A common theme from certain circles during the Yugoslav wars was that the seceding republics lacked a right to secede, but that if a right were accorded them by the EC or international community, it would have to be granted to the Serbian minorities in these republics, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on pain of inconsistency. This microcosm argument is in fact unsound. On a reasonable conception of a right of self-determination and secession elaborated here, the Republic of Bosnia (...) and Herzegovina enjoyed a right of secession, while Bosnian Serbs did not. Nor did Bosnian Serbs restrict their claim to such a right to territories in which they held a majority; rather, they demanded "secession" for a whole swathe of lands which lacked even a Serb plurality before their brutal "ethnic cleansing". Either voluntarist or ethnicist conceptions of a right of secession might have been construed as supporting the microcosm argument, but both of those are terrible conceptions of the right of self-determination and secession. (shrink)

Writing about secession is not an easy task for a political philosopher. Yet, writing about secession in India raises further practical and theoretical problems. The incredible task of professor Chandhoke’s book, Contested Secessions, is thus to provide a restatement of a liberal theory of secession, understood as a remedial right theory, which is still compatible with situations of contested secessions, such as those occurring in post-colonial societies like India. This paper focuses on two distinct yet related aspects (...) of Chandhoke’s theory: her distinctive version of remedial right theory, and her emphasis on a form of comprehensive pluralist liberalism. I argue that this approach might result in inconsistency due to the conflicting demands of these two approaches. If we take seriously Chandhoke’s political claim in favour of the legitimacy of what she calls “formal” democracy, further clarifications are needed with respect to the account of pluralism she proposes. (shrink)

I defend the cosmopolitan instrumentalist theory of secession, according to which a group has a right to secede only if this would promote cosmopolitan justice. I argue that the theory is preferable to other theories of secession because it is an entailment of cosmopolitanism, which is independently attractive, and because, unlike other theories of secession, it allows us to give the answers we want to give in cases like secession of the rich or secession that (...) would make things worse for minorities. I defend the view against the objections that it allows for colonialism and annexation, that it is not a distinct theory, and that it is impractical. (shrink)

This paper explores the question of whether there can be a right to secede from a liberal state by examining the concept of a liberal state and the different forms of liberalism that may be appealed to in order to justify secession. It argues that where the foundations of the state’s legitimacy are conceived in terms of a non-derivative right to self-determination, then secession from a liberal state may be a justified form of action for different types of (...) groups including ‘illiberal’ ones. If, however, a broader definition of political legitimacy is adopted – one that is predicated upon the liberal notions of individual moral autonomy and equality – then the right to independent statehood will generally not include a right to secede from a state that already upholds these principles. Consequently, liberal theorists of secession are forced to choose between particularizing a right of independent statehood to groups trapped in illiberal states, or acknowledging that the right to secede includes a right to establish an ‘illiberal’ state that bestows upon its citizens unequal rights and entitlements other than a right of exit. (shrink)

Allen Buchanan proposes a methodological framework with which theorists may evaluate different theories of secession, including the National Self-Determination theory. An important claim he makes is, because the right to secede is inherently institutional, any adequate theory of secession must include, as an integral part, an analysis of institutional morality. Because the National Self-Determination theory blatantly lacks such an analysis, Buchanan concludes that this theory is inherently flawed. In this paper, I consider Buchanan’s framework and the responses from (...) supporters of national self-determination theory. I try to clarify the confusion shared by both parties. I conclude that, although Buchanan’s theory of institutional morality is sound, his critiques of the national self-determination theory fails. (shrink)

Some have argued that the right of national self-determination gives every national group the power to decide for itself whether to remain part of an existing state or to secede unilaterally and form its own state. Such a theory underpins the claim that Quebec is entitled to decide on its own whether or not to leave Canada. This paper examines the main philosophical arguments for the theory and finds them one-dimensional and inadequate; they fail to take account of the full (...) range of complex issues arising in actual cases of proposed secession. If the right of national self-determination is understood as involving a right of unilateral secession, it cannot be attributed to national groups across the board. It arises only in specific historical circumstances, usually involving oppression or other forms of grave injustice. (shrink)

Dans les années 1997–2002, les Comores, un des plus petits et un des plus jeunes pays d’Afrique, ont été la scène d’un processus de la désagrégation de l’État, qui consistait non seulement en la désintégration effective du pouvoir central dans une partie considérable du territoire de l’archipel, mais également en la sécession des deux îles et l’émergence sur l’une d’elles d’un quasi-État qui, suite au concours de nombreuses circonstances, parvint à mener une existence autonome durant une période de cinq ans. (...) D’après un point de vue rencontré fréquemment, c’est une situation économique précaire qui mena à la crise de l’État aux Comores ainsi qu’à l’intensification des tendances séparatistes dans ce pays. En réalité, le problème de l’effondrement de l’État comorien est bien plus complexe et des prémisses historiques, politiques, sociales et économiques, aussi bien que des facteurs liés à l’environnement y ont contribué. (shrink)

For Rousseau, humankind is in a perpetual state of decay—decadency from an earlier, natural, primitive, and perfect state. For Rousseau, the natural man, or man in the state of beast, was of an era where humankind was unencumbered by that which is now entirely associated with society—that is, “. . . establishment of laws and of the right of property . . . the institution of magistracy . . . and the conversion of legitimate into arbitrary power.” For Kant, humankind (...) is in its natural state. For Kant, nature brings about conditions that continually develop and refine humankind’s dispositions, purposefully setting about societies in order to facilitate a foundation within all civilized society, whereby all of humankind’s goals may be achieved. All matters have their place—placed there by nature, as though with purpose. For Kant, nature intended for humankind to employ reason, to acquiesce to coercion for social cohesion, and to strive to build a society that is ever-increasingly progressing towards perfection. Nature uses humankind’s dispositions, including ‘antagonistic’ behavior to gradually bring about a, “perfectly just civil constitution.” Humankind’s highest goal yet to be achieved is for that just civil constitution to emerge from trial and error (in the form of wars, revolutions, secessions, abdications), over time, ultimately providing for development of other dispositions within a perfect society. (shrink)

The paper studies two fundamentally different forms in which the concept of care makes its comeback in twentieth-century thought. We make use of a distinction made by Peter Sloterdijk, who argues that the ancient and medieval ‘ascetic’ ideal of self-enhancement through practice has re-emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, particularly in the form of a rehabilitation of the Hellenistic notion of self-care (epimeleia heautou) in Michel Foucault’s late ethics. Sloterdijk contrasts this return of self-care with Martin Heidegger’s concept of (...) being-in-the-world as ‘total care’ (Sorge), an utterly ‘secularized’ understanding of the human being as irreducibly world-embedded that rejects the classical ascetic ideal of world-secession. We examine further the historical roots and emergence of these contrasting contemporary reappropriations of care in the Western tradition of thought and show them to be rooted in two different ontologies and ethics of the self as either world-secluded or world-immersed, autonomous or constitutively relational. The historical point of divergence of these two approaches to care, we argue, can be found in the Christian transformation of Hellenistic ethics. (shrink)

Supporters of open borders sometimes argue that the state has no pro tanto right to restrict immigration, because such a right would also entail a right to exclude existing citizens for whatever reasons justify excluding immigrants. These arguments can be defeated by suggesting that people have a right to stay put. I present a new form of the exclusion argument against closed borders which escapes this “right to stay put” reply. I do this by describing a kind of exclusion that (...) has not been discussed in depth, which I call “territorial exclusion.” Territorial exclusion is the process according to which the group that wishes to exclude current citizens secedes from the territory in which those citizens reside. I argue that the wrongness of territorial exclusion explains why there is no pro tanto right for a state to exclude immigrants, because otherwise there would be a pro tanto right for the state to kick people out by seceding from the territory they inhabit. Because kicking people out like this is typically wrong, borders cannot be closed. (shrink)

This essay claims that the violence characterizing the 20th century has been coloured by the clash of two very different senses of legal authority. These two senses of legal authority correspond with two very different contexts of civil violence: state secession and the violence characterizing a challenge to a state-centric legal authority. Conklin argues that the modern legal authority represents a quest for a source or foundation. Such a sense of legal authority, according to Conklin, clashes such a view (...) with the unwritten laws of early Amerindian traditional societies. Conklin argues further that by arguing that the Amerindian sense of legal authority has been concealed in the dominant modern sense of legal authority. (shrink)

Aboriginal claims for self-government in the Americas and Australasia are distinctive for being less about secession—at least so far—than about demanding an innovative rethinking of the regulative norms and institutions within and between already established nation-states. Recent cases in Australia (and Canada) provide an opportunity to consider the nature of such claims, and some of the theoretical implications for regulative conceptions of sovereignty and the rule of law. A general question informing the entire discussion here is: how do particular (...) conceptions of the rule of law affect Aboriginal claims? Can a distinctive body of Aboriginal law survive in a liberal constitutional state already constituted in part by regulative ideals of the rule of law? (shrink)

A number of philosophers argue that the moral value of national identity is sufficient to justify at least a prima facie right of a national community to create its own independent, sovereign state. In the literature, this argument is commonly referred to as the identity argument. In this paper, I consider whether the identity argument successfully proves that a national group is entitled to a state of its own. To do so, I first explain three important steps in the argument (...) and then consider whether they lead to the desired conclusion. My examination reveals that the identity argument relies on the Optimal Protection Principle; however, this principle does not apply to the case of a national community. As a result, the identity argument fails to justify even a prima facie right of a national community to establish its own state. (shrink)

In the history of statehood, separatism is a natural phenomenon rather than something unusual. Separatism is mostly perceived as a group’s seeking to separate one part of the territory of a given country from the rest in order to create a new state organism (secessionism) or to unify within one country lands inhabited by people that form a single ethnocultural community (irredentism). Sometimes the idea of separatism serves as a negotiating strategy for a regional group to get from the state (...) authorities benefits that are minor in comparison to territorial separation, e.g., the governance of a regional community within the framework of territorial autonomy, or better conditions for a region’s integration with the rest of the country. It is often the case, especially during a long-lasting intensification of a regional conflict, that separatism becomes the ideological legitimization for the outbreak and continuance of armed conflict, while the conflict itself turns into a way of life for at least some of its initiators and participants. Postcolonial Africa has been and will be experiencing conflicts of a separatist nature. One example of separatism in Africa that is extremely complex and interesting to the researcher in such problems is the conflict that has taken place since 1983 in the Senegalese region of Casamance. (shrink)

The principle of self-determination, like Janus, has two faces: negative and positive. Often understood as enabling the fracture of states into national components, the principle is better seen as facilitating the creation of multinational frameworks that foster toleration and human rights.

This essay is my short, critical review of Donald Livingston’s anthology, Rethinking the American Union for the Twenty-First Century. The contributors of this anthology all argue for secession as a legal and proper tool for calling the Federal government down in size and power. I critically examine the arguments of the contributors.