Results for 'Ludovic Frobert'

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  1. Dinâmica cognitiva.Ludovic Soutif - 2013 - In João Branquinho & Ricardo Santos (eds.), Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica. Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa. pp. 1-29.
    No presente verbete faço a revisão crítica de algumas entre as mais expressivas tentativas de resolver o chamado ‘problema da dinâmica cognitiva’. De acordo com Kaplan (1989) – que é responsável pelo próprio apelido, a questão que se coloca é: o que significa dizer de uma pessoa que expressou uma crença particular num determinado contexto de proferimento que ela reteve ou mudou de crença fora desse contexto? E caso ajustes (linguísticos, psicológicos) sejam necessários para manter a relação com o conteúdo (...)
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  2. La signification de Nicod pour la phénoménologie de Wittgenstein.Ludovic Soutif - 2005 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 2 (2):215-243.
    Quoique l'on ne trouve qu'un nombre limité de références à Nicod dans les manuscrits de la période dite « intermédiaire » de Wittgenstein, une lecture attentive de La Géométrie dans le monde sensible s'avère pourtant décisive pour comprendre la nature du projet phénoménologique de Wittgenstein de la fin des années vingt. Nous nous proposons de montrer que la prise en compte ainsi que la reformulation du problème posé par Nicod en 1924, celui de la nature de la relation d'inclusion spatiale, (...)
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  3. On Ur-intentionality.Ludovic Soutif & Carlos Mario Márquez Sosa - 2021 - Revista de Filosofia Moderna E Contemporânea 9 (2):79-99.
    Starting from Brentano’s classical characterization of intentionality, we review the radical enactivist proposal about basic cognition and show that the underlying assumption that stripping teleosemantics of its representationalist commitments results in no explanatory loss is unwarranted. Significant features of basic cognition are lost, or so we argue, with the RECtification of teleosemantics that are retrieved by means of an alternative dubbed metaphysically non-committal content-ascriptivism.
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  4. Pensamento Singular e Atos de Pensamento Episódicos.Soutif Ludovic - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (1):93-113.
    No debate acerca da singularidade de, pelos menos, alguns de nossos pensamentos sobre o mundo, assume-se corriqueiramente que o responsável pela natureza singular do episódio mental não é o próprio episódio e, sim, a proposição singular expressa quer por um proferimento assertórico de sentença singular autônoma, quer pela cláusula complementar em um relato de atribuição de atitude proposicional. As rotas semânticas padrão assumem que a singularidade do episódio mental (conceitual) é por assim dizer “herdada” da singularidade do conteúdo. Argumento que (...)
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  5. Travis-Like Cases and Adequate Ideas: A Critical Notice of Bozickovic’s The Indexical Point of View.Ludovic Soutif & Carlos Mario Márquez Sosa - 2022 - Manuscrito 45 (3):23-52.
    In this critical notice we review Bozickovic's recent attempt to settle two interrelated issues: (i) the issue of the cognitive significance of indexical thoughts expressed at a time in the face of difficulties posed by cases in which the subject either mistakes two objects for one or one for two different objects; (ii) that of the cognitive dynamics of temporal indexical thoughts in the face of difficulties posed by cases in which the belief seems to be retained while the proper (...)
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  6.  81
    True Pejorative Sentences Beyond the Existential Core: On Some Unwelcome Implications of Hom and May’s Theory.Ludovic Soutif & André Pontes - 2022 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 63 (153):757-780.
    RESUMO O presente artigo contempla uma das tentativas mais significativas e controversas de explicar o significado de pejorativos como itens lexicais, a saber, a de Hom e May. Após apresentarmos em linhas gerais a teoria, identificamos conjuntos de sentenças pejorativas que saem verdadeiras nessa teoria e para as quais a questão da sua compatibilidade com a visão por eles defendida (a chamada Inocência Moral e Semântica) permanece em aberto. Explorando o arcabouço teórico padrão da teoria dos modelos em que Hom (...)
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  7. Meaning, Colouring, and Logic: Kaplan vs. Frege on Pejoratives.Ludovic Soutif - 2022 - Princípios: Revista de Filosofia 29 (59):151-171.
    In this essay I consider Kaplan’s challenge to Frege’s so-called dictum: “Logic (and perhaps even truth) is immune to epithetical color”. I show that if it is to challenge anything, it rather challenges the view (attributable to Frege) that logic is immune to pejorative colour. This granted, I show that Kaplan’s inference-based challenge can be set even assuming that the pejorative doesn’t make any non-trivial truth-conditional (descriptive) contribution. This goes against the general tendency to consider the truth-conditionally inert logically irrelevant. (...)
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  8. Pensée singulière et conception normative de l’accointance.Ludovic Soutif - 2019 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 130 (193):403-419.
    I discuss the view tentatively put forward by Recanati in Mental Files to turn two potentially contradictory claims compatible: the claim to the effect that acquaintance is a necessary condition of singular thought and the claim that we do entertain acquaintanceless singular thoughts (i.e. thoughts directed at particulars as particulars). Key to the proposal is a normative construal of the acquaintance constraint. I show the proposal as it stands is wanting, first, because the norm the users of descriptive names are (...)
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  9. In What Sense is Frege's (Statement of the) Puzzle 'Problematic'?Ludovic Soutif - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica 53 (136):51-57.
    I take issue with Glezakos’s explanation of why Frege’s puzzle is un-puzzling. On her view, Frege’s statement – how can sentences of the form a=a and a=b, if true, differ in cognitive value if they express the same semantic content/are made true by the same object’s self-identity? – should not be considered any puzzling either because it is on the whole circular, or because, neutrally stated, it cannot even be set up. I argue against this that if, as she takes (...)
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  10. De Re Thought, Object Identity, and Knowing-Wh*.Ludovic Soutif - 2012 - Analytica (Rio) 16 (1-2):133-164.
    In this paper, I discuss a view of de re thoughts that can be naturally endorsed in the wake of Russell's account. This is the view that a thought is about the very thing (res) rather than a mere characterization of it if and only if it is constitutively tied, if not to the existence, at least to the identity of its object and the thinker knows which/who the object of his/her thought is. Faced with the challenge of accommodating far (...)
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  11. Patterns, Noise, and Beliefs.Lajos Ludovic Brons - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (1):19-51.
    In “Real Patterns” Daniel Dennett developed an argument about the reality of beliefs on the basis of an analogy with patterns and noise. Here I develop Dennett’s analogy into an argument for descriptivism, the view that belief reports do no specify belief contents but merely describe what someone believes, and show that this view is also supported by empirical evidence. No description can do justice to the richness and specificity or “noisiness” of what someone believes, and the same belief can (...)
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