This paper seeks to bring cosmopsychism, a contemporary metaphysical position on the nature of mind and consciousness, into contact with the philosophical tradition of Hinduism. Behind this exercise lies the motivation to examine how ideas developed within this rich tradition could aid in the effort to think constructively and creatively about issues which occupy the contemporary literature on panpsychism, and in particular cosmopsychism. I argue that, within the Hindu philosophical corpus, contemporary cosmopsychism finds its most natural allies in two world-affirming (...) views: Kashmir Śaivism, and the integral Advaita of Sri Aurobindo. After discussing these views, and their affinities to cosmopsychism, I argue that one important potential contributions of such perspectives lies in the fact that they present us with a form of priority monism little developed within contemporary philosophy. I call this neglected perspective generative monism, and I offer a preliminary exposition of the view and of its explanatory potential. (shrink)

When evaluating R.K. Narayan, Shashi Tharoor seems to commit himself to these theses: Narayan has a natural style of writing, or a style which is second nature to him; to go significantly beyond his limited range he would have to experiment more with language, reducing the accessibility of his fictions. I cast doubt on the first of these by speculating that Narayan’s middle-of-the-road style required suppressing linguistic innovations in earlier drafts.

I propose that some cases of underrepresentation reflect different conceptions of what is an appropriate time frame for assessment, using the publication history of R.K. Narayan to illustrate my hypothesis.

What is R.K. Narayan’s position in relation to his story “Such perfection”? It is natural to interpret him as conveying a message similar to one Western readers are familiar with from ancient Greek myths: fear perfection; it offends the gods. But there is room for a more complicated interpretation.

This paper responds to Shashi Tharoor’s criticism that “much of Narayan’s prose reads like a translation.” He does not name any writers in another language to back up his claim and without doing so there is an explanation for his impression, but one which leaves it looking misleading.

Specialization appears to be a more efficient way to achieve shared ends: you specialize in one task and I in another and we combine our efforts. Specialization in literature would seem to call for a divide between literary critics, who interpret and evaluate fictions, and fiction writers themselves. But such a divide is a disadvantage for assessing some claims made within literary criticism, notably that a certain style goes with a certain content.

Nobody claims to be a proponent of white feminism, but according to the critique presented in this article, many in fact are. I argue that feminism that does not take multiple axes of oppression into account is bad in three ways: it strategically undermines solidarity between women; it risks inconsistency by advocating justice and equality for some women but not all; and it impedes the ultimate function of feminism function by employing epistemological “master’s tools” that stand in antithesis to feminist (...) emancipatory work. In investigating ethnocentrism in feminism, I develop the idea of latent ethnocentrism, which occupies the space between meaning that is generated from reference to the self and overt racism. I identify an epistemological prong in the ethnocentrism charge against feminism, where I draw on bell hooks’ interlocking axes-model of oppression to answer why the ethnocentrism problem is important for feminism and what its underlying epistemological causes are. I draw on Uma Narayan’s destabilization of cultural dualisms to argue that they do not serve emancipatory agendas. There is a mutually constitutive relation between language that informs our understanding, on the one hand, and the political agendas that produce this language to sustain the male and the western norm as center, on the other hand. I call this circular and reciprocally reinforcing mechanism the episteme-politic. I conclude that the ethnocentrism problem is not merely an issue of strategy or feminist consistency but of shooting oneself in the foot by uncritically accepting patriarchal concepts for feminist politics. (shrink)

Anger is often an appropriate reaction to harms and injustices, but is it a politically beneficial one? Martha Nussbaum (Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1), 41–56, 2015, Anger and Forgiveness. Oxford University Press, 2016) has argued that, although anger is useful in initially recruiting agents for action, anger is typically counterproductive to securing the political aims of those harmed. After the initial shockwave of outrage, Nussbaum argues that to be effective at enacting positive social change, groups and individuals (...) alike, must move quickly out of the state of anger. Feminist theorists (Frye, The Politics of Reality. Crossing Press, 1983; Lorde, 1997; Narayan, Hypatia 3 (2): 31–48, 1988) on the other hand have for long highlighted the efficacy of anger, as well as its moral and epistemic value, in fighting against the oppressive status quo. It might be thought therefore that for political action to be effective, a continued state of anger is preferable. Protestors must after all create and sustain a sense of moral obligation and justice. A main way of doing so is to promote successive moral shocks that trigger outrage (Jasper, Emotion Review 6 (3): 208–213, 2014). I present a novel, empirically informed defense of anger’s efficacy in political action. Nussbaum holds a traditional view on the nature of anger, inherited from Aristotle and the Stoics, which holds that anger constitutively involves a desire for retribution. The view that anger is counterproductive falls out of this and is dominant in academic work as well as in our personal and political lives. Based on work in social psychology, I argue that we need to reconsider this. In doing so, I highlight anger’s aim for recognition, rather than retribution, as key. Furthermore, I uncover conditions for anger’s political efficacy, as well as reasons for why the traditional view of anger has been so pervasive. (shrink)

This paper responds to the question of whether the Internet has made lectures obsolete and Matthew Pickles’ investigation of why lectures persist. It is written as a pastiche of R.K. Narayan, about whom a somewhat parallel question is probably asked. Pickles refers to a logic lecturer so dry people went swimming, and a pastiche approach is an alternative.

Shashi Tharoor criticizes R.K. Narayan in the following way: “Narayan’s prose was like a bullock-cart: a vehicle that can move only in one gear, is unable to turn, accelerate or reverse, and remains yoked to traditional creatures who have long since been overtaken.” I think there is a quick defence, which is that it is very unlikely that one can write the different kinds of works he did without being able to significantly change pace; but there is an (...) objection from Joseph Conrad criticism. (shrink)

I raise a worry that Shashi Tharoor’s criticism that “much of Narayan’s prose reads like a translation” is inconsistent with his criticism “the ABC of bad writing – archaisms, banalities and cliches – abounded” because these things tend to be worded in a way that exploits local linguistic features, such as alliteration, making translation difficult. I also flag another inconsistency worry, but earlier in this paper.

The question of authenticity centers in the lives of women of color to invite and restrict their representative roles. For this reason, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Uma Narayan advocate responding with strategic essentialism. This paper argues against such a strategy and proposes an epistemic understanding of the question of authentic- ity. The question stems from a kernel of truth—the connection between experience and knowledge. But a coherence theory of knowledge better captures the sociality and the holism of experience and (...) knowledge. (shrink)

This paper argues against a thesis that Shashi Tharoor seems to accept: that R.K. Narayan’s style is bound up with a very specific context, of people left behind by the times in South India. It cannot deal with other subject matter. I present a little fiction to challenge the thesis.

A brief survey of the pioneers of Malayalam literature.