The method of reflective equilibrium (MRE) is a method of justification popularized by John Rawls and further developed by Norman Daniels, Michael DePaul, Folke Tersman, and Catherine Z. Elgin, among others. The basic idea is that epistemic agents have justified beliefs if they have succeeded in forming their beliefs into a harmonious system of beliefs which they reflectively judge to be the most plausible. Despite the common reference to MRE as a method, its mechanisms or rules are typically expressed in (...) a metaphorical or simplified manner and are therefore criticized as too vague. Recent efforts to counter this criticism have been directed towards the attempt to provide formal explications of MRE. This paper aims to supplement these efforts by providing an informal working definition of MRE. This approach challenges the view that MRE can adequately be characterized only in the negative as a set of anti-essentialisms. I argue that epistemic agents follow MRE iff they follow four interconnected rules, which are concerned with a minimalistic form of foundationalism, a minimalistic form of fallibilism, a moderate form of holism, and a minimalistic form of rationality. In the critical spirit of MRE, the corresponding working definition is, of course, provisional and revisable. In general, the aim is to contribute to a reflective equilibrium (RE) concerning MRE. If it is successful, this working definition provides a better grasp of the most basic elements of the method and thereby enhances our understanding of it. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that solutions to normative challenges associated with autonomous driving, such as real-world trolley cases or distributions of risk in mundane driving situations, face the problem of reasonable pluralism: Reasonable pluralism refers to the fact that there exists a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive moral doctrines within liberal democracies. The corresponding problem is that a politically acceptable solution cannot refer to only one of these comprehensive doctrines. Yet a politically adequate solution to the normative challenges (...) of autonomous driving need not come at the expense of an ethical solution, if it is based on moral beliefs that are (1) shared in an overlapping consensus and (2) systematized through public reason. Therefore, we argue that a Rawlsian justificatory framework is able to adequately address the normative challenges of autonomous driving and elaborate on how such a framework might be employed for this purpose. (shrink)

It is commonly agreed that so-called echo chambers and epistemic bubbles, associated with social media, are detrimental to liberal democracies. Drawing on John Rawls’s political liberalism, we offer a novel explanation of why social media platforms amplifying echo chambers and epistemic bubbles are likely contributing to the violation of the democratic norms connected to the ideal of public reason. These norms are clarified with reference to the method of (full) reflective equilibrium, which we argue should be cultivated as a civic (...) virtue in the context of political justification. The paper demonstrates how epistemic bubbles and echo chambers are likely to be detrimental to the disposition to follow the method of reflective equilibrium in the political context. Based on this diagnosis the paper highlights the need for interventions that help cultivate reflective equilibrium as a civic virtue and the need for corresponding interdisciplinary research. (shrink)

In this paper, we focus on one controversial element of the method of reflective equilibrium, namely Rawls’s idea that the commitments that enter the justificatory procedure should be pre-selected or filtered: According to him, only considered judgements should be taken into account in moral philosophy. There are two camps of critics of this filtering process: 1) Critics of reflective equilibrium: They reject the Rawlsian filtering process as too weak and seek a more reliable one, which would actually constitute a distinct (...) epistemic method. 2) Proponents of reflective equilibrium: They reject the Rawlsian filtering process as too exclusionary. We defend RE against its critics, arguing that the method can secure reasonable commitments without depending on a strong external filtering process. However, we side with the critical proponents of reflective equilibrium and argue that without the Rawlsian weak filtering process, RE is more plausible both as a general method as well as in the context of moral philosophy. (shrink)

I argue against the claim that it is trivial to state that Sidgwick used the method of wide reflective equilibrium. This claim is based on what could be called the Triviality Charge, which is pressed against the method of wide reflective equilibrium by Peter Singer. According to this charge, there is no alternative to using the method if it is interpreted as involving all relevant philosophical background arguments. The main argument against the Triviality Charge is that although the method of (...) wide reflective equilibrium is compatible with coherentism (understood as a form of weak foundationalism) as well as moderate foundationalism, it is not compatible with strong foundationalism. Hence, the claim that a philosopher uses the method of wide reflective equilibrium is informative. In particular, this is true with regard to Sidgwick. (shrink)

Mit einer virtuellen Welt kann sehr Verschiedenes und Mannigfaltiges assoziiert werden, unter anderem ein weiterer schillernder Begriff: Die Utopie. Sind nun virtuelle Welten allesamt Utopien? Oder müsste man vielmehr umgekehrt die Utopie als eine besondere virtuelle Welt hervorheben? Dass es überhaupt einen engen Zusammenhang zwischen den beiden Begriffen gibt, scheint nicht einmal selbstverständlich: Es gibt ihn sicherlich nicht, wenn man unter einer virtuellen Welt lediglich ein mit Hilfe von Computertechnik generiertes Szenario und unter einer Utopie schlicht und einfach eine der (...) Wirklichkeit unangemessene Wunschvorstellung versteht oder aber die Utopie als die literarische Konzeption einer für ideal befundenen Gesellschaftsform begreift und ideengeschichtlich demgemäß mit Platons „Staat“ beginnen lässt. Damit das begriffliche Verhältnis zwischen den heute durchaus auch im allgemeinen Sprachgebrauch verwurzelten Ausdrücken „Utopie“ und „Virtualität“ untersucht werden kann, soll der Versuch unternommen werden, anschaulich zu machen, wie sie verwendet werden könnten. (shrink)

In Anarchie, Staat, Utopia aus dem Jahre 1974 legte Robert Nozick eine libertäre Staatstheorie dar, die er auch als Utopie verstanden wissen will. Ist nun diese Selbst-Etikettierung berechtigt? Hierzu möchte ich sowohl Nozicks Auffassung von einer Utopie betrachten, als auch nach einem sinnvollen Utopie-Begriff suchen, dem ein als utopisch bezeichneter Text zu genügen hat. Dabei werde ich hauptsächlich den Blick auf Thomas Morus’ genre-prototypischen Text über die Insel Utopia richten. Neben der Frage, ob Nozicks Staatstheorie als Utopie bezeichnet werden sollte, (...) möchte ich zum Schluß versuchen, eine Antwort auf die Frage zu finden, warum sich Nozick eines Begriffs bedient, der im allgemeinen Sprachgebrauch durchaus nicht immer positiv verstanden wird. (shrink)

Mit dem treffenden Ausdruck "Der wunderbare florentinische Geist" bezeichnet Jacob Burckhardt den Geist der Erneuerung in Florenz zur Zeit der italienischen Renaissance - des Rinascimento. Er revolutionierte die unterschiedlichsten kulturellen Bereiche, wie etwa das politische Denken, Wissenschaft, Technik und Kunst. Dieser Geist wirkt bis heute fort. In seiner vielfältigen Gestalt dient er als Ausgangspunkt, um den Hintergrund der europäischen Kultur zu erkunden.

Mark Coeckelbergh starts his book with a very powerful picture based on a real incident: On the 9th of January 2020, Robert Williams was wrongfully arrested by Detroit police officers in front of his two young daughters, wife and neighbors. For 18 hours the police would not disclose the grounds for his arrest (American Civil Liberties Union 2020; Hill 2020). The decision to arrest him was primarily based on a facial detection algorithm which matched Mr. Williams’ driving license photo with (...) the picture of a man who was suspected of watch theft two years earlier. Not only did the computer ‘get it wrong’ as one of the detectives said, when Mr. Williams made them aware that the picture of the suspect obviously wasn’t resembling him, the probably unreliable algorithm very likely contributed to racial discrimination (Hill 2020). It is well documented that many available facial detection algorithms at this time had significant problems (e.g. a comparably high false positive rate) with respect to black persons, like Mr. Williams (NIST 2019). Multiple causes may exist, such as unbalanced training datasets and insufficient optimization. Coeckelbergh compares the disturbing case of Mr. Williams with a political interpretation of Franz Kafka’s The Trial, where the protagonist, Josef K., is accused of an unspecified crime by an opaque, oppressive and absurd bureaucracy: “In the 21st-century United States, Josef K. is black and is falsely accused by an algorithm, without explanation” (p. 2). (shrink)

Have you been surprised by the recent development and diffusion of generative artificial intelligence (AI)? Many institutions of civil society have been caught off guard, which provides them with motivation to think ahead. And as many new plausible pathways of socio-technical development are opening up, a growing interest in technology ethics that addresses our corresponding moral uncertainties is warranted. In Sven Nyholm’s words, “[t]he field of technology ethics is absolutely exploding at the moment” (p. 262), and so the publication of (...) his introduction to the topic is well timed. (shrink)