10 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Mylan Engel [5]Mylan Engel Jr [5]
See also
Mylan Engel Jr
Northern Illinois University
  1. The Immorality of Eating Meat.Mylan Engel - 2000 - Chapter in The Moral Life:856-889.
    Unlike other ethical arguments for veganism, the argument advanced is not predicated on the wrongness of speciesism, nor does it depend on your believing that all animals are equal or that all animals have a right to life, nor is it predicated on some highly contentious metaethical theory which you reject. Rather, it is predicated on your beliefs. Simply put, the argument shows that even those of you who are steadfastly committed to valuing humans over nonhumans are nevertheless committed to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  2. Vegetarianism.Mylan Engel - 2016 - Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics.
    Ethical vegetarians maintain that vegetarianism is morally required. The principal reasons offered in support of ethical vegetarianism are: (i) concern for the welfare and well-being of the animals being eaten, (ii) concern for the environment, (iii) concern over global food scarcity and the just distribution of resources, and (iv) concern for future generations. Each of these reasons is explored in turn, starting with a historical look at ethical vegetarianism and the moral status of animals.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3. Epistemic Luck.Mylan Engel Jr - 2011 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-41.
    Epistemic luck is a generic notion used to describe any of a number of ways in which it can be accidental, coincidental, or fortuitous that a person has a true belief. For example, one can form a true belief as a result of a lucky guess, as when one believes through guesswork that “C” is the right answer to a multiple-choice question and one’s belief just happens to be correct. One can form a true belief via wishful thinking; for example, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  4. The Mere Considerability of Animals.Mylan Engel Jr - 2001 - Acta Analytica 27:89-108.
    Singer and Regan predicate their arguments -- for ethical vegetarianism, against animal experimentation, and for an end to animal exploitation generally -- on the equal considerability premise (EC). According to (EC), we owe humans and sentient nonhumans exactly the same degree of moral considerability. While Singer's and Regan's conclusions follow from (EC), many philosophers reject their arguments because they find (EC)'s implications morally repugnant and intuitively unacceptable. Like most people, you probably reject (EC). Never the less, you're already committed to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  5. Intemalism, the Gettier Problem, and Metaepistemological Skepticism.Mylan Engel - 2000 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (1):99-117.
    When it comes to second-order knowledge, internalists typically contend that when we know that p, we can, by reflecting, directly know that we are knowing it. Gettier considerations are employed to challenge this internalistic contention and to make out a prima facie case for internalistic metaepistemological skepticism, the thesis that no one ever intemalistically knows that one internalistically knows that p. In particular, I argue that at the metaepistemological second-order level, the Gettier problem generates three distinct problems which, taken together, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. Taking Hunger Seriously.Mylan Engel Jr - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):29-57.
    An argument is advanced to show that affluent and moderately affluent people, like you and me, are morally obligated: To provide modest financial support for famine relief organizations and/or other humanitanan organizations working to reduce the amount of unnecessary suffering and death in the world, and To refrain from squandering food that could be fed to humans in situations of food scarcity. Unlike other ethical arguments for the obligation to assist the world’s absolutely poor, my argument is not predicated on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. A Noncontextualist Account of Contextualist Linguistic Data.Mylan Engel - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (2):56-79.
    The paper takes as its starting point the observation that people can be led to retract knowledge claims when presented with previously ignored error possibilities, but offers a noncontextualist explanation of the data. Fallibilist epistemologies are committed to the existence of two kinds of Kp -falsifying contingencies: (i) Non-Ignorable contingencies [NI-contingencies] and (ii) Properly-Ignorable contingencies [PI-contingencies]. For S to know that p, S must be in an epistemic position to rule out all NI-contingencies, but she need not be able to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8.  42
    The Problem of Other Minds: A Reliable Solution.Mylan Engel Jr - 1993 - Acta Analytica 11 (11):87-109.
    Paul Churchland characterizes the "epistemological problem" in philosophy of mind as the problem "concerned with how we come to have knowledge of the internal activities of conscious, intelligent minds." This problem is itself divided into two separate, but related problems: (1) the problem of self-consciousness -- that of determining how one comes to have knowledge of one's own mental states, and (2) the problem of other minds -- that of explaining how one can ever come to know that something other (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. The Equivocal or Question-Begging Nature of Evil Demon Arguments for External World Skepticism.Mylan Engel - 2005 - Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):163-178.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  47
    Personal and Doxastic Variants of Epistemic Justification and Their Roles in the Theory of Knowledge.Mylan Engel Jr - 1988 - Dissertation, The University of Arizona
    Most epistemologists agree that epistemic justification is required for knowledge. This requirement is usually formulated in one of two ways: S knows that p only if S is justified in believing that p. S knows that p only if S's belief that p is justified. Surprisingly and are generally regarded as synonymous formulations of the justification condition. In Chapter 1, I argue that such a synonymy thesis is mistaken and that, in fact, and specify substantively different requirements. requires that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark