Biology seems to present local and transitory regularities rather than immutable laws. To account for these historically constituted regularities and to distinguish them from mathematical invariants, Montévil and Mossio (Journal of Theoretical Biology 372:179–191, 2015) have proposed to speak of constraints. In this article we analyse the causal power of these constraints in the evolution of biodiversity, i.e., their positivity, but also the modality of their action on the directions taken by evolution. We argue that to fully account for the (...) causal power of these constraints on evolution, they must be thought of in terms of normativity. In this way, we want to highlight two characteristics of the evolutionary constraints. The first, already emphasised as reported by Gould (The structure of evolutionary theory, Harvard University Press, 2002), is that these constraints are both produced by and producing biological evolution and that this circular causation creates true novelties. The second is that this specific causality, which generates unpredictability in evolution, stems not only from the historicity of biological constraints, but also from their internalisation through the practices of living beings. (shrink)

The non-human animal holds a significant position in Bergson’s work. However, because it often serves to illuminate other concepts – humanity, the élan vital – few studies have delved into Bergson’s animal philosophy. However, Bergson’s conception of the animal as an instinctive but conscious being, distinct from humans but partaking, like them, in the élan vital, provides valuable philosophical tools to address contemporary challenges in ethology and evolutionary theory. The aim of this article is to analyse the paradoxical instinctive consciousness (...) that Bergson attributes to animals, and to explore the contemporary implications of such a conception. To do this, I first examine the singular place of animals in Bergsonian philosophy in relation to humans and the élan vital, highlighting how Bergson steers clear of an anthropocentric approach. I then investigate how, through their consciousness, animals uniquely contribute to the creativity of the élan vital. This leads me to distinguish between two forms of animal consciousness in Bergson, one of which makes room for genuine non-human inventiveness. Finally, I analyse the contemporary stakes of this animal philosophy, demonstrating how Bergson’s approach allows ethology to rethink its methods and encourages a fresh consideration of the role played by non-human organisms in evolution. (shrink)

The standard view of classical cognitive science stated that cognition consists in the manipulation of language-like structures according to formal rules. Since cognition is ‘linguistic’ in itself, according to this view language is just a complex communication system and does not influence cognitive processes in any substantial way. This view has been criticized from several perspectives and a new framework (Embodied Cognition) has emerged that considers cognitive processes as non-symbolic and heavily dependent on the dynamical interactions between the cognitive system (...) and its environment. But notwithstanding the successes of the embodied cognitive science in explaining low-level cognitive behaviors, it is still not clear whether and how it can scale up for explaining high-level cognition. In this paper we argue that this can be done by considering the role of language as a cognitive tool: i.e. how language transforms basic cognitive functions in the high-level functions that are characteristic of human cognition. In order to do that, we review some computational models that substantiate this view with respect to categorization and memory. Since these models are based on a very rudimentary form of non-syntactic ‘language’ we argue that the use of language as a cognitive tool might have been an early discovery in hominid evolution, and might have played a substantial role in the evolution of language itself. (shrink)

Neo-Darwinism, through the combination of natural selection and genetics, has made possible an explanation of adaptive phenomena that claims to be devoid of metaphysical presuppositions. What Bergson already deplored and what we explore in this paper is the implicit finalism of such evolutionary explanations, which turn living beings into closed and static systems rather than understanding biological evolution as a process characterized by its interactions and temporal openness. Without denying the heuristic efficiency of the explanation resting upon natural selection, we (...) analyze what it leaves out and what remains to be explored: the unpredictability of the evolutionary process. We will therefore study the role of contingency in evolution, as Stephen J. Gould proposed, but we will also consider the causality specific to the living world that makes it impossible to reduce it to a simple algorithm, as proposed by Daniel Dennett among others, but that it is really a creative causation, or dialectical spiral. (shrink)

Agency is a central concept in the organisational approach to organisms, which accounts for their internal purposiveness. Recent recognition of the active role played by organisms in evolution has led researchers to use this concept in an evolutionary approach. Agency is then considered in terms of ‘unintentional’ choice: agents choose from a given repertoire the behaviour most appropriate to their goal, with this choice influencing evolutionary pathways. This view, while allowing for the evolutionary role of the activity of organisms, presents (...) two pitfalls. First, it restricts organisms’ agency by confining their choice within the bounds of a behavioural repertoire, and assuming their goals are dictated by natural selection. Second, this view, while claiming to eliminate the idea of intentionality, retains its structure: organisms are portrayed as rational entities, persistently pursuing specific goals. This leads us back to a teleological thinking, whose use in evolutionary theory has already been heavily criticised. This paper proposes a conception of biological agency which does not assume goal-directedness but considers agency as inventiveness. An organism will be said to be an agent if it is the triggering cause of behaviours falling outside the known repertoire and whose form can only be explained by the unique relationship between the organism and the environment. If these behaviours have implications in evolution, the agent will be considered an evolutionary agent. The merit of this approach is further validated by evidencing the significant role behavioural innovations play in evolution. Finally, the last section delves into the process of invention by examining animal play. (shrink)

We regularly intentionally expose ourselves to fictions we take to be likely to elicit in us emotions we generally find unpleasant when prompted by actual states of affairs. This is the so-called “paradox of tragedy”. We contribute to solving the paradox of tragedy by denying that, when fiction-directed, most of these emotions are in themselves unpleasant. We first provide strong evidence that these emotions, such as fear, sadness, or pity, are often enjoyed when fiction-directed. We then advance an explanation of (...) what makes these fiction-directed emotions often not unpleasant, while their reality-directed counterparts are generally so. In the last section, we advance an explanation of what makes fiction-directed emotions often enjoyable, and argue that a complete solution to the paradox of tragedy should be pluralist. (shrink)

In the eyes of the biologist Jacques Monod, Bergson is “the most illustrious promoter of a metaphysical vitalism” revolting against rationality. This interpretation, not exclusive to Monod, is often accompanied by the accusation that Bergson’s vitalism would be teleological, and maybe even mystical – this last idea being reinforced by the success that Bergson receives among the spiritualists. This understanding of Bergsonian philosophy led to his disrepute among scientists. Even today, despite the renewed interest in Bergson’s reflections on science, he (...) is not considered a philosopher of science. And the popular (textbook) opinion is still that his élan vital is a spiritual principle at the origin of all living things and even of all reality: Bergson is considered a vitalist using biology to develop a spiritualist metaphysics, which makes him acceptable to philosophers but not to scientists. Yet, Bergson’s position is ambiguous. Even though he criticises the intellectualist paradigm of science, which he claims is unable to comprehend the living, and proposes a form of vitalism, the philosophy of Creative Evolution may be regarded as a true philosophy of biology. However, some texts make the status of his vitalism problematic, such as The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, in which the élan vital is integrated into a reflection on the divine. The aim of this paper is to disentangle what, in Bergson, can or cannot be considered as a philosophy relevant to science, by trying to clarify the label ‘vitalist’ that has so commonly been assigned to him, often pejoratively. This will involve examining the link between his vitalism and the spiritualism he has been credited with. Contrary to Olivier Perru who has proposed an excellent analysis of Bergson’s vitalism but focusing only on Creative Evolution, I will study his different works, to show that Bergson’s position shifts according to the subjects under study: before Creative Evolution, Bergson develops a form of spiritualism; in Creative Evolution, he proposes a form of vitalism that may not be clearly related to his spiritualism; finally, I argue that, in The Two Sources, the distinction is not so clear and that his vitalism itself may indeed become spiritualist. His spiritualism transforms according to his works and the meaning of his vitalism changes in return. I hypothesise that Bergson is a vitalist-opportunist: there are several forms of vitalism Bergson, that have neither the same ontological status nor the same function, according to the purpose of the moment. This is not to say that Bergson changes his theory completely. (shrink)

Bergson offers an epistemological critique of Darwin’s theory that focuses on his gradualism: for Darwin variation is “minute”, and Bergson glosses “insensible.” His main argument is that if variations are insensible, they cannot confer an advantage to the organism and therefore be selected. Yet, for Darwin, the selected variation is not insensible: to be selected, it must be beneficial to its bearer in the struggle for existence. This article aims at understanding the origin of this misunderstanding by tracing the history (...) of this critique. To do this, we will study Bergson’s sources, showing that his interpretation of Darwin is in line with the critique of many biologists at the turn of the 20th century, albeit in a confused way. This will lead us back to the origin of this critique: the work of Mivart. In this study, we wish to reveal the anchor of the Bergsonian interpretation in the debates of his time, and the shifts from the traditional exposition of the argument that led Bergson to formulate this false paradox. This article will also analyze more precisely the counterexample of the “analogy of structure” to show that, despite Bergson’s misunderstanding, he did point to actual limits of the Darwinian theory. (shrink)

This article examines the principle of wealth maximization, as developed by Richard Posner, seeking to dispel misunderstandings, address criticisms, and contextualize its role in legal and political philosophy. The paper first delineates the distinction between the concepts of experienced utility and decision utility, elucidating how the latter is fundamental to the principle of wealth maximization. Next, the authors engage with criticisms of wealth maximization, including issues relating to basic needs, individual rights, and distributive justice. The paper contends that these aspects (...) of ‘justice’ can be understood as emergent properties of efficiency. The article then presents affirmative arguments for wealth maximization by connecting it to social contract theory and demonstrating its consistency with the tenets of liberal democracy. By analyzing the concept from both Hobbesian and Rawlsian perspectives, the paper illustrates the merits of the wealth maximization principle in relation to social contract theory. In conclusion, the article argues that wealth maximization serves as a robust and justifiable framework for legal and philosophical analysis, ultimately offering a better fit with the principles of liberal democracy than competing normative theories. (shrink)

Short introduction to the V2 publication of "The War of Appearances: Transparency, Opacity, Radiance" (2016). An anthology with Matteo Pasquinelli, Luciana Parisi, Graham Harman, Tomas Saraceno, René ten Bos, Tim Morton, McKenzie Wark, Wim Delvoye, Diana Scherer, Paolo Cirio, Paul Frissen, and Willem Schinkel.

Short introduction to the V2 publication of "The War of Appearances: Transparency, Opacity, Radiance" (2016). An anthology with Matteo Pasquinelli, Luciana Parisi, Graham Harman, Tomas Saraceno, René ten Bos, Tim Morton, and many others.

Roberto Cordeschi, La scoperta dell’artificiale. Psicologia, filosofia e macchine intorno alla cibernetica, Milano, Masson–Dunod, 1998, pp. 320; Domenico Parisi, Mente: I nuovi modelli della Vita Artificiale, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999, pp. 200.