Results for 'Ronald Sundstrom'

124 found
Order:
See also
Ronald Sundstrom
University of San Francisco
  1. Xenophobia and Racism.David Haekwon Kim & Ronald Sundstrom - 2014 - Critical Philosophy of Race 2 (1).
    Xenophobia is conceptually distinct from racism. Xenophobia is also distinct from nativism. Furthermore, theories of racism are largely ensconced in nationalized narratives of racism, often influenced by the black-white binary, which obscures xenophobia and shelters it from normative critiques. This paper addresses these claims, arguing for the first and last, and outlining the second. Just as philosophers have recently analyzed the concept of racism, clarifying it and pinpointing why it’s immoral and the extent of its moral harm, so we will (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  2. Frederick Douglass's Longing for the End of Race.Ronald Sundstrom - 2005 - African Philosophy 8 (2):143-170.
    Frederick Douglass (1817–1895) argued that newly emancipated black Americans should assimilate into Anglo-American society and culture. Social assimilation would then lead to the entire physical amalgamation of the two groups, and the emergence of a new intermediate group that would be fully American. He, like those who were to follow, was driven by a vision of universal human fraternity in the light of which the varieties of human difference were incidental and far less important than the ethical, religious, and political (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.
    It's a common idea in philosophy that we possess a peculiar kind of "phenomenal concept" by which we can think about our conscious states in "inner" and "direct" ways, as for example, when I attend to the way a current pain feels and think about this feeling as such. Such phenomenal ways of thinking figure in a variety of theoretical contexts. The bulk of this article discusses their use in a certain strategy – the phenomenal concept strategy – for defending (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  4. Is the Mystery an Illusion? Papineau on the Problem of Consciousness.Pär Sundström - 2008 - Synthese 163 (2):133-143.
    A number of philosophers have recently argued that consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. This paper examines David Papineau’s influential version of this view. According to Papineau, the difference between our “phenomenal” and “material” concepts of consciousness produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  5. Are Colours Visually Complex?Pär Sundström - 2013 - In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Ontos Verlag.
    This paper articulates a case for supposing that all shades of colour are visually complex.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6. On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):43-95.
    Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept *Q* (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or implicitly accepted by many contemporary philosophers However, there is no good reason to accept it. Or so I argue.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7. An Argument Against Spectrum Inversion.Pär Sundström - 2002 - In Sten Lindstrom & Par Sundstrom (eds.), Physicalism, Consciousness, and Modality: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind. pp. 65--94.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  8. Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.
    Colours and consciousness both present us with metaphysical problems. But what exactly are the problems? According to standard accounts, they are roughly the following. On the one hand, we have reason to believe, about both colour and consciousness, that they are identical with some familiar natural phenomena. But on the other hand, it is hard to see how these identities could obtain. I argue that this is an adequate characterisation of our metaphysical problem of colour, but a mischaracterisation of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9. Lessons for Mary.Pär Sundström - 2004 - In Marek and Reicher (ed.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
    What could you learn if you saw a colour after being confined from birth to a black-and-white room? It turns out that this is surprisingly hard to say. I suggest that reflection on this question teaches us that colour perception has a richer content than we might have thought.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. A Somewhat Eliminativist Proposal About Phenomenal Consciousness.Pär Sundström - 2008 - In Hieke and Leitgeb (ed.), Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences: Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium. The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
    This paper develops a proposal about phenomenal consciousness that is (somewhat) eliminativist in two respects. First, regarded in the light of some common ways of conceiving of consciousness, the proposal is "deflationary". Second, it opens up space for a development in which what we now naturally think about as consciousness turns out to be many different things.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Review of David Papineau's Thinking About Consciousness. [REVIEW]Pär Sundström - 2006 - Theoria 72 (1):80-86.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Humes utelämnade nyans av blått.Pär Sundström - 2008 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 29 (3):18-33.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Nagel's Case Against Physicalism.Pär Sundström - 2002 - SATS 3 (2):91-108.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14.  56
    Nagel's Case Against Physicalism.Pär Sundström - 2002 - SATS 3 (2).
    This paper is an attempt to understand and assess Thomas Nagel's influential case against physicalism in the philosophy of mind. I show that Nagel has claimed that experience is "subjective", or "essentially connected with a single point of view" in at least three different senses: first, in the sense that it is essential to every experience that there be something it is like to have it; second, in the sense that what an experience is like for its possessor cannot be (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Two Types of Qualia Theory.Pär Sundström - 2014 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 20:107-131.
    This paper distinguishes two types of qualia theory, which I call Galilean and non-Galilean qualia theories. It also offers considerations against each type of theory. To my mind the considerations are powerful. In any case, they bring out the importance of distinguishing the two types of theory. For they show that different considerations come into play—or considerations come into play in quite different ways—in assessing the two types of theory.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16.  68
    Visual Experience.Pär Sundström - 2020 - In The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: pp. 39-65.
    A visual experience, as understood here, is a sensory event that is conscious, or like something to undergo. This chapter focuses on three issues concerning such experiences. The first issue is the so-called ‘transparency’ of experiences. The chapter distinguishes a number of different interpretations of the suggestion that visual experiences are ‘transparent’. It then discusses in what sense, if any, visual experiences are ‘transparent’, and what further conclusions one can draw from that. The second issue is which properties we are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Emotional Truth.Ronald De Sousa & Adam Morton - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76:247-275.
    [Ronald de Sousa] Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such as emotions; (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  18. Collapse of the New Wave.Ronald P. Endicott - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):53-72.
    I critically evaluate the influential new wave account of theory reduction in science developed by Paul Churchland and Clifford Hooker. First, I cast doubt on claims that the new wave account enjoys a number of theoretical virtues over its competitors, such as the ability to represent how false theories are reduced by true theories. Second, I argue that the genuinely novel claim that a corrected theory must be specified entirely by terms from the basic reducing theory is in fact too (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  19. Flat Versus Dimensioned: The What and the How of Functional Realization.Ronald P. Endicott - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:191-208.
    I resolve an argument over “flat” versus “dimensioned” theories of realization. The theories concern, in part, whether realized and realizing properties are instantiated by the same individual (the flat theory) or different individuals in a part-whole relationship (the dimensioned theory). Carl Gillett has argued that the two views conflict, and that flat theories should be rejected on grounds that they fail to capture scientific cases involving a dimensioned relation between individuals and their constituent parts. I argue on the contrary that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  20. Realization Reductios, and Category Inclusion.Ronald P. Endicott - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (4):213-219.
    Thomas Polger and Laurence Shapiro argue that Carl Gillett's much publicized dimensioned theory of realization is incoherent, being subject to a reductio. Their argument turns on the fact that Gillett's definition of realization makes property instances the exclusive relata of the realization relation, while his belief in multiple realization implies its denial, namely, that properties are the relata of the realization relation on occasions of multiple realization. Others like Sydney Shoemaker have also expressed their view of realization in terms of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  21. Functionalism, Superduperfunctionalism, and Physicalism: Lessons From Supervenience.Ronald Endicott - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2205-2235.
    Philosophers almost universally believe that concepts of supervenience fail to satisfy the standards for physicalism because they offer mere property correlations that are left unexplained. They are thus compatible with non-physicalist accounts of those relations. Moreover, many philosophers not only prefer some kind of functional-role theory as a physically acceptable account of mind-body and other inter-level relations, but they use it as a form of “superdupervenience” to explain supervenience in a physically acceptable way. But I reject a central part of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  22. Post-Structuralist Angst - Critical Notice: John Bickle, Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave.Ronald P. Endicott - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):377-393.
    I critically evaluate Bickle’s version of scientific theory reduction. I press three main points. First, a small point, Bickle modifies the new wave account of reduction developed by Paul Churchland and Clifford Hooker by treating theories as set-theoretic structures. But that structuralist gloss seems to lose what was distinctive about the Churchland-Hooker account, namely, that a corrected theory must be specified entirely by terms and concepts drawn from the basic reducing theory. Set-theoretic structures are not terms or concepts but the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  23. Multiple Realizability.Ronald P. Endicott - 2005 - In D. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition. Thomson Gale, Macmillan Reference.
    Multiple realizability has been at the heart of debates about whether the mind reduces to the brain, or whether the items of a special science reduce to the items of a physical science. I analyze the two central notions implied by the concept of multiple realizability: "multiplicity," otherwise known as property variability, and "realizability." Beginning with the latter, I distinguish three broad conceptual traditions. The Mathematical Tradition equates realization with a form of mapping between objects. Generally speaking, x realizes (or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  24. Species-Specific Properties and More Narrow Reductive Strategies.Ronald P. Endicott - 1993 - Erkenntnis 38 (3):303-21.
    In light of the phenomenon of multiple realizability, many philosophers wanted to preserve the mind-brain identity theory by resorting to a “narrow reductive strategy” whereby one (a) finds mental properties which are (b) sufficiently narrow to avoid the phenomenon of multiple realization, while being (c) explanatorily adequate to the demands of psychological theorizing. That is, one replaces the conception of a mental property as more general feature of cognitive systems with many less general properties, for example, replacing the conception of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  25. Naturalizing Phenomenology? Dretske on Qualia.Ronald McIntyre - 1999 - In Jean Petitot, Francisco Varela, Bernard Pachoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology: Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Stanford University Press. pp. 429--439.
    First, I briefly characterize Dretske’s particular naturalization project, emphasizing his naturalistic reconstruction of the notion of representation. Second, I note some apparent similarities between his notion of representation and Husserl’s notion of intentionality, but I find even more important differences. Whereas Husserl takes intentionality to be an intrinsic, phenomenological feature of thought and experience, Dretske advocates an “externalist” account of mental representation. Third, I consider Dretske’s treatment of qualia, because he takes it to show that his representational account of mind (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  26. Resolving Arguments by Different Conceptual Traditions of Realization.Ronald Endicott - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (1):41-59.
    There is currently a significant amount of interest in understanding and developing theories of realization. Naturally arguments have arisen about the adequacy of some theories over others. Many of these arguments have a point. But some can be resolved by seeing that the theories of realization in question are not genuine competitors because they fall under different conceptual traditions with different but compatible goals. I will first describe three different conceptual traditions of realization that are implicated by the arguments under (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  27. Developing the Explanatory Dimensions of Part–Whole Realization.Ronald Endicott - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3347-3368.
    I use Carl Gillett’s much heralded dimensioned theory of realization as a platform to develop a plausible part–whole theory. I begin with some basic desiderata for a theory of realization that its key terms should be defined and that it should be explanatory. I then argue that Gillett’s original theory violates these conditions because its explanatory force rests upon an unspecified “in virtue of” relation. I then examine Gillett’s later version that appeals instead to theoretical terms tied to “mechanisms.” Yet (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. Nomic-Role Nonreductionism: Identifying Properties by Total Nomic Roles.Ronald P. Endicott - 2007 - Philosophical Topics 35 (1&2):217-240.
    I introduce "nomic-role nonreductionism" as an alternative to traditional causal-role functionalism in the philosophy of mind. Rather than identify mental properties by a theory that describes their intra-level causal roles via types of inputs, internal states, and outputs, I suggest that one identify mental properties by a more comprehensive theory that also describes inter-level realization roles via types of lower-level engineering, internal mental states, and still higher-level states generated by them. I defend this position on grounds that mental properties should (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  29. On the Moral Considerability of Homo Sapiens and Other Species.Ronald Sandler & Judith Crane - 2006 - Environmental Values 15 (1):69 - 84.
    It is sometimes claimed that as members of the species Homo sapiens we have a responsibility to promote the good of Homo sapiens itself (distinct from the good of its individual members). Lawrence Johnson has recently defended this claim as part of his approach to resolving the problem of future generations. We show that there are several difficulties with Johnson's argument, many of which are likely to attend any attempt to establish the moral considerability of Homo sapiens or species generally. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30. Searle, Syntax, and Observer Relativity.Ronald P. Endicott - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):101-22.
    I critically examine some provocative arguments that John Searle presents in his book The Rediscovery of Mind to support the claim that the syntactic states of a classical computational system are "observer relative" or "mind dependent" or otherwise less than fully and objectively real. I begin by explaining how this claim differs from Searle's earlier and more well-known claim that the physical states of a machine, including the syntactic states, are insufficient to determine its semantics. In contrast, his more recent (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  31.  93
    Constructival Plasticity.Ronald P. Endicott - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 74 (1):51-75.
    Some scientists and philosophers claimed that there is a converse to multiple realizability. While a given higher-level property can be realized by different lower-level properties (multiple realizability), a given lower-level property can in turn serve to realize different higher-level properties (this converse I dubbed the unfortunately obscure "constructival plasticity" to emphasize the constructive metaphysics involved in this converse to multiple realizability). I began by defining multiple realizabilty in a formal way. (Looking back, one point of interest is that I defined (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  32. The Curious Case of Ronald McDonald’s Claim to Rights: An Ontological Account of Differences in Group and Individual Person Rights: Winner of the 2016 Essay Competition of the International Social Ontology Society.Leonie Smith - 2018 - Journal of Social Ontology 4 (1):1-28.
    Performative accounts of personhood argue that group agents are persons, fit to be held responsible within the social sphere. Nonetheless, these accounts want to retain a moral distinction between group and individual persons. That: Group-persons can be responsible for their actions qua persons, but that group-persons might nonetheless not have rights equivalent to those of human persons. I present an argument which makes sense of this disanalogy, without recourse to normative claims or additional ontological commitments. I instead ground rights in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  33. Ernst Bloch, "the Principle of Hope". [REVIEW]Ronald Aronson - 1991 - History and Theory 30 (2):220.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34.  95
    Introduction.Martin Davies & Ronald Barnett - 2015 - In M. Davies and R. Barnett (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Critical Thinking in Higher Education. New York, NY, USA: pp. 1-25.
    What is critical thinking, especially in the context of higher education? How have research and scholarship on the matter developed over recent past decades? What is the current state of the art here? How might the potential of critical thinking be enhanced? What kinds of teaching are necessary in order to realize that potential? And just why is this topic important now? These are the key questions motivating this volume. We hesitate to use terms such as “comprehensive” or “complete” or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  35. Reinforcing the Three ‘R's: Reduction, Reception, and Replacement.Ronald P. Endicott - 2007 - In M. Schouten & H. Looren de Jong (eds.), The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience, and Reduction. Blackwell.
    Philosophers of science have offered different accounts of what it means for one scientific theory to reduce to another. I propose a more or less friendly amendment to Kenneth Schaffner’s “General Reduction-Replacement” model of scientific unification. Schaffner interprets scientific unification broadly in terms of a continuum from theory reduction to theory replacement. As such, his account leaves no place on its continuum for type irreducible and irreplaceable theories. The same is true for other accounts that incorporate Schaffner's continuum, for example, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  36.  40
    Adaptive Information and Animal Behaviour: Why Motorists Stop at Red Traffic Lights.Ronald W. Templeton & James Franklin - 1992 - Evolutionary Theory 10:145-155.
    Argues that information, in the animal behaviour or evolutionary context, is correlation/covariation. The alternation of red and green traffic lights is information because it is (quite strictly) correlated with the times when it is safe to drive through the intersection; thus driving in accordance with the lights is adaptive (causative of survival). Daylength is usefully, though less strictly, correlated with the optimal time to breed. Information in the sense of covariance implies what is adaptive; if an animal can infer what (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. The Good of Non-Sentient Entities: Organisms, Artifacts, and Synthetic Biology.John Basl & Ronald Sandler - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (4):697-705.
    Synthetic organisms are at the same time organisms and artifacts. In this paper we aim to determine whether such entities have a good of their own, and so are candidates for being directly morally considerable. We argue that the good of non-sentient organisms is grounded in an etiological account of teleology, on which non-sentient organisms can come to be teleologically organized on the basis of their natural selection etiology. After defending this account of teleology, we argue that there are no (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  38. Species Concepts and Natural Goodness.Judith K. Crane & Ronald Sandler - 2011 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Carving Nature at its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science. MIT Press. pp. 289.
    This chapter defends a pluralist understanding of species on which a normative species concept is viable and can support natural goodness evaluations. The central question here is thus: Since organisms are to be evaluated as members of their species, how does a proper understanding of species affect the feasibility of natural goodness evaluations? Philippa Foot has argued for a form of natural goodness evaluation in which living things are evaluated by how well fitted they are for flourishing as members of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  39.  78
    Ronald Sandler and Philip Cafaro, Environmental Virtue Ethics. [REVIEW]Jason Kawall - 2006 - Environmental Ethics 28 (4):429-32.
    A short review of "Environmental Virtue Ethics" (2005), a collection edited by Ronald Sandler and Philip Cafaro.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Identity and Distinction in Spinoza's Ethics.Judith K. Crane & Ronald Sandler - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2):188–200.
    In Ethics 1p5, Spinoza asserts that “In Nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute”. This claim serves as a crucial premise in Spinoza’s argument for substance monism, yet Spinoza’s demonstration of the 1p5 claim is surprisingly brief and appears to have obvious difficulties. This paper answers the principle difficulties that have been raised in response to Spinoza’s argument for 1p5. The key to understanding the 1p5 argument lies in a proper understanding of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  41. A Bargaining Game Analysis of International Climate Negotiations.John Basl, Ronald Sandler, Rory Smead & Patrick Forber - 2014 - Nature Climate Change 4:442-445.
    Climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change have so far failed to achieve a robust international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Game theory has been used to investigate possible climate negotiation solutions and strategies for accomplishing them. Negotiations have been primarily modelled as public goods games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, though coordination games or games of conflict have also been used. Many of these models have solutions, in the form of equilibria, corresponding to possible (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. Wisdom in the University.Nicholas Maxwell & Ronald Barnett - 2008 - Routledge.
    We face grave global problems. We urgently need to learn how to tackle them in wiser, more effective, intelligent and humane ways than we have done so far. This requires that universities become devoted to helping humanity acquire the necessary wisdom to perform the task. But at present universities do not even conceive of their role in these terms. The essays of this book consider what needs to change in the university if it is to help humanity acquire the wisdom (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  43. Transhumanism, Human Dignity, and Moral Status.John Basl & Ronald Sandler - 2010 - American Journal of Bioethics 10 (7):63-66.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44. Ontology and Cognitive Outcomes.David Limbaugh, Jobst Landgrebe, David Kasmier, Ronald Rudnicki, James Llinas & Barry Smith - 2020 - Journal of Knowledge Structures and Systems 1 (1): 3-22.
    The term ‘intelligence’ as used in this paper refers to items of knowledge collected for the sake of assessing and maintaining national security. The intelligence community (IC) of the United States (US) is a community of organizations that collaborate in collecting and processing intelligence for the US. The IC relies on human-machine-based analytic strategies that 1) access and integrate vast amounts of information from disparate sources, 2) continuously process this information, so that, 3) a maximally comprehensive understanding of world actors (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. Toward A Concept of Instrumental Validity: Implications for Psychiatric Diagnosis.Ronald Pies - 2011 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 4 (1):18-19.
    Let’s begin by imagining a hypothetical psychotic illness called “Schneider’s Disease”, recognized for over 100 years. Let’s assume there has been great controversy as regards the “most valid” set of diagnostic criteria for SD.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46.  73
    Ronald Dworkin and the Curious Case of the Floodgates Argument.Noam Gur - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 31 (2):323-345.
    This article juxtaposes a jurisprudential thesis and a practical problem in an attempt to gain critical insight into both. The jurisprudential thesis is Dworkin’s rights thesis. The practical problem revolves around judicial resort to the floodgates argument in civil adjudication (or, more specifically, a version of this argument focused on adjudicative resources, which is dubbed here the FA). The analysis yields three principal observations: (1) Judicial resort to the FA is discordant with the rights thesis. (2) The rights thesis is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47.  84
    An Exchange on Disinterestedness.Arnold Berleant & Ronald Hepburn - 2003 - Contemporary Aesthetics 1.
    The idea of aesthetic disinterestedness has been a central concept in aesthetics since the late eighteenth century. This exchange offers a contemporary reconsideration of disinterestedness from different sides of the question.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  48. Restoring Emotion's Bad Rep: The Moral Randomness of Norms.Ronald De Sousa - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):29-47.
    Despite the fact that common sense taxes emotions with irrationality, philosophers have, by and large, celebrated their functionality. They are credited with motivating, steadying, shaping or harmonizing our dispositions to act, and with policing norms of social behaviour. It's time to restore emotion's bad rep. To this end, I shall argue that we should expect that some of the “norms” enforced by emotions will be unevenly distributed among the members of our species, and may be dysfunctional at the individual, social, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  49. "We-Subjectivity": Husserl on Community and Communal Constitution.Ronald McIntyre - 2012 - In Christel Fricke & Dagfinn Føllesdal (eds.), Intersubjectivity and Objectivity in Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl. Ontos. pp. 61-92.
    I experience the world as comprising not only pluralities of individual persons but also interpersonal communal unities – groups, teams, societies, cultures, etc. The world, as experienced or "constituted", is a social world, a “spiritual” world. How are these social communities experienced as communities and distinguished from one another? What does it mean to be a “community”? And how do I constitute myself as a member of some communities but not of others? Moreover, the world of experience is not constituted (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  97
    Searle, Syntax, and Observer Relativity.Ronald P. Endicott - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):101-122.
    I focus on and criticize John Searle's argument against a classical computational view of the mind according to which the attribution of syntax is observer relative (in Searle, Rediscovery of Mind, MIT Press, 1992). Searle's argument is interesting inasmuch as it differs from his previous and more well-known argument that syntax is not sufficient for semantics. This argument aims to undercut even the syntax as something that exists only in the eye of the beholder. I show that Searle's argument rests (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 124