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  1. Plantinga's Defence and His Theodicy are Incompatible.Richard Brian Davis & W. Paul Franks - 2017 - In Klaas J. Kraay (ed.), Does God Matter?: Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. Routledge. pp. 203–223.
    In this paper, we attempt to show that if Plantinga’s free will defence succeeds, his O Felix Culpa theodicy fails. For if every creaturely essence suffers from transworld depravity, then given that Jesus has a creaturely essence (as we attempt to show), it follows that Incarnation and Atonement worlds cannot be actualized by God, in which case we have anything but a felix culpa.
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  2. Against a Postmodern Pentecostal Epistemology.Richard Brian Davis & W. Paul Franks - 2013 - Philosophia Christi 15 (2):383-399.
    In this paper we explore the idea that Pentecostalism is best supported by conjoining it to a postmodern, narrative epistemology in which everything is a text requiring interpretation. On this view, truth doesn’t consist in a set of uninterpreted facts that make the claims of Christianity true; rather, as James K. A. Smith says, truth emerges when there is a “fit” or proportionality between the Christian story and one’s affective and emotional life. We argue that Pentecostals should reject this account (...)
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  3. On Jesus, Derrida, and Dawkins: Rejoinder to Joshua Harris.Richard Brian Davis & W. Paul Franks - 2014 - Philosophia Christi 16 (1):185-191.
    In this paper we respond to three objections raised by Joshua Harris to our article, “Against a Postmodern Pentecostal Epistemology,” in which we express misgivings about the conjunction of Pentecostalism with James K. A. Smith’s postmodern, story-based epistemolo- gy. According to Harris, our critique: 1) problematically assumes a correspondence theory of truth, 2) invalidly concludes that “Derrida’s Axiom” conflicts with “Peter’s Axiom,” and 3) fails to consider an alternative account of the universality of Christian truth claims. We argue that Harris’s (...)
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  4. Evil and Agent-Causal Theism.Richard Brian Davis - 2019 - In W. Paul Franks (ed.), Explaining Evil: Four Views. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 11-28.
    In this chapter, I attempt to show that evil exists only if what I call Agent Causal Theism (ACT) is true. According to ACT, human beings are immaterial, conscious agents endued (by God) with a power of self-motion: the power to think, decide, and act for ends in light of reasons, but without being externally caused to do so (even by God himself). By contrast, I argue that there is no space for evil in the worldviews of naturalistic Darwinism or (...)
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  5. Is Socrates A Predicate?Richard Brian Davis - 2006 - Metaphysica 7 (2).
    In his Moderate Realism and Its Logic (Yale, 1996), Donald Mertz argues that the traditional ontology of nonpredicable substances and predicable universals is beset by “intractable problems,” “harbors an insidious error,” and constitutes a “stumbling block” for the ontologist. By contrast, a onecategory ontology consisting of relation instances (and combinations thereof) is sustainable, and indeed the only way of avoiding commitment to bare particulars. The success of the project turns on Mertz’s claim that every relation instance has a linking aspect, (...)
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  6. Layman’s Lapse: On an Incomplete Moral Argument for Theism.Richard Brian Davis & W. Paul Franks - 2013 - Philo 16 (2):170-179.
    C. Stephen Layman contends that an argument supporting theism over naturalism can be constructed based on three defensible, non–question-begging premises about the moral order. Previous critics of Layman’s argument have challenged the truth of these premises. We stipulate them arguendo but go on to show that there is a deeper problem: a fourth premise introduced to complete the argument—the “completion premise,” as we call it—is true only if we assume that God exists or we concede that there is no afterlife. (...)
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  7. What Place, then, for Rational Apologetics?Richard Brian Davis & W. Paul Franks - 2013 - In Paul Gould & Richard Brian Davis (eds.), Loving God with Your Mind: Essays in Honor of J. P. Moreland (edited book). Chicago, IL, USA: Moody Publishers. pp. 127–140.
    In this chapter, we attempt to show that J.P. Moreland's understanding of apologetics is beautifully positioned to counter resistance to a rationally defensible Christianity—resistance arising from the mistaken idea that any rational defense will fail to support or even undermine relationship. We look first at Paul Moser's complaint that since rational apologetics doesn’t prove the God of Christianity, it falls short of delivering what matters most—a personal agent worthy of worship and relationship. We then consider John Wilkinson's charge that the (...)
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