentru ca o descriere, declarație sau afirmație să fie cunoaștere, trebuie ca aceasta să fie o credință, să fie adevărată, și să fie justificată. O declarație de credință este o expresie a credinței în cineva sau ceva. Credința trebuie să fie adevărată pentru a fi cunoaștere. Platon, în Gorgias, susține că credința este cel mai frecvent invocat purtător de adevăr. În multe dintre dialogurile lui Platon, precum Menon și, în special, Theaitetos, Socrate consideră cunoașterea ca fiind credința adevărată explicată sau definită într-un fel. Justificarea credinței implică un motiv bun pentru a face acest lucru. Definiția cunoașterii ca o credință adevărată justificată a fost acceptată pe scară largă până în 1960, când filosoful american Edmund Gettier a provocat discuții majore pe scară largă. -/- CUNOAȘTEREA ȘTIINȚIFICĂ, Vol. 1, Nr. 1, Septembrie 2022, pp. 3-26 ISSN 2021 – 8086, ISSN – L 2021 – 8086, DOI: 10.58679/CS68980. (shrink)

El origen platónico de la mirada es una investigación sobre el orígenes de la Teoría de las Ideas, a partir del análisis de los términos εdoς e ἰδέα a partir de la búsqueda de la definición. Esta investigación tienen como objetivo el análisis de aquellos principales pasajes en los cuales Platón emplea εdoς e ἰδέα para referirse a la forma o carácter común a una multiplicidad, siendo este carácter el requisito fundamental para lograr la definición de un término moral: ¿cómo (...) Platón va desarrollando una especificación del sentido y aplicación de estos términos, caracterizando la búsqueda de una definición, es decir, la búsqueda de un discurso unitario en oposición a la enumeración de ejemplos típica de una multiplicidad de casos? Para tal propósito este estudio se centró en tres diálogos: Eutifrón (5d1-4), Menón (72c) y Crátilo (389b)- siendo estos tres textos en su conjunto la columna vertebral de la tesis. El origen platónico de la mirada, es el estudio del alcance de estos términos a partir de los diálogos mencionados; indaga cómo la búsqueda de la definición de la piedad en el Eutifrón marca el inicio de una problemática que Platón desarrolla en el Menón y que, a nuestro parecer, llega a un punto determinante en el Crátilo. Estamos hablando de la tematización de εdoς e ἰδέα como un camino que nos conduce, a través de la oposición entre el carácter común y la multiplicidad, a la distinción entre doxa y episteme. Esta investigación está dirigida, a partir de los tres pasajes mencionados anteriormente, al estudio de la reflexión platónica sobre el carácter común, es decir, cómo y por qué es que se va desarrollando en el pensamiento platónico una preocupación por profundizar la distinción, y cómo es que se va elaborando ésta, entre dirigir nuestra atención al carácter común a una multiplicidad de acciones (como en el caso del Eutifrón y Menón) y la determinación de este mismo carácter en el Crátilo, como la lanzadera en sí en oposición a las lanzaderas particulares. En otras palabras, es el estudio de cómo el pensamiento platónico va especificando la distinción entre la búsqueda de la definición (del carácter común) y la realidad sensible (como el ámbito sujeto al movimiento y al cambio y, por tal razón, imposible de conocer). (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to comprehensively study various robustness arguments proposed in the literature from Levins to Lloyd as well as the opposition offered to them and pose enquiry into the degree of epistemic virtue that they provide to the model prediction results with respect to climate science and modeling. Another critical issue that this dissertation strives to examine is that of the actual epistemic notion that is operational when scientists and philosophers appeal to robustness. In attempting to (...) explicate this idea, the discussion turns to arguments provided by Schupbach who completely rejects probabilistic independence in favour of explanatory reasoning, Stegenga and Menon who still see some value in probabilistic independence, and Winsberg who takes applies Schupbach’s to climate science, going beyond models to involve multi-modal evidence. After an exhaustive discussion on these arguments, this dissertation attempts to provide a thorough and updated notion of robustness in climate modeling and climate science. (shrink)