The article focuses on Galileo's Letter to Castelli, 21 December 1613. The author analyzes Galileo's hermeneutical principles established in the first part of the letter and his literal interpretation of the passage from the Book of Joshua 10, 12-13, in Copernican terms, in the second part of the letter. Galileo appears to use the Bible as a scientific authority, supporting his Copernican views, and thus he seems to contradict his own hermeneutical principles. The author argues that Galileo's position is consistent, (...) especially if one takes into account the historical context of its genesis, that is, in the context of the constant, theologically-inspired attacks on Copernicus and Galileo and his commitment to the heliocentric world system and in the context of his newly-made telescopic observations and discoveries. (shrink)

Recenze: Matjaž Vesel, Copernicus: Platonist Astronomer-Philosopher. Cosmic Order, the Movement of the Earth, and the Scientific Revolution. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang 2014, 541 s.

Let ‘monism’ be the view that there is only one basic object—the world. Monists face the question of whether there are also non-basic objects. This is in effect the question of whether the world decomposes into parts. Jonathan Schaffer maintains that it does, Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč that it does not. In this paper, I propose a compromise view, which I call ‘Kantian monism.’ According to Kantian monism, the world decomposes into parts insofar as an ideal subject under (...) ideal conditions would divide it into parts, but it does not decompose into parts in and of itself, that is, in an entirely mind-independent manner. After articulating Kantian monism more precisely (Section 1), I present a prima facie case for preferring it over more standard varieties of monism (Section 2). (shrink)