Results for 'Ripstein'

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  1. Authority and Coercion.Arthur Ripstein - 2004 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (1):2-35.
    I am grateful to Donald Ainslie, Lisa Austin, Michael Blake, Abraham Drassinower, David Dyzenhaus, George Fletcher, Robert Gibbs, Louis-Philippe Hodgson, Sari Kisilevsky, Dennis Klimchuk, Christopher Morris, Scott Shapiro, Horacio Spector, Sergio Tenenbaum, Malcolm Thorburn, Ernest Weinrib, Karen Weisman, and the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs for comments, and audiences in the UCLA Philosophy Department and Columbia Law School for their questions.
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  2. Kant, Ripstein and the Circle of Freedom: A Critical Note.Laura Valentini - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):450-459.
    Much contemporary political philosophy claims to be Kant-inspired, but its aims and method differ from Kant's own. In his recent book, Force and Freedom, Arthur Ripstein advocates a more orthodox Kantian outlook, presenting it as superior to dominant (Kant-inspired) views. The most striking feature of this outlook is its attempt to ground the whole of political morality in one right: the right to freedom, understood as the right to be independent of others’ choices. Is Ripstein's Kantian project successful? (...)
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  3. Review of Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom. [REVIEW]Andrew Botterell - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Political Science 44:457-458.
    A review of Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 2009).
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  4. Kantian Freedom as “Purposiveness”.Ava Thomas Wright - 2022 - Kant Studien 113 (4):640-658.
    Arthur Ripstein’s conception of Kantian freedom has exerted an enormous recent influence on scholars of Kant’s political philosophy; however, the conception seems to me flawed. In this paper, I argue that Ripstein’s conception of Kantian freedom as “your capacity to choose the ends you will use your means to pursue” – your “purposiveness” – is both too narrow and too broad: (1) Wrongful acts such as coercive threats cannot choose my ends for me; instead, such acts wrongfully restrict (...)
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  5. A Sense of Proportion: Some Thoughts on Equality, Security and Justice.Annabelle Lever - 2020 - Res Publica 26 (3):357-371.
    This article develops an intuitive idea of proportionality as a placeholder for a substantive conception of equality, and contrasts it with Ripstein’s ideas, as presented in an annual guest lecture to the Society of Applied Philosophy in 2016. It uses a discussion of racial profiling to illustrate the conceptual and normative differences between the two. The brief conclusion spells out my concern that talk of ‘proportionality’, though often helpful and, sometimes, necessary for moral reasoning, can end up concealing, rather (...)
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  6. Nozick’s Reply to the Anarchist: What He Said and What He Should Have Said about Procedural Rights.Helga Varden - 2009 - Law and Philosophy 28 (6):585-616.
    Central to Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia is a defense of the legitimacy of the minimal state’s use of coercion against anarchist objections. Individuals acting within their natural rights can establish the state without committing wrongdoing against those who disagree. Nozick attempts to show that even with a natural executive right, individuals need not actually consent to incur political obligations. Nozick’s argument relies on an account of compensation to remedy the infringement of the non-consenters’ procedural rights. Compensation, however, cannot remedy (...)
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  7. Is the risk–liability theory compatible with negligence law?Toby Handfield & Trevor Pisciotta - 2005 - Legal Theory 11 (4):387-404.
    David McCarthy has recently suggested that our compensation and liability practices may be interpreted as reflecting a fundamental norm to hold people liable for imposing risk of harm on others. Independently, closely related ideas have been criticised by Stephen R. Perry and Arthur Ripstein as incompatible with central features of negligence law. We aim to show that these objections are unsuccessful against McCarthy’s Risk–liability theory, and that such an approach is a promising means both for understanding the moral basis (...)
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  8. The Harm Principle vs. Kantian Criteria for Ensuring Fair, Principled and Just Criminalisation.Dennis J. Baker - 2008 - Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 33 (66):66-99.
    In this paper, I consider Ripstein and Dan-Cohen's critiques of the 'harm principle'. Ripstein and Dan-Cohen have asserted that the harm principle should be jettisoned, because it allegedly fails to provide a rationale for criminalising certain harmless wrongs that ought to be criminalised. They argue that Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative and his concept of 'external freedom' are better equipped for ensuring that criminalisation decisions meet the requirements of fairness. Per contra, I assert that Kant's deontological (...)
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  9. Can tolerance be grounded in equal respect?Enzo Rossi - 2013 - European Journal of Political Theory 12 (3):240-252.
    In this paper I argue that equal respect-based accounts of the normative basis of tolerance are self-defeating, insofar as they are unable to specify the limits of tolerance in a way that is consistent with their own commitment to the equal treatment of all conceptions of the good. I show how this argument is a variant of the long-standing ‘conflict of freedoms’ objection to Kantian-inspired, freedom-based accounts of the justification of systems of norms. I criticize Thomas Scanlon’s defence of ‘pure (...)
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