Cognitive scientists have revealed systematic errors in human reasoning. There is disagreement about what these errors indicate about human rationality, but one upshot seems clear: human reasoning does not seem to fit traditional views of human rationality. This concern about rationality has made its way through various fields and has recently caught the attention of philosophers. The concern is that if philosophers are prone to systematic errors in reasoning, then the integrity of philosophy would be threatened. In this paper, I (...) present some of the more famous work in cognitive science that has marshaled this concern. Then I present reasons to think that those with training in philosophy will be less prone to certain systematic errors in reasoning. The suggestion is that if philosophers could be shown to be less prone to such errors, then the worries about the integrity of philosophy could be constrained. Then I present evidence that, according to performance on the CRT (Frederick 2005), those who have benefited from training and selection in philosophy are indeed less prone to one kind of systematic error: irrationally arbitrating between intuitive and reflective responses. Nonetheless, philosophers are not entirely immune to this systematic error, and their proclivity for this error is statistically related to their responses to a variety of philosophical questions. So, while the evidence herein puts constraints on the worries about the integrity of philosophy, it by no means eliminates these worries. The conclusion, then, is that the present evidence offers prima facie reasons to ascribe a mitigated privilege to philosophers' ability to rationally arbitrate between intuitive and reflective responses. (shrink)

The theater principle personifies the universe and all natural as a live performance theater run by an unknown showrunner and indifferent audience members. The principle references evolution as a means of comparison and goes in depth describing exactly how natural occurrences bring out the reality of this principle. And the fortunate circumstances of being a conscious being.

Prior research found correlations between reflection test performance and philosophical tendencies among laypeople. In two large studies (total N = 1299)—one pre-registered—many of these correlations were replicated in a sample that included both laypeople and philosophers. For example, reflection test performance predicted preferring atheism over theism and instrumental harm over harm avoidance on the trolley problem. However, most reflection-philosophy correlations were undetected when controlling for other factors such as numeracy, preferences for open-minded thinking, personality, philosophical training, age, and gender. Nonetheless, (...) some correlations between reflection and philosophical views survived this multivariate analysis and were only partially confounded with either education or self-reported reasoning preferences. Unreflective thinking still predicted believing in God whereas reflective thinking still predicted believing that (a) proper names like ‘Santa’ do not necessarily refer to entities that actually exist and (b) science does reveal the fundamental nature of the world. So some robust relationships between reflection and philosophical tendencies were detected even among philosophers, and yet there was clearly more to the link between reflection and philosophy. To this end, demographic and metaphilosophical hypotheses are considered. (shrink)

Depression is a common and devastating instance of ill-being which deserves an account. Moreover, the ill-being of depression is impacted by digital technology: some uses of digital technology increase such ill-being while other uses of digital technology increase well-being. So a good account of ill-being would explicate the antecedents of depressive symptoms and their relief, digitally and otherwise. This paper borrows a causal network account of well-being and applies it to ill-being, particularly depression. Causal networks are found to provide a (...) principled, coherent, intuitively plausible, and empirically adequate account of cases of depression in every-day and digital contexts. Causal network accounts of ill-being also offer philosophical, scientific, and practical utility. Insofar as other accounts of ill-being cannot offer these advantages, we should prefer causal network accounts of ill-being. (shrink)

Philosophy is a reflective activity. So perhaps it is unsurprising that many philosophers have claimed that reflection plays an important role in shaping and even improving our philosophical thinking. This hypothesis seems plausible given that training in philosophy has correlated with better performance on tests of reflection and reflective reasoning has correlated with demonstrably better judgments in a variety of domains. This article reviews the hypothesized roles of reflection in philosophical thinking as well as the empirical evidence for these roles. (...) This reveals that although there are fairly reliable links between reflection and philosophical judgment among both laypeople and philosophers, the role of reflection in philosophical thinking may nonetheless depend in part on other factors, some of which have yet to be determined. So progress in research on reflection in philosophy may require further innovation in experimental methods and psychometric validation of philosophical measures. (shrink)

Reflectivists consider reflective reasoning crucial for good judgment and action. Anti-reflectivists deny that reflection delivers what reflectivists seek. Alas, the evidence is mixed. So, does reflection confer normative value or not? This paper argues for a middle way: reflection can confer normative value, but its ability to do this is bound by such factors as what we might call epistemic identity: an identity that involves particular beliefs—for example, religious and political identities. We may reflectively defend our identities’ beliefs rather than (...) reflect open-mindedly to adopt whatever beliefs cohere with the best arguments and evidence. This bounded reflectivism is explicated with an algorithmic model of reflection synthesized from philosophy and science that yields testable predictions, psychometric implications, and realistic metaphilosophical suggestions—for example, overcoming motivated reflection may require embracing epistemic identity rather than veiling it (à la Rawls 1971). So bounded reflectivism should be preferred to views offering anything less. (shrink)

Ordinary judgments about personal identity are complicated by the fact that phrases like “same person” and “different person” have multiple uses in ordinary English. This complication calls into question the significance of recent experimental work on this topic. For example, Tobia (2015) found that judgments of personal identity were significantly affected by whether the moral change described in a vignette was for the better or for the worse, while Strohminger and Nichols (2014) found that loss of moral conscience had more (...) of an effect on identity judgments than loss of biographical memory. In each case, however, there are grounds for questioning whether the judgments elicited in these experiments engaged a concept of numerical personal identity at all (cf. Berniūnas and Dranseika 2016; Dranseika 2017; Starmans and Bloom 2018). In two pre-registered studies we validate this criticism while also showing a way to address it: instead of attempting to engage the concept of numerical identity through specialized language or the terms of an imaginary philosophical debate, we should consider instead how the identity of a person is described through the connected use of proper names, definite descriptions, and the personal pronouns “I”, “you”, “he”, and “she”. When the experiments above are revisited in this way, there is no evidence that the differences in question had an effect on ordinary identity judgments. (shrink)

In this paper I focus on the problem of accounting for apparent inconsistencies between Plato’s early and middle works. Developmentalism seeks to account for these variances by differentiating a Socratic philosophy in the early dialogues from a Platonic philosophy in the middle. In opposition to this position, I propose an alternative explanation: differences between these two groups are due to Plato’s depiction and use of middle period epistemology. I argue that, in the early dialogues, Plato depicts Socrates’ use of the (...) “summoners” described in Book 7 of the Republic, and that Plato uses Socrates’ failed attempts to summon interlocutors for the purpose of summoning readers. In conclusion, I suggest that the hypothesis that Plato uses summoners provides a framework for addressing the wider problem of inconsistencies within the Platonic corpus. (shrink)

자국의 통상이익을 확보하려는 국가의 노력과 무역의 자유화와 확대를 위한 경제심 판관으로서 WTO의 역할은 인류복지의 극대화를 위하여 한 방향으로 나아가면서도 충 돌하고 있다. 개별국가의 성장과 복지없는 인류복지의 극대화는 껍데기에 불과하고, 자유와 비차별(non-discrimination)의 원칙에 바탕한 기회균등, 공정경쟁조건의 보장이 없는 한 국제무역은 홉즈식 "즉발적 利己主義(spontaneous disorder)"만이 횡행하게 된 다. 이를 구제하기 위하여 국가적·국제적 통상관리체제가 발전되어 왔으며, WTO가 세 계경제헌법체제로서 많은 역할을 하고 있는 것은 주지의 사실이다. 많은 WTO업적 중 최근의 버드법 문제는 그 이례성과 전략성으로 인하여 양식있는 자의 관심이 대상이 되어 왔으며, 최근 미 (...) 연방법원과 WTO분쟁해결기구는 동 법의 적립금배분조항에 관 하여 국제적·국내적으로 위헌성을 확인한 바 있다. 그러나 양대 司法機關의 결정취지는 동일한 것이 아니다. 미국 연방법원은 문제된 버드법 조항이 헌법상 보장된 표현의 자 유와 평등권을 침해하여 위헌이라는 결정을 하였고, WTO분쟁해결기구는 반덤핑협정 이나 보조금협정 등 관련협정에서 허용하고 있지 않는 내용의 무역규제조치를 하였다 는 이유로 동법의 협정위반을 선언하고 그 철폐를 권고하였다. 이에 본고는 버드법상 적립금배분제도에 관한 양대 사법기관의 결정요지를 살펴보고, 헌법국가의 이상이라는 관점에서 사법기관의 역할과 버드법에 관한 사법심사가 주는 시사점을 음미하기로 한 다. 이는 종래의 외교통상문제와 국내문제의 엄별이라는 기존관념으로부터 헌법국가이 상의 역사적 의의와 발전, 국제법과 국내법의 관계, 사법기관의 국제적 협조와 연대라 는 관점에서 보다 적극적 자세로의 인식전환과 관련을 갖는다. 사법기관은 역사적으로 시민사회의 형성ㆍ발전에 있어 기본적 가치의 수호를 통하여 국제적ㆍ국내적 차원에서 중요한 역할을 하여 왔으나,현대 국제사회에서는 외교통상 행정영역의 발전에 뒤떨어 지는경향이있고, 세계헌법주의라는 관점에서 새로운 조명이 필요하다고 본다. 결론에 서는 현재 국제사회의 현실에서 사법부를 포함하여 우리정부의 전략적ㆍ법제적 대응 방안을 간략히 적시해 보도록 한다. (shrink)